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Abstract
As the American political parties have polarized and nationalized, what are the im-
plications for environmental policy? This question is particularly important at the
state and local levels, where many environmental policy decisions are made and im-
plemented, but about which scholars have drawn mixed conclusions. This dissertation
enters the debate to expand understanding of the parties’ role in state-level regula-
tory enforcement; describe and assess changing public attitudes about environmental
protection; and deeply explore local perceptions of an important type of environ-
mental disruption: energy infrastructure. I begin by exploring the public basis for
environmental protection. In paper one, I estimate state-level public opinion about
environmental protection from the late 1970s through 2016. I show that regional
differences in public views about environmental protection have declined, whereas
state publics have sorted more cleanly into partisan camps in every state. I also
find that economic tradeoffs have increased in their importance for shaping Amer-
icans’ environmental views. These data provide a crucial foundation for assessing
the evolution of the state and national parties’ positions about environmental protec-
tion, and exploring the elite rhetoric that may explain the shifting drivers of public
environmental preferences. In the second paper, I ask how party control of state gov-
ernment institutions influences regulatory enforcement in the U.S. Despite growing
evidence for the parties’ influence across the slate of policy issues, scholars have drawn
divergent conclusions regarding the parties’ impact on state environmental policy. I
apply a regression discontinuity design to assess whether party control of state houses
and governors’ mansions causes a meaningful change in Clean Air Act enforcement
between 2000 and 2017. The findings suggest that narrowly elected Republican gover-
nors and legislative majorities reduce enforcement effort, and that the two branches’
influence differs according to their distinct mechanisms of political control over the
bureaucracy. Paper three moves beyond public attitudes about environmental topics
in the abstract to assess local views of one particularly salient environmental topic:
energy. Public views of energy technologies are critical to the United States’ energy
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future, but party and ideology do not contribute much explanatory power in explain-
ing Americans’ views of the energy system. I apply a framework rooted in social
psychology to explain how sense of place shapes residents’ interpretations and evalu-
ations of large-scale energy transmission infrastructure as a threat or an opportunity.
Thesis Supervisor: Andrea Campbell
Title: Department Head and Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
Thesis Supervisor: Justin Steil
Title: Assistant Professor of Law and Urban Planning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On August 7, 2017, David Graham of The Atlantic noted the stark contrast between
the appearance of a dysfunctional administration under President Trump’s leadership
and a “shadow government” that was making steady progress in enacting its policy
agenda (Graham, 2017a). The week prior, Congress had failed to pass the Obamacare
repeal, one of Trump’s highest legislative priorities; federal courts were blocking his
“Muslim travel ban;” and Congress was showing little support for funding Trump’s
proposed wall on the U.S. border with Mexico (Graham, 2017b). Yet, Graham wrote,
“Even as the public government sputters, other elements of the Trump administration
are quietly remaking the nation’s regulatory landscape, especially on the environment
and criminal justice” (Graham, 2017a). Graham referred to the Trump administra-
tion’s progress in changing environmental rules, overhauling public-lands administra-
tion, appointing judges, approving infrastructure projects, and other actions that do
not require congressional approval but that dramatically alter the policy landscape.
Graham is not the only student of politics to highlight Trump’s progress in advancing
his agenda outside the legislative arena (e.g., Popovich et al. (2017); Vinik (2017)).
While some of Trump’s positions do not reflect those of the modal Republican
politician, his environmental agenda is typical of an increasingly anti-regulatory Re-
publican party. Several recent governors stand out as exemplars. North Carolina’s
Roy Cooper and his appointed environmental-agency director remade the state De-
partment of Environmental Quality to promote a regulatory regime more favorable
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to industry groups (Gabriel, 2014). After Michigan’s Democratic Governor Jennifer
Granholm merged her state’s environmental agencies to centralize control and tighten
enforcement, her Republican successor Rick Snyder split the agencies again to the ire
of environmentalists (Jackman, 2017). Maine’s Republican Governor Paul LePage
strutted into office in 2011 and pushed sweeping proposals to repeal many of the
state’s environmental regulations (Woodard, 2014).
Data suggest that these anecdotes may indicate general trends. At the federal
level, Republican legislators have become increasingly hostile to policies to protect
the environment–including but not limited to policies that would address climate
change (Kim and Urpelainen, 2017; Shipan and Lowry, 2001; League of Conservation
Voters, 2012). Additionally, state leaders, like federal legislators, may “leapfrog” over
constituency preferences to take more extreme positions than the majority of their
constituents would prefer (Bafumi and Herron, 2010). The public has polarized in
their views about environmental protection, but elite preferences are more extreme
than the attitudes of the parties’ public bases (Skocpol, 2013; Lindaman and Haider-
Markel, 2002). While Snyder, Cooper, and LePage’s actions are consistent with
national trends, we lack the data to assess the generalizability of this fit to other
states.
These examples and trends are also puzzling in light of several historical examples
of environmental leadership by Republican Presidents. Theodore Roosevelt founded
the Forest Service and set aside hundreds of millions of acres of public lands as conser-
vation areas (National Park Service, 2017). Richard Nixon, under substantial public
pressure and prodding by advisors, created the Environmental Protection Agency and
signed the National Environmental Protection Act, Clean Air Act, and Endangered
Species Act (Rinde, 2017).1 George H.W. Bush helped to push through the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, a canonical use of market-based instruments to address
pollution (Stavins, 1998). Bush also signed the Global Change Research Act, which
requires the government to produce a National Climate Assessment every four years
1Nixon’s environmental legacy is far from pristine. For example, he vetoed the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments in 1973, but Congress overrode his veto to establish the law that would
become known as the Clean Water Act.
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(Global Change Research Act, 1990). Even John McCain, until his 2008 Presidential
run, advocated for federal policy to address climate change (Lizza, 2010).
How did we get from the Republican Party of Roosevelt, Nixon, Bush Sr., and
McCain (prior to his presidential run) to the vehemently anti-regulatory Republican
Party of 2018? What does this process imply about how the parties’ leaders and
public bases develop clear, coherent stances about political issues? Are the anecdotal
examples of Republican governors’ shifts towards anti-regulatory views illustrative of
generalizable shifts within state parties? If so, do the policy implications of these shifts
match their rhetorical force, and what can partisan influence over state environmental
policy teach us about the parties’ broader policy influence? How locally pervasive are
the effects of the parties’ increasingly divergent stances on environmental protection,
and what explains policy views and outcomes when partisanship is not the driving
force? These are the questions at the heart of this dissertation.
In Chapter One, “States Divided: Partisan Polarization and Environmental Pro-
tection,” I explore public polarization about environmental protection at the state
level. I compile hundreds of survey responses and adapt Caughey and Warshaw’s
(2015) Bayesian estimation method to measure changing public support for environ-
mental protection among the state parties’ public bases, from the late 1970s through
2016. The data set serves as a new and valid measure of public views about environ-
mental protection at the state level and over time. Prior scholars have relied on proxy
measures like interest group membership and broad measures of ideological liberal-
ism. I use these data to assess the changing explanatory power of regional differences,
partisanship, and economic considerations in driving public support for environmen-
tal protection. I show that regional differences in public views about environmental
protection have declined, with the exception of the West, whereas economic tradeoffs
have increased in their importance for shaping Americans’ environmental views. This
analysis is a crucial first step for understanding the evolution of the parties’ positions
in this issue area. In turn, the analysis can contribute to broader understanding of
how the parties coalesce around consistent positions. There are three leading ex-
planations for how issue positions evolve. In one explanation, party-position change
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originates from state and local party leaders (Schickler, 2016). In the second expla-
nation, national party leaders drive issue evolutions (Carmines and Stimson, 1986;
Adams, 1997). In the third, parties adapt to maintain or expand their coalition of
member groups (Karol, 2009). Leading explanations for the changing Republican
party’s position on environmental protection center around powerful donors from the
oil and gas industry (e.g., (Davenport and Lipton, 2017)), but this explanation re-
mains incomplete without state-level information about public and elite views.
In Chapter Two, “Controlling the Regulators: How Party Control of Government
Shapes Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century,” I assess the parties’ influ-
ence over state-level regulatory enforcement. Despite party leaders’ polarized (Poole
and Rosenthal, 1984, 2001; McCarty et al., 2006; Clinton et al., 2004; Shipan and
Lowry, 2001; Kim and Urpelainen, 2017) and nationalized (Hopkins, 2018) positions
about environmental protection, scholars have returned mixed conclusions regard-
ing the implications of partisan politics for environmental policy (Ringquist, 1993a,
1994; Medler, 1989; Ka and Teske, 2002; Potoski and Woods, 2002; Yi and Feiock,
2014; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2018; Ka and Teske, 2002; Daley and Garand,
2005; Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016; Konisky and Woods, 2012). More generally, most
knowledge about the parties’ influence on state policy comes from studies of legislative
outputs (Caughey et al., 2017; Kousser, 2002; Chen, 2007; Yates and Fording, 2005;
Reed, 2006). These make up only a fraction of the work of government and leave
out policy implementation, enforcement, and enactments emitted by the bureaucracy
rather than the legislature. A great deal of environmental policy occurs outside of
the legislature and at the state level, and the analysis assesses how partisan politics
influences this administrative realm. I apply a regression discontinuity design to as-
sess whether Republican control of state houses and governors’ mansions causes a
change in the number of enforcement actions state agencies report between 2000 and
2017. I find that narrowly elected Republican governors and state legislatie majorities
reduce regulatory enforcement, but that influence from the executive and legislative
branches differs according to their distinct mechanisms of political influence. The
analysis shows that elections have consequences for regulatory enforcement. Because
16
of the importance of enforcement for promoting compliance with the Clean Air Act
and improving environmental performance (Shimshack, 2014; Gray and Shimshack,
2011; Gray and Shadbegian, 2007), this means elections have consequences for envi-
ronmental quality and public health in the U.S.
In Chapter Three, “Backyard Voices: How Sense of Place Shapes Views of Large-
Scale Energy Transmission Infrastructure,” I move beyond public attitudes about
environmental topics in the abstract to assess local views of specific environmental
disruptions. Local political questions are often described as more “technical” than
ideological (Trounstine, 2010, p. 416),2 and some work shows that partisanship does
not contribute much explanatory power to Americans’ views of the energy system
(Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2014). This raises questions about the ideas, identities,
and meanings that shape local political discourses. Energy scholars have found that
perceived socioeconomic impacts shape public discourse around energy siting deci-
sions (Slattery et al., 2012; Bidwell, 2013; Brannstrom et al., 2011; Larson and Kran-
nich, 2016; Abbott, 2010; Walker et al., 2014; Songsore and Buzzelli, 2015). There is
wide variation in how individuals and coalitions portray and interpret these impacts
though, and the survey-based literature does not illuminate the forces shaping these
perceptions. Thus, I focus on perceptions of socioeconomic impacts to explain dis-
tinctions between supporters’ and opponents’ perceptions and portrayals of project
impacts. I conduct semi-structured interviews with residents and stakeholders along
the routes of two large-scale transmission projects in the American Midwest. Apply-
ing a framework rooted in social psychology (Devine-Wright, 2009), I show how place
sentiments shape interpretations and evaluations of the infrastructure proposed for
two case sites. The geographic scale of place attachments informs the definitions of
values and principles residents use to evaluate proposed disruptions. Additionally,
the symbolic meanings people associate with their communities–particularly those
associated with economic identities and aesthetic qualities–shape views of direct and
second-order economic impacts.
2Though see de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) for evidence of partisan effects on municipal
policy
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Taken together, these papers advance understanding of the implications of parti-
san politics for environmental policy, and of the extra-partisan drivers of local envi-
ronmental policy. Chapter One builds from the widely acknowledged polarization of
Americans’ political attitudes to describe state-level environmental attitudes, exam-
ine the relationship between environmental attitudes and ideology, and explore how
the drivers of environmental attitudes have changed over time. Chapter Two extends
the growing consensus that party control of government institutions causes meaning-
ful shifts in states’ legislative programs. I develop theoretical predictions for how the
executive and legislative branches of government influence bureaucratic behavior. I
test these predictions and provide evidence for partisan influence over administrative
policy, and for the differential mechanisms of control available to the two branches.
Chapter Three builds from survey research showing that perceived socioeconomic im-
pacts shape Americans’ willingness to accept energy infrastructure, and that place
sentiments shape interpretations and evaluations of community disruptions. I apply
the sense-of-place framework in the transmission infrastructure context, focusing on
how the scale and content of place attachment interact to shape perceptions. The
application contributes to conceptual and empirical explanations of public attitudes
about the U.S. energy system, by illuminating the sources of public perceptions of
proposed projects prior to their approval and construction.
18
Chapter 2
States Divided: Partisan Polarization
and Environmental Protection
2.1 Introduction
Scholars have provided tremendous insights concerning the nature of public attitudes
about environmental issues, highlighting the increasingly strong role that partisanship
plays in shaping public opinion about the environment (McCright and Dunlap, 2011;
Egan and Mullin, 2012; McCright et al., 2014; Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008; Guber,
2013; Carmichael and Brulle, 2017; Lindaman and Haider-Markel, 2002). Legislators–
partially due to the influence of activists, industry groups, and think tanks–have also
become more divergent in their views about environmental protection (Oreskes and
Conway, 2011; Layzer, 2012; Jacques et al., 2008; Skocpol, 2013; Shipan and Lowry,
2001; Kim and Urpelainen, 2017), and these increasingly polarized elite cues have
contributed to public polarization (Brulle et al., 2012; Carmichael and Brulle, 2017).
What scholars have not assessed, however, is the degree to which these dynamics
extend to the state level. This question is particularly important due to the strong
role that states play in environmental policy making and scholars’ increasing focus
on cities and states for leadership in climate policy (Rabe, 2004, 2006; Betsill and
Bulkeley, 2006; Betsill and Rabe, 2009; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013).
A direct measure of state-level support for environmental protection would open
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at least three research avenues in environmental politics and political science more
broadly. First, scholars investigating the drivers of environmental and energy policy
have used a variety of proxies for state-level environmental concern, due to a lack
of direct measures. These proxies include broad measures of ideology (Berry et al.,
1998), rates of membership in interest groups like the Sierra Club (e.g., Bromley-
Trujillo et al. (2016); List and Sturm (2006)), or voting-based measures of legislator
support for environmental protection (e.g., Lyon and Yin (2010); Ringquist (1993a);
Cragg et al. (2013)). These measures are conceptually invalid: the link between
ideology and environmental concerns may vary over time, group membership reflects
the presence of issue publics rather than median opinion, and legislative scorecards
reflect elite–not public–views. Scholars of state environmental policy need a valid
measure of state-level public support for environmental protection.
Second, scholars have argued that regional and economic characteristics define
public and elite views and environmental policy choices, rather than (or in addition
to) partisan considerations (Layzer, 2011; Shipan and Lowry, 2001; Woods and Bara-
nowski, 2006). This contradicts recent work on the parties’ nationalization, wherein
scholars have observed that neither state- nor local-level concerns distinguish state
parties from each other (Hopkins, 2018). If this is true of party positions about en-
vironmental protection, and if state parties influence state policy (Caughey et al.,
2017; Kousser, 2002; Chen, 2007; Yates and Fording, 2005; Reed, 2006; Besley and
Case, 2003), then expectations about state experimentation with climate and environ-
mental policy should be tempered. A state-level measure of environmental concern
would help scholars adjudicate between these substantively important claims and
better assess political representaton in the environmental policy arena. Third, the
environmental policy arena makes a felicitous case for assessing the drivers of mass
and elite partisan position change, particularly due to the regional differentiation that
has characterized views on this topic. Adjudicating between competing theories of
issue evolution (e.g., Schickler (2016); Carmines and Stimson (1986); Karol (2009))
necessitates measures of issue-specific public (and elite) opinion.
This study begins to address these gaps by describing and assessing the evolu-
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tion of public views toward environmental protection at the state and state-party
level. I compile a large dataset of survey responses gauging environmental concern
and support for policies to protect the environment. I adapt the modeling framework
developed by Caughey and Warshaw (2015) to estimate median opinion among state
and state-party publics, from 1976 through 2016. The data show that environmental
polarization has been ubiquitous around the country, but that states follow two broad
patterns of polarization: divergent and parallel trends. National trends are generally
consistent with broad measures of ideology, although the two trends do diverge at
certain points. I next assess the changing influence of economic factors, geographic
variation, and partisanship in predicting environmental concern around the country. I
find that public environmental attitudes have declined in their geographic differentia-
bility, with the exception of the Western region. There, public environmentalism has
increased over time and is robust to controlling for partisanship. I also find that eco-
nomic performance has increased in its importance for shaping public environmental
attitudes. The descriptive data provide the foundation for studying the relationship
between public views and state party positions, the role of state parties in shaping
environmental policy agendas and outcomes, and the process by which state parties
and state publics may have contributed or responded to changes in the national elite
discourse.
2.2 Background: Public opinion and environmental
protection
In light of the strong role that partisanship plays in shaping Americans’ opinions about
policy and politics (Lenz, 2013; Gerber and Huber, 2009; Zaller, 1992; Green et al.,
2004), why is it worthwhile to measure subnational public opinion about environ-
mental protection? Despite the growing use of ideological scales to measure citizens’
opinions and politicians’ responsiveness to them, this choice may inaccurately cap-
ture public attitudes and is inappropriate for some analyses. The debate about how
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to measure public opinion grew out of Converse’s (1964) observation that individu-
als’ political views are poorly constrained by any underlying ideological coherence.
Subsequent scholarship suggests that individuals’ opinions may be relatively stable
but subject to stochastic variation. Imperfect survey instruments or anomalies of the
political moment within which a survey is administered may explain this variation
(Achen, 1975; Page and Shapiro, 1992). Aggregating across individuals and conceptu-
alizing public opinion as a distribution can smooth this error (Page and Shapiro, 1992;
Erikson et al., 2002; Stimson, 2004). Furthermore, as the parties have begun to send
stronger and more coherent cues about policy preferences, public opinion has become
more structured (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). The upshot of the debate is that
a growing group of scholars argues that public opinion can be accurately estimated
using only one dimension (Stimson, 2004; Erikson et al., 2002; Jessee, 2009; Caughey
and Warshaw, 2017; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013; Enns and Koch, 2013). Ac-
cording to this view, knowing an individual’s “ideology” would allow a researcher to
know her preferences on a range of policy issues.
Other work shows that members of the public are ideologically mixed, and that
collapsing public opinion to a single dimension can lead to erroneous conclusions
(Broockman, 2016). For example, scholars using single-dimensional scales of public
opinion have raised alarms about poor representation in legislatures, due to the ap-
parent observation that legislators’ decisions reflect more extreme views than those
of their constituents (Fiorina and Abrams, 2009; Caughey and Warshaw, 2016; Ba-
fumi and Herron, 2010; Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Levendusky, 2009; Fowler and
Hall, 2015; Clinton, 2006). Comparing constituents’ and legislators’ views about spe-
cific issues leads to a different conclusion about representation, however. Legislators
taking “extreme” positions (when viewed on a single-dimensional scale) may be vot-
ing in alignment with the majority of their constituents across the slate of issues,
if constituents are ideologically “mixed” rather than “moderate” (Ahler and Broock-
man, 2018). The difference between these conclusions stems from the choice of us-
ing single-dimensional ideological scales or issue-specific measures of public opinion.
The divergent conclusions–and theoretical work suggesting differential representation
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across issues–suggest the need for more research, at least some of which should be
built around issue-specific measures of public opinion.
Moreover, at least four important questions about politics are best answered with
issue-specific measures of public opinion. The first, easy, example is research into
the drivers of opinion or policy in a particular substantive area, such as the environ-
ment (e.g., (Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017; Kim and Urpelainen, 2017, 2018;
Ringquist, 1993a; Konisky et al., 2008)). Here, most scholarship has used cross-
sectional (e.g. Howe et al. (2013)), nationally aggregated (e.g. Carmichael and Brulle
(2017)), or geographically undifferentiated (e.g. McCright et al. (2014); Guber (2013);
Lindaman and Haider-Markel (2002)) measures of environmental concern, or prox-
ies such as membership in interest groups like the Sierra Club (e.g. List and Sturm
(2006); Bromley-Trujillo et al. (2016)). A time series of subnational issue-specific
public opinion would better suit these analyses. Second, and of broader interest to
political scientists, theory suggests that candidates for office cater their campaigns
to certain issues, to attract voters in places that care about these issues (List and
Sturm, 2006). Assessing this claim demands issue-specific measures of constituency
opinion. Third, scholars have found evidence for variation in responsiveness to public
opinion on different issues (Erikson, 1978; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Page and Shapiro,
1983; Canes-Wrone et al., 2011) or in different institutional or temporal contexts (Lax
and Phillips, 2012, 2009). Developing a complete understanding of variation in re-
sponsiveness across time, space, and issues requires issue-specific measures of public
opinion and legislator positions. Fourth, understanding the process by which the par-
ties develop their strong and coherent stances on different issues necessitates the use
of issue-specific measures of public and elite views. Current theory and evidence clus-
ter around just a few issues (e.g., abortion and civil rights) (Adams, 1997; Carmines
and Stimson, 1986; Schickler, 2016), leading to a partial picture of the evolution of
political issues. Explaining substantive policy outcomes, assessing the use of differ-
ent issues in campaigns, characterizing variation in responsiveness and accountability
across issues, and developing the theory of issue evolution necessitates issue-specific
measures of public opinion.
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Existing measures of issue-specific public opinion fall short in their utility for these
areas of inquiry. Some measures are subnational but cross-sectional, while most exist-
ing time series of opinion are nationally aggregated. Some studies measure national
policy mood on particular issues across a long time span (e.g., Brulle et al. (2012);
Carmichael and Brulle (2017); Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2009)). Legislators respond
to public opinion in their states or districts; nationally aggregated measures there-
fore cannot be used to assess legislative accountability or responsiveness. Nationally
aggregated measures also do not facilitate assessment of the sub-national drivers or
responses to party-position change. Scholars often study representation and account-
ability by gauging views towards specific legislative proposals. These measures are
cross-sectional by definition (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Levendusky, 2009; Abramowitz,
2010; Layman et al., 2010). This limits their utility for studying processes that un-
fold over many years, or incorporating temporal variation into assessments of these
processes. Also, since most Americans pay little attention to politics, it may be un-
realistic to expect them to have meaningful preferences about policy proposals in
the legislature (Converse, 1964; Bartels, 2003; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Moreover,
individual survey items are subject to error generated from question order and word-
ing (Achen, 1975; Ansolabehere et al., 2008) or other stochastic “considerations” that
influence responses (Zaller, 1992). These observations about the nature of survey re-
sponses provoke caution in relying on overly specific survey questions, or even relying
on individual-level survey data at all.
The approach presented here addresses both these shortcomings by pooling re-
sponses to many survey items and estimating public opinion at the state level and
over a long time period. While it may be unreasonable to expect most citizens to
have real preferences for very specific policy proposals (Berinsky, 2017), individuals
have meaningful general orientations toward different issues (Zaller, 1992; Bartels,
2003). Of particular relevance to the present study, scholarship suggests that the
same latent “common cause” structures individuals’ views of environmental protec-
tion (Guber, 2013, p. 101). Moreover, scholars have have shown that, on aggregate,
public opinion sends a meaningful signal and responds to politics in rational ways
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(Page and Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, 2004). Aggregation allows researchers to capture
a meaningful signal of public orientation towards politics. If public attitudes may not
be accurately captured by ideological scales Broockman (2016), and if public opinion
is most accurately described in aggregates, then public views may be most accurately
estimated using aggregated measures of issue-specific views. I present such a set of
estimates in this paper.
The estimates reflect state publics’ general orientation towards government effort
to prioritize environmental protection, under the assumption that this orientation
drives public support or opposition for a range of specific policies. I estimate this
construct from the late 1970s to 2016. In section 2.5 I present figures describing
public attitudes about environmental concern. I also present the results of predic-
tive models describing the changing drivers of environmental attitudes. The data
open new opportunities for studying processes including issue evolution and polar-
ization, and for incorporating institutions, economic change, and other temporally or
geographically varying dynamics into studies of representation and accountability.
2.3 Methods: Dynamic, group-level item-response
theory model of environmental concern
Measuring state-level environmental concern over time presents two main measure-
ment challenges. First, few surveys have asked the same question about environmen-
tal protection over a long time period. This poses a challenge for measuring public
opinion over time. Second, large-sample national surveys are not designed to draw
representative samples from each state. This poses a challenge for estimating state-
level public opinion. I address these challenges by adapting the dynamic, hierarchical
group-level item-response theory (DGIRT) model developed by Caughey and War-
shaw (2015). First, I gather a large and comprehensive dataset of publicly available
survey questions gauging Americans’ attitudes about environmental protection. Next,
I use these data to estimate the median level of environmental concern for each state
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in each year. I also estimate median attitudes among state partisans in each year.
Whereas scholars such as Levendusky (2009) and Lax and Phillips (2009) have
studied issue-specific opinion using survey data about very specific policies, this anal-
ysis instead conceptualizes issue attitudes as a latent construct that underlies in-
dividuals’ views of issues and policy proposals. This conceptualization comports
theoretically with an important branch of research stemming from Converse’s (1964)
pessimistic view of ideological constraint among the mass public. Individuals’ opin-
ions may be relatively stable but subject to stochastic variation (Achen, 1975; Page
and Shapiro, 1992). Scholars can smooth out error due to survey instruments by using
a battery of related questions, rather than a single survey item (Ansolabehere et al.,
2008). This insight underpins scaled measures of ideology and opinion. Respondent-
level stochasticity can be smoothed by aggregating across individuals and conceptu-
alizing public opinion as a distribution, since the public as a whole moves in rational
ways (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Erikson et al., 2002; Stimson, 2004). The model I
deploy in this study incorporates both of these insights.
The modeling approach builds upon item-response theory (IRT), multilevel re-
gression and post-stratification (MRP), and dynamic linear modeling (DLM) to gen-
erate annual estimates of environmental-policy preferences in each state-party-year
(Caughey and Warshaw, 2015). IRT combines responses to different survey ques-
tions into a single measure of latent policy views. Aggregating questions smooths
survey-specific error, by pooling responses to as many high-quality survey questions
as available (Ansolabehere et al., 2008; Tausanovitch and Warshaw, 2013). In an
individual-level IRT model, question responses are jointly determined by respondents’
score on some unobserved trait–in this case, their level of support for environmental-
protection measures–and by the characteristics of the survey question. Typically,
the latent trait is modeled using responses to several questions, but the model I
use does not require each individual to answer more than one question. Instead, I
model group-level opinion, assuming that individuals’ opinion within each group is
distributed normally around the group mean.
MRP leverages the predictive power of groups and models the relationship be-
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tween demographic and geographic covariates and survey responses. In the MRP
framework, researchers estimate a multilevel model that predicts opinion based on
geographic and demographic covariates, and use that information to predict public
opinion for all combinations of demographic covariates in each geographic subunit–
in this case, the state and the state-party (Park et al., 2004). Median opinion for
each geographic subunit is a weighted average: the sum of opinion within each de-
mographic stratum, weighted by the proportion of the stratum in the subunit. The
model borrows information from similar demographic groups and similar places to
improve the accuracy of group means in each place.
The choice to incorporate grouping variables into the model implies a tradeoff
between bias and variance. Using groups reduces variance: leveraging the predictive
power of groups can improve estimates in states with small samples, by incorporating
information about those groups in other states. Using groups can also bias estimates
for states with few respondents, by pulling the estimates towards other similar states.
In the Appendix I present results from a variety of specifications using race,1 party,
and state of residence as hierarchical predictors,2 and without using hierarchical pre-
dictors. The main results are estimated with only state intercepts. These estimates
appear to perform best, based on comparisons (included in the Appendix) with other
existing measures of ideology and environmental concern.
In addition to pooling information between states using demographic predictors,
researchers also often estimate state-specific intercepts based on economic, political, or
demographic covariates at the state level. Using state-level predictors further pools
information between states with similar economic structures, demographic popula-
tions, or other characteristics. In general, since multilevel modeling reduces variance,
it is more appropriate for estimates designed for use as independent variables. This
is because measurement error in the independent variable produces attenuation bias
1I define race as black non-hispanic (where specified) and non-black, which includes white and other
race categories. I define race this way because many early surveys did not include hispanic, Asian,
American Indian or Alaskan native, or other race groups as response options. Thus, this is the
finest-grained definition that allows for the inclusion of all respondents in the data.
2 Future iterations of the model may also incorporate education and gender as demographic predic-
tors.
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in regression coefficients, whereas measurement error in the dependent variable is less
worrisome (Angrist and Pischke, 2014). I use state-level intercepts in the models
presented here, but I do not use state-level predictors. In Appendix A.2, I discuss a
number of other decisions I make about data and model specifications, including the
tradeoffs associated with each.
The model is dynamic, which enables me to estimate issue-specific opinion over
time. As MRP borrows strength within groups and between places to improve es-
timates, DLMs allow the model to borrow strength across time (Martin and Quinn,
2002; Jackman, 2005; Linzer, 2013). The model treats each demographic and geo-
graphic hierarchical parameter’s value in one period as the prior for its value in the
next period, using DLM to model changes in the parameters (Caughey and Warshaw,
2015). While the group and state parameters’ values change over time, I hold the
parameter for each survey item constant. This enables overtime comparison of public
attitudes. Holding item parameters constant implies that the latent-variable measure
has the same meaning each year.
In sum, I estimate the opinion of groups defined by states, parties, and race, using
MRP and DLM to estimate parameters for each group in each year and IRT to produce
a scaled response from many survey items. Then I estimate average latent opinion in
each state and state-party as the weighted sum of group-level opinion in that state
and state-party. Modeling public opinion about environmental protection as a latent
construct allows me to improve the reliability of estimates because they are produced
from a battery of questions rather than from a single survey item that may produce
biased responses (Ansolabehere et al., 2008). Additionally, the model allows me to
measure public opinion at the state level, over time. By estimating public opinion
along a single dimension though, I lose the ability to distinguish between attitudes
about different environmental issues. For example, I pool questions about pollution
and conservation, under the assumption that responses to both are related to the
same latent dimension. One exception is climate change, an issue for which thick
enough survey data exist to enable estimation of a standalone measure of attitudes
about climate change (Bergquist and Warshaw, 2018). I do not include questions
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about climate change in my dataset, for two reasons. First, I assess whether public
concern about environmental topics, broadly defined, has become as polarized as
public concern about climate change. This assessment requires separate measures of
climate concern and environmental concern. Second, I use the climate concern model
(along with Democratic presidential vote share and Caughey and Warshaw’s (2017)
measure of ideological liberalism) to assess the face validity of the estimates developed
here.
2.4 Data: Compiling survey evidence for environ-
mental concern
To estimate state-level support for environmental protection, I sought to collect all
publicly available survey questions gauging Americans’ support for environmental pro-
tection and concern about environmental problems, from the 1970s to the present. I
collected the bulk of the data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at
Cornell University, which aggregates public opinion data from a variety of sources in-
cluding news outlets (e.g., New York Times, ABC News) and think tanks (e.g., Pew,
Public Religion Research Institute). I also obtained data directly from the Cooper-
ative Congressional Election Study, Annenberg National Election Survey, American
National Election Studies, General Social Survey, and Gallup Poll Social Series.
The estimation approach requires that the individual-level data include respon-
dents’ state of residence, race, party identification, and a measure of environmental
concern. In total, I identified 170 surveys which met these prerequisites and were
fielded between 1973 and 2016. The dataset includes 79 distinct question series,
which are grouped into several categories as shown in Table 2.1. Appendix B para-
phrases the wording for each question included in the model, the surveys from which
responses are included for each question, and the years in which each question was
asked.
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Table 2.1: Question Categories Included in the Estimates of Environmental Concern
Category Description
spending Should the government spend more, less, or the same
amount to protect the environment?
policy Do you support government policy to protect the
environment?
worry How much do you worry about environmental
problems?
tradeoffs: energy Should we prioritize energy production or
environmental protection?
tradeoffs: economy Should we prioritize economic development or
environmental protection?
voting How important is the environment to your vote?
The table shows the categories of questions included in the model, and a general description of
questions included in each group. Appendix B shows a full list of survey items and sources, and
reflects the differences in wording and response options between surveys.
The full dataset includes over 450,000 survey respondents, and Table 2.2 shows
the samples in each year for which I estimate environmental concern. The dataset
includes many questions that were asked for several years, and some that were asked
in only one year. These single-year questions introduce some variation into the model
that is difficult to model. Thus, I estimate models with and without them. In the
Appendix, I present estimates from models that incorporate single-year questions, but
the results in Section 2.5 include only those items that are asked in more than one
year. Table 2.2 shows the sample sizes for models that include and exclude single-year
items.
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Table 2.2: Annual Samples Used to Estimate Environmental Concern
Samples
Year 2-year item filter All items
1973 5555
1977 2903 5748
1980 3688 9435
1985 4956 8360
1990 3544 6584
1991 1865 2589
1992 7052 8705
1993 2508 4141
1994 3033 4515
1996 3010 6142
1997 1769 3685
1998 2867 6210
2000 28404 29224
2001 10394 10417
2002 3250 5788
2003 2468 4941
2004 9095 9095
2005 970 970
2006 39442 46262
2007 15253 15254
2008 41263 67824
2009 5149 6562
2010 60440 64117
2011 1747 1747
2012 53398 54363
2013 970 5085
2014 2928 55505
2015 3374 3374
2016 1058 2440
This table shows the annual samples for each year included in the model. Column 2 shows samples
for the model estimated with items asked in two or more years. Column 3 shows samples for the
model estimated using all items. Missing years for the early part of the time period reflect years for
which samples were small enough to necessitate combining several years of data.
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The dynamic nature of the model is facilitated by “bridge” questions which are
asked in multiple years. These bridge series overlap with each other in the span of
time across which they are asked, but no bridge question spans the full time series
included in the model. They form the glue that allows me to estimate public opinion
across the full time span covered in the data, and to estimate item parameters for
discrete questions asked in a given year. Figure 2-1 illustrates the importance of bridge
questions for estimating the model. The figure shows the annual average responses to
four questions. None of the series covers the full time span included in the model, but
they do follow similar trends for the spans of time when they overlap. Each question
provides a bridge between a) the questions asked during different parts of the time
spans they cover and b) discrete questions and the estimated latent variable.
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Figure 2-1: Bridge questions allow for estimation of time-series measures of public
opinion
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The figure shows average responses among Republicans (red), Democrats (blue), and Independents
(gray) for four of the questions asked over many years in the data. High levels on the y axis
indicate higher levels of support for environmental protection, but the scales for the four questions
are different due to variation in response options for each. The points reflect the size of the national
sample of party-identifying respondents answering each question in each year. The figure illustrates
that trends tend to correlate strongly across question series, but that no series covers the full time
span of the analysis. These bridging series form the glue that allow me to estimate the latent
construct for the entire panel of state-years.
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The precise question wording and response options offered to respondents vary
across surveys. I preserved the multinomial or bivariate structure of response options
from the original surveys, rather than collapsing multinomial responses into binary
bins. Where necessary, I re-ordered the original response options, such that higher
responses always indicate higher levels of support for environmental protection. For
all items, zero represents the lowest level of environmental concern or support for
environmental protection. I coded questions with exactly the same wording and
response options as the same item, and I used annual cross-tabs from each survey to
verify the validity of this coding scheme. Conversely, I coded questions with distinct
wording and response options as distinct items. I also coded as distinct items any
question asking whether the government should adjust its spending on environmental
protection. This is because the meaning of responses to spending questions varies
annually, according to the federal budget. The decision to maintain these items
as discrete is a substantial departure from prior work gauging state-level attitudes
about environmental protection (Kim and Urpelainen, 2018).3 As shown in Figure
2-2, trends in attitudes about spending and other questions in the data set correlate
strongly. Nonetheless, I do not use the spending question as a bridging question since
it is conceptually distinct.
3This choice is one feature that differentiates the estimates presented here from those presented in
Kim and Urpelainen (2018). Their estimates are derived from MRP analysis of the General Social
Survey’s (GSS) question about environmental spending. The estimates presented here smooth
out sampling error using item-response theory, do not assume independence over time in state
opinion, incorporate many more respondents than the GSS offers, and are more suitable for overtime
comparison because they are not tied to the federal budget.
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Figure 2-2: Attitudes about environmental spending over time
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This figure shows changing preferences for whether the government should increase, decrease, or
maintain the current level of environmental spending in each year (National Opinion Research Cor-
poration, 2017). I do not use this series as a bridging question in the model, since its meaning
changes each year with the federal budget.
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Consistent with most MRP applications, U.S. Census and American Community
Survey data form the basis by which I estimate the proportion of each demographic
group in each state-year. Since the U.S. Census Bureau does not collect individuals’
party identification, I must combine the Census strata with another dataset to esti-
mate public opinion by party. I use the estimated proportion of each stratum that is
composed of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans, based on the “supersurvey”
collected by Caughey and Warshaw (2017).4 These estimated proportions are quite
precise due to the enormous sample of responses included in Caughey and Warshaw’s
(2017) estimates of mass liberalism.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 National trends in environmental concern
Figure 2-3 shows national trends in public concern about environmental protection
since 1976, among Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.5 The figure shows
that the two parties have diverged dramatically in their levels of support for environ-
mental protection. These trends are not particularly novel, since prior work shows
that public opinion about climate change has become quite polarized at the national
level (McCright et al., 2014; McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Guber, 2013; Baldassarri
and Gelman, 2008; Lindaman and Haider-Markel, 2002), and that national party lead-
ers have diverged in their support for environmental protection (Kim and Urpelainen,
2017; Shipan and Lowry, 2001). Instead, the novelty of the data lie in their level of
aggregation. The data allow for time-series analysis of the drivers and consequences
of environmental concern, at a sub-national level of aggregation.
4Thanks to Chris Warshaw and Devin Caughey for making these data available.
5Figure 2-3 shows results estimated with only those items asked in two or more years.
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Figure 2-3: Increasing polarization about environmental protection
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National polarization in environmental concern
This figure shows trends in environmental concern among Democrats (blue), Republicans (red), and
Independents (black), between 1976 and 2016. The estimates show that the parties have diverged
sharply in their levels of support for environmental protection, after a bipartisan peak in concern in
1990.
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Next I compare national trends in liberalism and environmental concern, to assess
whether the issue-specific measure of environmental concern tells us anything that a
single-dimensional measure of ideology does not.6 Figure 2-4 shows trends in nation-
ally aggregated public ideological liberalism (Caughey and Warshaw, 2017), climate
concern (Bergquist and Warshaw, 2018), and environmental concern between the late
1970s and 2016.
The figure shows that environmental concern (shown in green) rose steadily through-
out the 1980s and reached a peak in 1991. Environmental concern then declined
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, rose in the mid-2000s, and declined again be-
ginning in 2008. Concern hovered until 2010, when it began to tick up again. Broadly,
environmental concern and climate concern reveal similar trends, although climate
concern dips to a more extreme low in 2004.7
6To assess the face validity of the estimates of environmental concern, I also present the cross-
sectional correlations between these estimates in Appendix A.2.
7When measured with all items, instead of filtering out items that are only included in a single year,
the environmental concern estimates dip to more extreme levels in the mid-2000s. Figure A.2-5
shows this trend.
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Figure 2-4: National trends in environmental concern, ideology, and climate concern
AKLAR
AZCAO
CTDC
DEFLGA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSY
LAM
MDEMIN
OS
MT
NC
ND
E
NH
NJ
NMV
Y
OHOKR
PA
RISC
S
T
TX
UT
V
V
WWIV
WY
AK
AL
AR
Z
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSKY
LAMA
MDME
MI
MN
OMS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NMNV
NY
OH
OK
PA
RISC
SD
TN
TX
UT
V
VT
WAWIV
WY
AK
AL
AR
ZCACO
CT
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KSKY
LAMA
MDE
MIMN
OS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NMV
NY
OH
OKR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
W
WIV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CAO
CT
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSKY
LA
MA
MDE
MINMOS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NMNV
NY
OH
OKOR
PA
RI
SC
SD
T
TX
UT
VA
V
W
W
WV
WY
AKL
AR
AZCAO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MIN
MO
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NHJ
NMV
NY
OH
OKOR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
V
W
WI
WV
WY
AKL
AR
AZCACO
CT
DC
DEFL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KSKY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MIN
MOMS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NHJ
NMNV
NY
OH
OKR
PA
RI
SC
S
TN
TX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKLARAZCACO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSY
L
MA
MD
ME
MIMN
MO
MT
NC
NNE
NHJ
NM
NV
NY
OHOKO
PA
RI
SC
S
T
TX
UT
VA
VT
W
WIWV
WY
AKAL
ARAZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
ILIN
KSY
LA
MA
MD
M
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NHNJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OKOR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
V
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKAL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
ILIN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NHNJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OKOR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKL
ARZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
ILIN
KSKY
LA
MA
MD
M
MIN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
V
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKAL
ARAZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
ILIN
KSKY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MIN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OKOR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DEFL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KSY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MIMN
MO
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NMNV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKAL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DEFL
GA
HI
IA
ID
ILIN
KSY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
M
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
V
Y
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKAL
ARAZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DEFLGA
HI
IA
ID
ILN
KSKY
LA
MA
MD
M
MIMN
M
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NHNJ
NM
V
Y
OH
OK
R
P
RI
SC
SD
TNTX
UT
VA
VT
W I
WV
WY
AK
ALRZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DEFLGA
HI
IA
ID
ILINKSKY
L
MA
MDME
MIMNMOS
MT
NC
NDNE
NHNJNM
V
Y
OH
OK
ORP
RI
S
S
TNTX
UT
V
VT
WW
WV
WY
AKALARZ
CACO
CT
DC
DEFLGA
HI
IA
ID
ILNKSY
L
MA
MDM
MI
MN
MOS
MT
NC
NNE
NHNJM
V
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
SD
TTX
UT
V
VT
W
WI
WV
WY
AK
ALRAZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DEFL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSY
LA
MA
MDM
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
NDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
S
SDTN
TX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
ARZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
L
INKSKY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
NDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
SDTN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
ARAZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKSKY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
N
MO
MS
MT
NC
NDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SDTN
TX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKALARZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
IDIN
KSYL
MA
MD
M
MI
N
MOTNCNDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OHOK
OR
P
R
SSDTXUV
VT
WA
WIWWYAKALARZ
CACOT
DC
DEFLGA
HIIA
ID
INKSYL
MADM INMOTNCNE
NHJMV
NY
OHOK
ORP
R
SDTXUV
VT
WWWWY
AKALRZ
CACOT
DC
DEFLGA
HI
IA
ID
INKSKYL
MA
MDMINMOTNCNDNE
NHJNMV
NY
OHOK
ORP
RI
SDTNXUV
VT
WA
WWWY
AK
ALARZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
INKSYLA
MA
MD
MEMI
MN
MOSMT
NC
NDNE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OHOK
OR
P
RI
SSDTNTXUTV
VT
WA
WI
WVY
AKALRZ
CA
COCT
DC
DEFLGA
HI
IA
IDINKSYL
MAMD
MEIMNMOMTNCNE
NH
J
NM
V
NY
OHOK
ORP
R
SDTNXUTV
VT
W
WIWWY
AKALRAZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
IINKSYLA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MOTNCNDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OHOK
OR
P
RI
SDTNTXUV
VT
WA
WI
WWY
AK
ALAR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
I
INKSKY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
NDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OHOK
OR
PA
RI
SCSTTXU
V
VT
WA
WI
WVWY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
I
INKS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
M
MT
NC
NDE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CTDE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
WA
WI
WV
WY
U
US
US
U
US
U
U
US
US
US
US US
US
U
USUS
US
USUS
USU U U US
US
U
US
US
AK
AL
ARZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IAD
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PARI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WAWI
WV
WY
AK
AL
ARZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
M
MN
MO
MS
T
NCND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
W
WI
WV
WY
AKALAR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
D
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
W
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
D
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MA
MD
MEIN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
V
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VTWA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
R
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
L
M
MD
ME
MIMN
O
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
V
VTWA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
I
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
N
OH
OK
OR
PA
R
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
W
WI
WV
WY
AK
ALAR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
I
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MAMD
MEMIN
MO
MS
MT
NC
E
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
K
ORPA
RI
S
SD
TN
TXVAVTWA
WI
WV
Y
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
MEMI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
N
NE
H
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
N
KS
KY
L
MA
MD
ME
I
MN
MO
MT
C
ND
NE
NH
NJ
M
NV
NY
OH
OK
ORPA
RI
SC
SD
N
TX
UT
V
VT
WA
I
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYL
MA
MD
ME
I
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OPA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VTWAWI
WV
WY
AKAL
AZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
I
IN
KS
KYLA
MA
D
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NMNV
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VAVTWAI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AZ
C
CO
CT
DC
E
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
L
MA
MD
MEI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
J
M
V
NY
OH
OK
RPA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VVT
AI
WV
WY
K
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
F
GA
HI
IA
ID
IN
KS
KYL
A
D
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
E
NH
NJ
MNV
OH
OK
RP
RI
SC
S
TN
TX
U
VA
VT
WAI
V
WY
KAL
AR
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MD
E
MI
MN
MO
M
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
MNV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
S
TN
TX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKL
RAZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
I
ID
IL
IN
KS
KLA
MA
MD
MEN
MO
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NMNV
NY
OH
O
OR
PA
RI
SC
S
T
TX
U
V
VT
WAWI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MAD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
O
OK
OR
P
RI
S
SD
T
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MAMD
MEIN
MO
MS
MT
NC
NE
NH
NJ
NMNV
NY
OH
OK
ORPA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
U
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
A
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
G
HI
A
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
L
MA
MD
MEMIMN
O
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
M
V
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SDTX
UT
V
VT
WA
W
WV
WY
AK
LAR
Z
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
F
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MA
MD
ME
MI
N
MO
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
H
J
MV
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
S
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
AWIV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
G
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
I
MN
MO
MT
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
V
NY
OH
K
OR
PA
RI
SC
S
TX
UT
V
VT
WA
WIV
WY
AK
AL
AZ
CA
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
INKYLA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
E
NH
NJ
NY
OH
O
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WIV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
MI
MN
MO
S
MT
C
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OHOK
OR
PA
RI
SDTNTX
UT
VA
VT
WA
I
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SDTNTX
UT
V
VT
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FLGA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MO
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
S
SDTNTX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MA
MD
ME
MIMN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OHK
OR
PA
RI
S
SDTNX
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
M
M
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
R
PA
RI
SC
SDTNTX
VA
VT
W
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
NDNE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SDTN
TX
VA
VT
W
WI
WV
WY
US
US
US
US
USUSUS
US
US US
US
U
U
U US
US
USUS
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
AK
AL
AR
Z
C
CO
T
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
MA
MD
ME
I
MN
OMS
MT
NC
N
NE
NH
NJ
M
NV
Y
OH
OK
PA
RI
SC
SDTN
V
VT
WAI
V
WY
AK
AL
R
AZ
DC
DE
F
GA
HI
IA
I
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
D
E
MI
N
O
MS
MT
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
PA
I
SC
S
TN
TX
UT
V
VT
A
I
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
C
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
G
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
K
L
MA
MD
E
MNOS
MT
NC
ND
NE
H
NJ
M
V
Y
H
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
X
UT
VA
VT
WAWI
WV
WY
AKAL
AR
AZ
CO
CT
DC
DE
F
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MA
MD
MI
MN
MO
S
MT
C
ND
NE
H
NJ
M
NV
Y
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
T
TX
UT
VA
VT
A
WI
V
WY
AKAL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
M
MD
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
C
ND
NE
NH
J
V
NY
OHOK
R
PA
RI
SC
SD
T
TX
UT
VA
VT
A
W
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CACO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
D
ME
MIMN
MO
MS
T
C
ND
NE
N
NJ
NM
V
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
R
S
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
A
WI
WV
WY
AKAL
ARZ
CA
CO
T
DC
DE
L
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
Y
LA
MA
MD
E
MI
N
S
MT
NC
ND
NE
NJ
V
NY
OH
R
P
RI
S
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WYAKAL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
Y
L
D
ME
I
MN
OMST
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
V
Y
OHOK
O
PASC
SD
TNX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AKAL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
I
ID
IL
IN
KS
KL
MA
MD
ME
MI
N
S
NC
ND
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
H
O
OR
PA
RI
SC
TN
TX
UT
V
VT
W
WI
V
WY
AK
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
N
MO
MSMT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
V
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
S
TTX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
W
WY
AKL
AR
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KYLA
MAMD
ME
I
MN
MOMS
MT
NC
ND
E
NH
NJ
NMV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
S
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI
MN
OS
MT
NC
N
NE
H
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
P
RI
SC
SD
TNX
UT
V
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
O
T
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
I
WV
WY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
T
DE
F
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KSY
L
MA
MD
E
MI
MN
MO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
V
NY
OH
OK
OR
P
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WYAK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MAD
MI
MN
MO
M
MT
NC
ND
NE
H
NM
N
NY
OH
OK
R
PA
RI
S
SD
T
TX
UT
VA
VT
A
WI
WVY
AK
AL
R
AZ
CA
CO
T
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
L
MAD
ME
MI
MNO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
H
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
O
PA
RI
SC
SD
TNTX
UT
VA
V
WA
WI
WVWY
AK
AL
AR
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MAD
ME
MI
MNMO
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
M
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY
US
U
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
U
US
US
−2
0
2
1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016
pu
bl
ic
 o
pi
ni
on
 
(st
an
da
rdi
ze
d) measure
a
a
a
climate
environment
ideology
The figure shows trends in environmental concern, climate concern (Bergquist and Warshaw, 2018),
and mass ideology (Caughey and Warshaw, 2017), between the late 1970s and 2016. The national-
level estimates are post-stratified from a model estimated without race or party group effects, and
all three sets of estimates are standardized within simulation iterations, so that they are comparable
across time and across measures.
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Both climate concern and environmental concern generally follow ideological lib-
eralism with a few notable exceptions. First, environmental concern dips in 1992,
whereas ideological liberalism appears flat between 1991 and 1992. Incidentally, this
is the same year as the Rio Earth Summit, where the Kyoto Protocol originated and
the Convention on Biological Diversity was opened for signatures. Second, between
2000 and 2004, the environmental measures decline even as the public expresses more
liberal policy preferences overall. Both trends then reverse course (in opposite di-
rections) between 2004 and 2006 (the year Al Gore released An Inconvenient Truth,
a documentary about climate change). Third, an uptick in environmental concern
and policy liberalism appear slightly off-sync in the last years of the time series. En-
vironmental concern begins to uptick in 2010, whereas policy liberalism continues
to decline through 2012. These differences suggest some value in measuring issue-
specific public opinion, since the public appears to respond in distinctive ways to
changes in the political and social environment. Future research should investigate
the causes and consequences of these moments when the national ideological mood
and environmental moods are out of sync.
2.5.2 State-level environmental concern and partisan polar-
ization
I next describe the state-level dynamics of partisan polarization concerning environ-
mental protection. Figure 2-5 shows polarization around the country about environ-
mental protection, and suggests that by the year 2012, all state publics had sorted
and diverged such that mass partisans’ views are cleanly differentiated. This finding
is novel, since some scholars and the media have argued that that, at least in some
political moments, regional differences have mattered as much or more than party in
shaping views about climate policy (Layzer, 2011; Bowlin and Brown, 2017). Figure
2-5 shows that environmental protection was not always but is now a polarized issue
in every state around the country. The conservationist wing of the Republican Party
appears to have disappeared everywhere.
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Moreover, both figures show that polarization at the state level is largely driven
by Republicans’ movement away from support for environmental protection, rather
than Democrats becoming more enthusiastic in their environmentalism. This finding
departs from a recent MRP-based analysis of state-level environmental concern (Kim
and Urpelainen, 2018), which found greater movement among Democrats. These
divergent findings raise opportunities for further inquiry into the drivers of opinion
change within both parties.
Figure 2-5: Increasing polarization in the states
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
AL
UT
TX
RI
AZ
MO
OK
AR
NC
VA
WY
MT
OH
FL
WA
ND
NE
NH
ID
WV
TN
PA
MA
NM
KS
HI
MN
AK
US
IA
ME
NV
CO
IN
DE
MD
VT
KY
DC
WI
SD
NJ
IL
CA
GA
NY
LA
MS
MI
OR
CT
SC
−2 −1 0 1 2
1980
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
l l
WY
ID
UT
AL
OK
TN
NE
MT
MO
MS
KS
TX
SC
AR
ND
KY
WV
OH
NV
GA
IN
AZ
AK
NC
FL
PA
VA
SD
LA
DE
US
WI
OR
CO
NJ
IL
MI
MN
IA
ME
CA
NH
CT
NM
WA
MD
MA
NY
RI
HI
VT
DC
−2 −1 0 1 2
2012
The figure shows point estimates and 95% credible intervals for environmental concern among
Democrats (shown in blue) and Republicans (shown in red) in each state. The x axis represents the
latent-variable measure of environmental concern, standardized for comparability over time. The
figure shows that while there is some variation between state-level polarization, overall this issue has
become highly polarized in every state.
In general, states follow two patterns of polarization, as illustrated in Figure 2-
6. In some states, exemplified by Pennsylvania and Arkansas, mass partisans’ views
are differentiated but appear to move in parallel. In other places, exemplified by
Missouri and Delaware, mass partisans’ views have been steadily diverging. Other
states that follow a divergent pattern include Colorado, Arizona, Indiana, Idaho,
Michigan, Maryland, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode
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Island, Ohio, Wyoming, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Utah. These different patterns
provide one plausible entry to exploring the process of state-level polarization on
this issue. What elements of state political context drive public attitudes about
environmental protection, and how do party identifiers react differently to events
that trigger public debate about environmental protection?
Figure 2-6: Two patterns of changing public opinion
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The figure shows four states that illustrate two patterns of polarization in the states. Pennsylvania
and Arkansas show a pattern of parallel trends, where Democrats and Republicans appear to respond
to annual shocks in similar ways within the same state. Delaware and Missouri exemplify a pattern
of divergence, where the public is differentiated along party lines, growing increasingly divergent,
and mass partisans appear to respond to annual shocks in different ways.
2.5.3 The changing drivers of environmental concern
This four-decade panel of state-level environmental concern estimates provides new
analytical leverage in assessing the drivers of public support for environmental pro-
tection. In addition to providing increased statistical power, the state level of aggre-
gation allows me to incorporate sub-national variation (e.g., economic growth), and
the panel structure of the data allows me to assess changes over time in the drivers
of concern. The IRT-based model also smooths out survey-specific error, while still
allowing for a plausible level of analysis. Thus, I next use panel regression to assess
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the changing importance of geography, economic factors, and partisanship as drivers
of environmental concern.
I build on individual-level cross-sectional analyses and national-level time-series
analyses that have assessed the drivers of environmental concern. National-level anal-
yses (Brulle et al., 2012; Carmichael and Brulle, 2017; Kahn and Kotchen, 2010) and
some individual-level studies (Hamilton and Keim, 2009; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012;
Shum, 2012) suggest that support for environmental protection is conditional on eco-
nomic prosperity. A recent causally identified individual-level study does not find ev-
idence that economic recession influences environmental concern (Mildenberger and
Leiserowitz, 2017). This failure to detect an individual-level effect is unsurprising in
light of uneven findings that the American public incorporates economic performance
into its voting decisions (Kramer, 1971; Fiorina, 1978; MacKuen et al., 1992; Green
et al., 1998; Achen and Bartels, 2016). One insightful finding from the economic vot-
ing literature is that media cues and campaign messages are critical if the public is to
incorporate economic information into voting decisions or political views (Page and
Shapiro, 1992; Lenz, 2013, 2009). Some work suggests this is true of environmental
concern also (Carmichael and Brulle, 2017). Thus, it is possible that uneven findings
about the relevance of economic fluctuation to environmental attitudes is due to un-
evenness in political or media messaging about the supposed economy-environment
tradeoff. I offer a rough test of this hypothesis by assessing whether the importance
of economic drivers has changed over time. Future research should assess the mech-
anism underlying the changing salience of the economy in predicting environmental
concern. For example, exploring the influence of party position-taking about this
tradeoff could provide a fruitful line of inquiry.
I also assess whether geographic variation has declined in its importance for pre-
dicting environmental attitudes. Some prior work suggests that environmental con-
cern is differentiated regionally rather than along partisan lines (Shipan and Lowry,
2001; Layzer, 2011). But a number of scholars have shown the increasing impor-
tance of partisanship in predicting environmental attitudes (McCright et al., 2014;
McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Guber, 2013; Lindaman and Haider-Markel, 2002; Kim
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and Urpelainen, 2018). Alongside the broad observation that today’s political envi-
ronment is increasingly nationalized (Hopkins, 2018), we might expect regional differ-
entiation in environmental attitudes to have declined to zero and partisanship to have
increased in its predictive power. I assess whether any regional variation remains, af-
ter controlling for the rising importance of partisanship in predicting environmental
concern.
I use the estimates produced without race or party groups to assess the extent to
which economic factors, partisanship, and regional differences have changed in their
importance for shaping environmental views. To assess change over time, I use a
panel model with interaction terms between decade and each of the three independent
concepts of interest: partisanship, economic health, and geography. I use state and
year fixed effects to control for time-invariant state-level confounding and for over-time
changes that might influence environmental concern around the country. I cluster
standard errors by state to account for serial correlation in state-level opinion. I
operationalize partisanship using the Democratic candidates’ vote share in the most
recent presidential election (MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2017). I use state-
level seasonally adjusted unemployment rates (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017) as
the measure of economic health, and I use the four census regions (United States
Census Bureau, 2018) to test for the effect of geography.
I estimate the model shown in Equation 2.1:
𝑌𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑈𝑠𝑡−1 ∗𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑠𝑡 ∗𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑠𝑡 ∗𝐷𝑠𝑡 +𝑈𝑠𝑡−1 +𝑅𝑠𝑡 +𝐷𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 (2.1)
where 𝑠 and 𝑡 index states and years, respectively, 𝑈 refers to the seasonally-adjusted
unemployment rate, 𝑉 is the Democratic vote share in the most recent presidential
election, 𝐷 is an indicator for each decade in the data set, 𝑅 is an indicator for each
of the four census regions,8 𝛼 and 𝛾 are state and time-specific intercepts, and 𝜖 is an
error term. Table 2.3 shows the results from this analysis.
8The four census regions are Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.
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Table 2.3
Dependent variable:
Vote share (proportion) −0.086∗∗
(0.039)
Unemployment (%) 0.015
(0.019)
1990s: Midwest −0.384∗∗∗
(0.074)
1990s: South −0.290∗∗∗
(0.072)
1990s: West −0.258∗∗∗
(0.076)
2000s: Midwest −0.162∗∗∗
(0.059)
2000s: South −0.122∗∗
(0.052)
2000s: West 0.125∗
(0.069)
2010s: Midwest −0.105
(0.080)
2010s: South −0.082
(0.082)
2010s: West 0.279∗∗
(0.108)
1990s: vote share 0.169∗∗∗
(0.026)
2000s: vote share 0.074∗
(0.039)
2010s: vote share 0.142∗∗∗
(0.055)
1990s: unemployment −0.010
(0.027)
2000s: unemployment −0.081∗∗
(0.035)
2010s: unemployment −0.102∗∗∗
(0.033)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows results from a two-way fixed effect regression of environmental concern on Demo-
cratic presidential vote share, region, and unemployment. The table shows the declining influence
of region and increasing power of Democratic vote share and economic performance in predicting
environmental concern. The estimates of environmental concern are estimated without race or party
as grouping variables. The omitted categories are the Northeast region and the 1970s-80s decade.
45
Several surprising findings surface. The base term for vote share is statistically
significant and negative. This indicates that during the 1970s and 80s, states that
tended to vote Republican also tended to be more environmentally conscious. As
expected, in subsequent decades the influence of Democratic presidential vote share
reversed direction and became more substantively meaningful. The exception is be-
tween 2000 and 2010, when the magnitude of vote share as a predictor is smaller
than during the 1990s or the 2010s. This may reflect partisan bias in the public’s
evaluation of government policy. Republicans might have been more willing to ac-
cept government action to protect the environment when their co-partisan (President
George W. Bush) was in office. However, under this logic, we might also expect to see
an attenuation of the effect of vote share following the 2008 election when Democratic
President Barack Obama was elected. Future research should probe the rhetorical
foundations of this break in the power of partisanship to predict environmental at-
titudes. Second, the influence of unemployment has increased over time as a driver
of environmental attitudes. A rise in unemployment causes environmental concern to
fall in the 2000s and 2010s, but not in the 70s, 80s, or 90s. Third, even after control-
ling for partisanship, states in the western U.S. have become more environmentally
concerned over time.
Figure 2-7 visualizes these changes. The Figure shows the marginal effects of
each predictor during each decade, and illustrates the decreasing predictive power
of geography (with the exception of the Western region), the consistent power of
partisanship since the 1990s, and the rising influence of unemployment after 2000.
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Figure 2-7: Drivers of Environmental Concern Across Three Decades
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The figure shows the changing predictive power of a one standard-deviation increase in Democratic
vote share and state-level unemployment rates over time, and the predictive power of each census
region over time. Coefficients have been standardized, and reflect the results from a model with state
and year fixed effects and state-clustered standard errors. The coefficients for vote share incorporate
the effect for the base term, which is statistically significant.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have compiled hundreds of responses from 170 nationally representa-
tive public opinion surveys, to estimate state-level public concern about environmen-
tal protection across 40 years. The method smooths out error from individual survey
instruments and captures the public’s underlying orientation towards environmental
protection, the economy-environment tradeoff, and the expenditure of government
resources to protect the environment. The data are also an advance over nationally
aggregated measures of public environmental concern, which are useful for some pur-
poses but provide limited leverage for assessing the drivers and consequences of public
opinion.
The descriptive results I present raise several opportunities for further inquiry.
The data show that every state public has become polarized along partisan lines, but
states seem to follow two different patterns of polarization. Some states’ partisan
publics follow parallel trends and others diverge over time in their levels of support
for environmental protection. Future research should explore this variation in the
processes of polarization.
Additionally, the data open opportunities for comparing ideological polarization
with environmental polarization. I have incorporated ideological polarization as a
robustness check for the estimates I present, but theory and evidence for polarization
might be improved by comparing the extent and patterns of polarization on specific
topics. The data I present allow for this type of comparison, on a common scale.
As a starting point, I show that even during the time period when ideology and
environmental concern are highly correlated, national trends in these two measures
diverge from each other at certain moments. This suggests that there is some utility to
measuring issue-specific opinion. The public responds to political and social events
in ways that may not be reflected in broad-based single-dimensional measures of
ideology. The state-level data presented here open new opportunities for comparing
polarization on the environment with polarization about other political issues.
The predictive regression model I present also raises opportunities for further in-
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quiry. I find that region has decreased in its predictive power over environmental
concern, with the exception of the western region. In the west, the public has become
more supportive of environmental protection even after controlling for partisanship. I
also find that unemployment has increased in its relevance for environmental concern.
Future work should probe the discursive roots of these changes, deepen understand-
ing of how the economy affects environmental concern, and explore the intersection
of party and economic change in shaping environmental concern. Ideological polar-
ization has been tied to increases in income inequality (McCarty et al., 2006), and
anecdotal evidence suggests the presence of a discourse that pulls both ends of the
income distribution (ie, business interests and workers) away from support from en-
vironmental protection. How have partisan and media cues changed since the late
1970s to account for the increasing and interactive importance of partisanship and
unemployment?
The data presented here also provide a foundation for studying two processes
that are of central concern to political scientists: political representation and issue
evolution. Some theory suggests that candidates for office use issues strategically in
their campaigns, to attract voters in places that care about these issues (List and
Sturm, 2006). On the other hand, as the parties become more nationalized, they are
becoming less adaptive to state-specific policy concerns (Hopkins, 2018). The envi-
ronment makes a substantively important and theoretically relevant case for studying
the consequences of partisan nationalization. Other work suggests that accountability
and responsiveness vary according to institutional differences and issue-specific fea-
tures like salience (Erikson, 1978; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Page and Shapiro, 1983;
Canes-Wrone et al., 2011; Lax and Phillips, 2012, 2009). Testing these predictions
necessitates issue-specific measures of public opinion, one of which I provide in this
paper. Overall, the data open possibilities for assessing state officials’ responsiveness
to changing public opinion about the environment, the factors that mediate respon-
siveness, and how party positions shape state legislative agendas.
The data presented here can also contribute to theory development about the evo-
lution of the parties’ positions about political issues. For thirty years, the leading the-
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ory of issue evolution posited that the mass public follows nationally recognized elite
partisans in adopting issue positions that re-orient the parties (Carmines and Stim-
son, 1986). Recent research presents evidence for a competing theory: party-position
change begins at the local and state levels and is driven by changes in constituencies
and constituent attitudes (Schickler, 2016). A third theory suggests that the parties’
issue stances evolve in response to the need to maintain or expand the coalitions of
interest groups that compose them (Karol, 2009). These theories provide competing
hypothetical mechanisms to explain nationalization. The theories may not be mu-
tually exclusive; instead, the process of issue evolution may vary between political
issues. This dataset of state-level public opinion about the environment provides a
starting point for assessing the role of the state-parties’ elite and mass bases in the
evolution of the national parties’ stances on environmental protection.
Several Republicans stand out as enthusiastic (e.g., Teddy Roosevelt, George H.W.
Bush) or at least tepid (e.g., Richard Nixon) environmentalists. This paper shows
that today’s Republican party has moved away from support for environmental pro-
tection measures all over the country, with the exception of the American West.
Leading explanations center on elite leadership or campaign finance (Jacques et al.,
2008; Davenport and Lipton, 2017), but the state-level roots or consequences of these
changes are poorly understood. This gap is conspicuous since recent developments in
the theory and evidence of issue evolution suggest that the parties’ positions evolve
in response to state-level changes in elite and public attitudes. The environment is
a felicitous case for studying this process as a generalizable phenomenon, because
cleavages in environmental concern have historically been described as more regional
than partisan. Any explanation of how the party got to where it is today should
thus incorporate the spatial dynamics of changing public attitudes and relate these
changes to the evolution of elite views. This paper provides the starting point for
such analysis.
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Chapter 3
Controlling the Regulators: How
Party Control of Government Shapes
Environmental Regulation in the 21st
Century
3.1 Introduction
In February 2014, Duke Energy spilled 39,000 tons of coal ash–a toxic waste produced
at coal-burning power plants–into the Dan River in Eden, North Carolina. The
accident polluted the river for 70 miles downstream and, for many, drew attention to
a deal that Duke had come to with the North Carolina Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) several months prior. The company had been under
fire from environmental groups for several years because of poor management of coal
ash at sites around the state. Probably to preempt a lawsuit from the Southern
Environmental Law Center, the DENR finally took action against the company for
violating the federal Clean Water Act (Semuels, 2017). The resulting settlement
imposed a small fine on Duke and did not require the company to remove coal ash
from leaky and unlined disposal ponds. Many argue that the accident could have been
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prevented if DENR had imposed stronger requirements for the company to clean up
its coal ash management practices (Editorial Board, 2015). Reinforcing this view,
scholars have found that strong regulatory enforcement improves compliance with
environmental regulations and deters future violations (Gray and Shimshack, 2011;
Shimshack, 2014).
For many, the accident also typified a broader culture of regulatory laxity, ca-
pitulation to industry interests, and abuse of the discretion that states are afforded
in enforcing the federal pollution control laws. Between 2011 and 2014 the DENR
cut staff by two-thirds due to budget cuts imposed by the legislature. The governor
increased from 24 to 179 the number of staff at the agency that were exempt from
civil service protections. This increased by a factor of seven the number of staff at the
agency who served at the discretion of the governor or of his appointed agency direc-
tor. And that director made a number of other changes that loosened the regulatory
enforcement regime, including directing agency staff to issue toothless warning let-
ters to potential violators, rather than more meaningful notices of violation (Gabriel,
2014). These changes illustrate that state environmental agencies have discretion in
implementing the federal pollution control laws and that agency choices are subject
to political influence. They may also indicate that enforcement has become partisan,
since a Republican governor and a Republican-controlled state legislature oversaw the
changes.
Political science theory predicts that the parties might influence regulatory en-
forcement in a direction that is consistent with the North Carolina example, but evi-
dence to support this claim is thin. Scholars have returned mixed conclusions regard-
ing the implications of partisanship or ideology for environmental policy (Ringquist,
1993a, 1994; Medler, 1989; Ka and Teske, 2002; Potoski and Woods, 2002; Yi and
Feiock, 2014; Nicholson-Crotty and Carley, 2018; Ka and Teske, 2002; Daley and
Garand, 2005; Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016; Konisky and Woods, 2012). More gener-
ally, most knowledge about the parties’ influence on state policy comes from studies
of legislative outputs (e.g., Caughey et al. (2017); Kousser (2002); Chen (2007); Yates
and Fording (2005); Reed (2006)), but these make up only a fraction of the work of
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government. At the federal level, scholars have assessed political influence over bu-
reaucratic activities (eg, Wood (1991); Ackerman and Hassler (1981); Layzer (2012);
Cook and Polsky (2005)), but there is no consensus about how governors and state
legislatures influence policy implementation, enforcement, and enactments emitted
by administrative agencies rather than legislatures. This gap is particularly notable
in the environmental policy area, where states have a great deal of leeway within a
national regulatory framework. The present study addresses these gaps by asking
whether party control of governors’ offices and state legislatures influences regula-
tory enforcement. The results elucidate whether the changes that occurred in North
Carolina are symptomatic of broader differences in regulatory enforcement under Re-
publican and Democratic-controlled state governments.
I use the case of the Clean Air Act (CAA), which regulates stationary and mobile
sources of air pollution, to assess political influence over regulatory enforcement. I
apply a regression discontinuity (RD) design to assess whether electing a Democratic
or a Republican governor or state-legislative majority causes a change in the strin-
gency with which state environmental agencies enforce the CAA. I also assess whether
political influence varies according to the two branches’ mechanisms of political con-
trol. The results suggest that both gubernatorial and state-legislative elections have
consequences for environmental enforcement, and that influence from the executive
and legislative branches differs according to their distinct mechanisms of political
influence.
The paper proceeds in six sections. I first summarize empirical findings and high-
light unanswered questions concerning the link between party control of government
and state policy (Section 3.2). Next, I develop theoretical expectations for how the
elected branches of state government influence administrative policy, and why we
might expect to observe a partisan direction of influence (Section 3.3). I then intro-
duce the case, methods, and data I use in the analysis (Section 3.4). I present and
interpret results (Section 3.5) from the RD analyses and conclude (Section 3.6) with a
discussion of the implications of these findings and the questions they raise for future
research.
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3.2 Background: State policy responsiveness and ad-
ministrative policy
There is a growing body of evidence that partisanship affects elected officials’ vot-
ing decisions, and that partisan control of government institutions has meaningful
consequences for policy. Some studies conclude that there is no link (e.g.,Hofferbert
(1966); Konisky (2007)), an ambiguous link (e.g., Alt and Lowry (1994)), or, counter-
intuitively, a negative relationship (e.g., Erikson et al. (1989); Lax and Phillips (2012);
Erikson et al. (1993); Fredriksson et al. (2011)) between Democratic control of gov-
ernment and the liberalism of state policies. Increasingly, scholars have identified a
link between party control of government and policy outputs (Caughey et al., 2017;
Kousser, 2002; Chen, 2007; Yates and Fording, 2005; Reed, 2006), although this link
is contingent on the policy area investigated, state institutional features (Besley and
Case, 2003), and whether the parties split control of the governorship and legislature
(Alt and Lowry, 2000). Findings of a robust link between Democratic (Republican)
control of elected institutions and the liberalism (conservativism) of state policies are
consistent with theoretical expectations (Bawn et al., 2012; Layman et al., 2010) and
empirical evidence of increasingly divergent partisan position-taking by legislators
(Fowler and Hall, 2015; Fowler et al., 2016; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 2001; Mc-
Carty et al., 2006; Clinton, 2006; Shor and McCarty, 2011). Nonetheless, even if we
accept recent findings that party control of government institutions influences policy
outputs, the bulk of political science scholarship on the topic draws its conclusions
from studies of legislative enactments. This body of evidence does not illuminate
how the elected branches of government affect policy implementation, enforcement,
or policy enactments that do not emit from the legislature.
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3.3 Theoretical framework: Polarization, national-
ization, and political influence over agency ac-
tivities
3.3.1 Partisan Influence Over Regulatory Enforcement
Why and how do elected officials influence administrative policy, and why might the
direction of influence differ between the two major American political parties? I
define administrative policy as policy implementation, enforcement, or other policy
actions that do not emit from the legislature but instead from administrative agencies.
A theory of political influence over administrative policy in general, and regulatory
enforcement in particular, begins with the observation that today’s polarized, nation-
alized parties exhibit stronger and more consistent influence on state policy than they
did in the early- and mid-twentieth century. A clear and growing gap has emerged
between the preferences and attitudes of Democratic and Republican party leaders
(Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 2001; McCarty et al., 2006; Clinton et al., 2004) and
mass partisans (Levendusky, 2009; Abramowitz, 2010; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008),
including at the state level (Shor and McCarty, 2011; Caughey and Warshaw, 2017).
Likewise, the state parties have become increasingly consistent with the national par-
ties in their policy views (Hopkins, 2018) and distinct from each other in their policy
programs (Caughey et al., 2017). Overall, whereas historically the state parties might
have responded to local and state-level concerns in distinctive (within the party) or
similar (across the parties) ways, today’s nationalized and polarized parties are likely
to promote similar (within the party) but divergent (across the parties) policy pro-
grams around the country.
The second component of the theory concerns variation in the extent to which the
parties seek to influence administrative policy, according to the organization of con-
flict around an issue. Political influence over bureaucratic behavior becomes a greater
concern under conditions of higher conflict between political principals and between
agents and principals (Waterman et al., 2004; Huber and Shipan, 2002). Thus, if
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the parties’ positions diverge on an issue, and if one of the parties’ policy position
diverges from the relevant administrative agency’s mandate, political principals are
likely to seek to influence agency actions. Nationalization and polarization imply
a high degree of goal conflict between the parties about environmental regulation
(Shipan and Lowry, 2001; Kim and Urpelainen, 2017), and between the increasingly
anti-regulatory Republican party and the regulatory mandates of environmental man-
agement agencies. This conflict leads to the expectation that Republicans would seek
to reduce enforcement activity, whereas Democrats would seek to increase it. I test
this expectation by assessing whether, in states that narrowly elect Republican gov-
ernors or state legislative majorities, regulatory enforcement action decreases relative
to states that narrowly elect Democratic governors and state legislative majorities.
3.3.2 Mechanisms of Political Influence
While nationalization and polarization lead to the expectation of partisan conflict
over regulatory enforcement, a satisfying theory of political control requires an un-
derstanding of the mechanisms that would enable partisan influence. Administrative
policy occurs in the executive branch of government, and the governor does not suffer
from collective action problems to the extent that the legislature does. Thus, the ex-
ecutive’s institutional position and structure suggest that governors are likely to exert
stronger influence than legislatures. Still, both the executive and the legislature enjoy
mechanisms of political influence over the bureaucracy. Thus, the third component
of the theory addresses how partisan political principals from the different branches
of government influence agency behavior.
The legislative and executive branches influence the bureaucracy through differ-
ent channels. The executive primarily influences agency behavior through staffing.
Either through their appointment powers or by rearranging an agency’s personnel,
executives influence the bureaucracy by deciding who works there (Moe, 1985; Lewis,
2010; Howell and Lewis, 2002). Thus, in a context of polarized, nationalized parties,
governors might influence regulatory agency behavior by nominating co-partisans to
agency director positions, oversight boards, or other appointed staff offices.
56
The party in control of the legislature might affect agency activities through over-
sight, low-profile policy challenges, or the state budget. The budget represents the
most direct avenue of influence. Legislatures use appropriations both to send signals
to an agency and to hamstring or expand its capacity to pursue long-running cases
or investigations (McCubbins et al., 1989). Additionally, the budget mechanism pro-
vides the legislature a means by which to send signals and adjust resources available to
the attorney general, who is partially or wholly responsible for bringing enforcement
actions in many states.
The executive and legislature negotiate to set the budget though. Some evidence
suggests that governors effectively use the budgetary process to advance their policy
agendas (Kousser and Phillips, 2012), but executive influence in budgeting appears
limited to reducing–rather than increasing–agency budgets relative to the legislature’s
desired appropriation (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1988; Wilson, 1989). Also, the evi-
dence for governors’ success in budget negotiations is drawn from high-profile agenda
items mentioned in governors’ state of the state addresses (Kousser and Phillips,
2012). It is unclear how these conclusions translate to policy changes that both
branches are likely to avoid publicizing.
Legislatures might also influence administrative policy through direct and indi-
rect oversight from legislative committees with jurisdiction over a particular agency.
Direct oversight mechanisms include “police patrol” activities like agency rule review,
ad hoc studies or reports, field observations, hearings, and legislative sanctions (Mc-
Cubbins and Schwartz, 1984). These mechanisms are costly and therefore likely to
occur more often as the relative political consequences of an agency’s work increase.
But more often, legislatures use indirect, “fire alarm” oversight mechanisms (McCub-
bins and Schwartz, 1984; Wilson, 1989; Potoski and Woods, 2001). These include
procedures, analysis requirements, and rules that are embedded into agencies’ oper-
ations. Some requirements enable citizens and groups to challenge agency actions
or raise infractions to the relevant legislative committee’s attention (McCubbins and
Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1987). Others define the evidence and frameworks
agencies must use to make decisions. They thereby speed, slow, or change the di-
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rection of agency policy-making without the direct interference of the legislature in
specific decisions (Potoski and Woods, 2001; McCubbins et al., 1989). Of course, the
consistency and direction of partisan influence on regulatory enforcement depends on
the interests of the constituencies that an oversight committee’s work affects and the
extent to which interested constituencies are sorted between the parties. Polariza-
tion and nationalization suggest consistent partisan preferences and, thus, consistency
in the direction of partisan influence on regulatory enforcement through committee
oversight.
While oversight mechanisms are embedded into agency structures through en-
abling statutes (McCubbins et al., 1989; Huber and Shipan, 2002), the legislature
can use low-profile tactics such as riders on must-pass bills to redirect agency policy-
making or change the rules and procedures that serve as oversight mechanisms (Layzer,
2012, p. 21). In an example relevant to the case explored in this paper, Congress
used appropriations riders to blunt the Reagan administration’s efforts to roll back
Clean Air Act implementation throughout the 1980s (Bryner, 1995). Low-profile tac-
tics influence policy without attracting the attention of other political principals or
groups empowered to raise fire alarms. This is an important feature for environmental
regulatory enforcement, since many groups are empowered to raise fire alarms and
the states operate within a federally enforceable framework. Overall, legislatures can
influence agency activities by adjusting resources through the budget, using existing
oversight mechanisms, or changing the rules and procedures that serve as oversight
mechanisms for the legislature.
Based on this framework, the elections of Democratic and Republican gover-
nors and state-legislative majorities can have consequences for administrative policy
through distinct mechanisms. State legislatures can expand, retract, or redirect re-
sources available to agencies and to other state offices including the attorney general.
Administrative activities vary in the resources they require, and this mechanism is
most effective for influencing resource-intensive activities. State legislatures can also
influence administrative policy through committee oversight and procedural changes
that speed, slow, or change the direction of agency policy-making. These mecha-
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nisms are most likely to influence formalized enforcement activities that are subject
to process constraints. Governors influence agency operations primarily through ap-
pointing friendly managers, re-organizing agency staffs, and adjusting agency priori-
ties through their relationships with agency leadership. These theoretical predictions
lead to the expectation that governors may exert strong direct influence on agency
actions through their appointment powers, but they are constrained in their influence
over resource-intensive activities or those subject to legislative oversight. I test this
prediction by assessing heterogeneity in the effect that governors and state legislatures
can achieve over different types of enforcement activities.
Prior research lends plausibility to this theory, but gaps remain in scholars’ as-
sessments of partisan influence over environmental policy in general and regulatory
enforcement in particular. In one body of work, scholars have examined the mech-
anisms included in the theory presented here. Evidence suggests that appointment
powers afford influence over regulatory decisions to governors (Wood and Waterman,
1994; Koski, 2007; Woods, 2004), and that appointed agency leaders have polarized
along with the political parties at the national level (Devins and Lewis, 2008). These
studies lend credence to the theorized mechanism of gubernatorial influence: staffing.
Evidence also suggests that indirect oversight mechanisms afford influence to the leg-
islative committees that oversee an agency (Potoski and Woods, 2001; Woods, 2013,
2004). Much of this work relies on perceptual measures of influence rather than in-
dicators of policy outputs. This suggests that some political influence is achieved
through bureaucrats’ anticipation of principals’ reactions to agency decisions. But
the survey-based evidence does not tell us whether political principals influence ad-
ministrative policy outputs, or whether the direction of influence differs between the
parties.
More broadly, state-level studies that assess partisan effects on environmental pol-
icy return mixed results. When scholars have included partisan control of government
or “government ideology” (Berry et al., 1998) in predictive models, many have found
that these influence environmental policy outputs (Yi and Feiock, 2014; Lyon and
Yin, 2010; Huang et al., 2007; Carley and Miller, 2012; Yi and Feiock, 2012; Chandler,
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2009; Stoutenborough and Beverlin, 2008; Vachon and Menz, 2006; Nicholson-Crotty
and Carley, 2018). Others find null (Fisher, 2006; Carley and Miller, 2012; Ringquist,
1993b; Daley and Garand, 2005) or inconsistent (Ringquist, 1994; Medler, 1989; Ka
and Teske, 2002; Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016) effects. Some of these studies opera-
tionalize partisan control as a dichotomous indicator of unified government (Huang
et al., 2007; Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2016), but the theory developed here suggests that
detecting the influence of partisan control merits a design that disaggregates control
of the legislature and governor’s office. Other studies rely on data from a time period
preceding the rise in political polarization, when the direction of partisan influence
may not have been consistent across the states (Ringquist, 1993a, 1994; Konisky,
2007; Medler, 1989; Ka and Teske, 2002). Some studies have applied causal designs
to identify partisan differences in environmental spending (Fredriksson et al., 2011)
or environmental outcomes (Beland and Boucher, 2015). These results are suggestive,
but leave the mechanisms of influence ambiguous. Overall, this research provides sug-
gestive evidence that partisan politics influences environmental policy, but it would
stretch these findings to conclude that election outcomes cause a change in environ-
mental policy outputs that is distinct from the enduring features of states’ political,
economic, and cultural contexts. This is a substantively important question. States
play a crucial role in enforcing the federal pollution-control laws, and enforcement is
critical to promoting compliance and strong environmental performance (Gray and
Shadbegian, 2007; Gray and Shimshack, 2011; Shimshack, 2014).
To bring clarity to this debate, the present study asks whether Republican or
Democratic control of state government causes systematic changes in environmen-
tal regulation in the American states. More precisely, how does the election of a
Republican governor or legislative majority affect enforcement compared with the
counterfactual election of Democrats to the same institution in the same state? I
also assess heterogeneity in the effect of the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment on enforcement activities, according to the resources and formal procedures
associated with the activities that agencies undertake.
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3.4 Case, design, and data for assessing political in-
fluence over regulatory enforcement
3.4.1 Case: The Clean Air Act
To examine political influence over regulatory enforcement, I examine state agencies’
enforcement of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA, passed in 1970, regulates the
emissions of air pollutants from mobile and stationary sources. The law sets up a
framework wherein states take primary responsibility for achieving national pollution-
control standards established by the Environmental Protection (EPA). Specifically,
states must develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which include air quality
standards that meet or exceed federally established criteria. If states do not sub-
mit regulatory programs that are consistent with the national standards, or if EPA
deems a state’s implementation efforts inadequate, EPA enforces the standards di-
rectly. Thus, within a nationally established framework, states have discretion in
implementing and enforcing federal pollution-control standards. Cross-state compa-
rability in policy outputs makes the CAA an ideal empirical setting for examining
political influence over state bureaucracies.
The CAA also provides a theoretically relevant case because of the centrality of
goal conflict to theories of political influence over the bureaucracy (Waterman et al.,
2004; Huber and Shipan, 2002). For some issues, such as education, states also enjoy
broad policy leeway. But it is difficult to theoretically derive the direction of influence
that the parties would exert or to operationalize policy indicators that are both com-
parable between states and more substantively meaningful than spending measures.
Environmental regulation, by contrast, has become a hallmark of ideological conflict
between the parties at the national level. Theoretically deriving the expected direc-
tion of partisan influence is straightforward, based on the observation that elite and
mass partisans hold divergent preferences about environmental problems and poli-
cies (Kim and Urpelainen, 2018; McCright et al., 2014), and that Republicans have
trended away from support for environmental protection policies (Shipan and Lowry,
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2001; Kim and Urpelainen, 2017). The study tests whether goal conflict between Re-
publican political principals (governors and legislative majorities) and environmental
regulatory agencies influences regulatory policy enforcement in the states.
I focus in particular on stationary sources regulated under the Title V permitting
program. Title V was included in the 1990 CAA amendments to improve report-
ing, enforcement, and compliance with the law. Under the program, large sources of
air pollution and some smaller sources are required to obtain permits that establish
facility-level pollution control requirements. State and local agencies issue most Title
V permits, assume responsibility for monitoring compliance and taking action against
violators, and are required to report their enforcement actions to the EPA. Actions
states might take include informal warnings, notices of violation that do not impose
penalties but instead provide guidance and request action from the facility, adminis-
trative orders that may impose compliance orders or fines, and civil or criminal pros-
ecutions. EPA groups these actions into “informal” and “formal” categories (United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Informal actions include warning
letters and notices of violation, whereas formal actions include administrative orders
and civil or criminal judicial proceedings. Two theoretically relevant features distin-
guish these kinds of actions: the resources they require and the actors involved in
carrying them out. Environmental agencies can issue warning letters and notices of
violation independently. In contrast, administrative orders and judicial proceedings
require the involvement of lawyers, often from the Attorney General’s office. Like-
wise, formal actions often unfold over several years and require tremendous financial
resources. Warning letters and notices of violation can emerge from some amount of
dialogue between a facility and enforcers during the monitoring process, but they are
relatively quick to issue and require a lower investment of time and money.
Since the theory predicts that legislatures and governors influence administrative
policy through different channels, their influence should be observed through different
outputs. Specifically, the legislature’s use of the budget and oversight mechanisms–
including low-profile changes that alter the rules for administrative proceedings–are
more likely to affect resource-intensive formal enforcement activities. This is due to
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the resources required, involvement of the attorney general (also subject to resource
constraints controlled by the legislature), and oversight mechanisms associated with
formal enforcement. The governor, on the other hand, is most likely to influence
informal enforcement activities where the agency enjoys more discretion.
3.4.2 Design: Regression discontinuity and randomization in-
ference
I use a regression-discontinuity (RD) approach to elucidate whether electing a Demo-
cratic or a Republican governor or state-legislative majority causes a change in en-
forcement activity in a state. The RD design allows researchers to identify a causal ef-
fect by focusing analysis within a narrow bandwidth spanning a treatment-assignment
threshold (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In many political-science applications–including
the present study–treatment is defined by electoral margins (the “running variable”)
and assigned according to the 50% vote share required for the Democratic or Republi-
can candidate to win (Lee, 2008). By focusing analysis on narrowly decided elections
in states that are otherwise similar, the RD design allows the researcher to assess the
causal effects of a party’s electoral victory.
The approach rests on an assumption of continuity of potential outcomes at the
treatment-assignment threshold (De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016). If potential outcomes
are continuous between units spanning the threshold, the RD design supports a claim
that any discontinuity observed between units assigned to treatment and control is
caused by the treatment. The continuity assumption is valid if there is no discon-
tinuity in pretreatment covariates or placebo outcomes at the treatment-assignment
threshold, within the bandwidth specified for the analysis. I use a series of robustness
checks to test the validity of the continuity assumption underlying these analyses.1 I
1I test for discontinuities using local linear regression, applying larger weights to observations near the
treatment-assignment threshold (De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016). I examine the effect of the lagged
running variable (e.g., the previous election’s vote margin in the gubernatorial RD) on the outcome
variable; the current running variable on the lagged outcome variable; and the running variable
on the lagged treatment (party of the governor or legislative majority) and running variables,
the current running variable and treatment for the opposite branch of government, and public
support for environmental protection. I derive estimates of public environmental concern using
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find no significant discontinuities, which suggests that the continuity assumption is
valid.2
For the analysis of gubernatorial control, I use a standard RD: treatment is defined
as a Bernoulli random variable and assigned by electoral margins in gubernatorial elec-
tions. For the analysis of legislative control, I use the multidimensional RD approach
developed by Feigenbaum et al. (2017). The main challenge for applying RD in a
legislative context is that treatment–party control of the legislature–is determined
not by one election but by many. Multidimensional RD combines these elections into
a single running variable that measures the distance between a vector of district-level
election outcomes and the electoral results that would deliver majority-party status.
I construct the running variable by first determining the number of seats (𝑚) the
minority party lacks to achieve majority status. Second, I determine the distance to
majority status in the minority’s 𝑚 closest elections.3 Since treatment is defined as
Republican victory, this distance is multiplied by -1 if the Republicans are in the mi-
nority. Once this variable has been constructed, the analysis proceeds as with simple
RD, where treatment is assigned according to the 50% threshold.
A shortcoming of the regression discontinuity approach is that the design restricts
analysis to the subset of the data that are concentrated near the treatment-assignment
threshold. This restriction raises concern about applying large-sample statistical pro-
cedures in some applications (Cattaneo et al., 2015). Since gubernatorial elections
only occur every four years, my analysis includes a small number of elections and an
even smaller number of close elections. As a robustness check for the analysis of gu-
bernatorial control, I complement the RD with randomization inference, a statistical
technique designed for hypothesis testing with small samples.
In the randomization-inference framework, the researcher tests the sharp null hy-
pothesis that there is no treatment effect for any unit. Under this sharp null, the
an adaptation of the dynamic group-level item response theory model developed in Caughey and
Warshaw (2015). To test for lasting effects of party control of government, I also examine the effect
of the lagged running variable and lagged treatment assignment on the outcome variable.
2The results of all placebo tests are included in Appendix Section B.0.1.
3Following Feigenbaum et al. (2017), I use Euclidean distance, such that distance to majority status
is determined by summing the squares of the margins of loss in the 𝑚 closest elections.
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potential outcomes for all units are known, since the potential outcome for each unit
is the same under the observed randomization of treatment and any counterfactual
treatment assignment. Since all potential outcomes are known under the null hypoth-
esis, the researcher can derive the distribution of any test statistic and determine the
p-value and confidence interval for an observed test statistic based on this distribu-
tion. The distribution of test statistics thus provides a reference distribution through
which to determine the probability of observing the effect that was actually observed
(Rosenbaum, 2010, Ch. 2), and rejecting or failing to reject the null hypothesis. I
test the sharp null hypothesis that there is no effect on enforcement following the
election of a Republican governor. I provide additional details about randomization
inference, including support for the identifying assumption of local randomization of
treatment, in the Appendix.
3.4.3 Data: Measuring regulatory enforcement and party con-
trol of government
The treatment-assignment variables are derived from election returns. For the guber-
natorial RD, I use election returns from 2000 to 2016 (CQ Press, 2018) and define the
running variable as Republican vote margin. State-years are assigned into treatment
if the Republican candidate receives more than 50% of the two-party vote share. For
the state-legislative RD, I use state legislative election returns from 2000 to 2016
(Klarner, 2018). The running variable for the legislative analysis is the Euclidean dis-
tance between a vector of district-level election results and the results that would be
required for the Republican party to win majority status (Feigenbaum et al., 2017).
Consistent with prior applications of the multidimensional RD (e.g., Caughey et al.
(2017)), I only examine the effect of electing a Republican majority to the lower leg-
islative chamber since many state senators are not up for re-election every term. I
do not include elections in multimember districts or Nebraska, since multimember
districts pose design complications and the Nebraska legislature is nonpartisan.
The outcome variables reflect states’ enforcement actions taken against major
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and synthetic minor facilities permitted under the CAA’s Title V Program, between
the years 2000 and 2017. I focus on this subset of enforcement actions to maximize
consistency in reporting over time and between states. States are required to report
enforcement actions taken against Title V-permitted major and synthetic minor emit-
ters.4 Also, the introduction of the Enforcement Compliance History Online (ECHO)
database in 2002 substantially improved the consistency with which states reported
their enforcement activities.5 EPA modernized its CAA data collection system dur-
ing the time period under study, and I use data from the modernized dataset, the
Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS-Air) (United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 2017).
I aggregate facility-level enforcement data from ECHO to produce state-level,
annual counts of formal, informal, and total enforcement actions taken by state and,
where authorized, local environmental agencies. To control for differences in states’
enforcement populations and annual shocks that affect enforcement in all states, I
use the residualizing approach recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010). I regress
the logged count of actions on state and year fixed effects, and use the change in the
residuals from this regression as the primary dependent variable.6
4While states are required to report enforcement actions taken against major and synthetic minor
sources, federal reporting has been the source of contentious debate and some inconsistencies. In the
present analysis, some caution is merited in interpreting the data: the absence of actions in the EPA
database indicates at least that these actions were not reported to EPA and at most that they did
not occur. By extension, it could be argued that any effect observed might reflect either state-level
regulatory changes or symbolic opposition to federal overreach in reporting requirements. While
either of these effects is interesting, it seems unlikely that states would under-report their enforce-
ment actions on principle and risk the EPA entering to impose stricter enforcement. Nonetheless,
replicating the analysis with data collected directly from the states would bolster confidence in the
interpretation.
5Thanks to Mike Barrett, ECHO manager at EPA, for his insights about managing and interpreting
data obtained through ECHO.
6I also run the models using simple logged counts of actions and the ratio of actions to manufacturing
facilities. The results are substantively and statistically similar for the results estimated with the
first-differenced counts, ratios, and the residualized, first-differenced counts. Robustness checks
suggest better balance between treated and control groups for the results using the residualized,
first-differenced variable. Thus, I use the residualized variables due to stronger support for the
continuity assumption. I include results using first-differenced logged counts in Appendix Table
B.0-14.
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3.5 Results: Regulatory enforcement under Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations
3.5.1 National trends in CAA enforcement
Figure 3-1 shows national-level trends in states’ enforcement efforts taken under the
CAA since 2000, in states controlled by Democratic and Republican governors and
state legislatures. The figure suggests two patterns of political influence. First, states
controlled by Republican governors appear to conduct fewer enforcement actions than
their Democratic counterparts, after accounting for between-state differences in the
enforcement population. Second, the relationship between party control of govern-
ment and changes in regulatory enforcement appears stronger for governors than for
state legislatures. This is consistent with theoretical expectations that the executive
is more easily able to influence administrative policy since it occurs in the executive
branch. Nonetheless, this correlation does not provide evidence that the election of
a Republican or a Democratic governor makes a meaningful difference in enforce-
ment, all else equal. I turn to the regression discontinuity analysis to adjudicate this
question.
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Figure 3-1: National Trends in CAA Enforcement
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The figure shows enforcement activity in states headed by Democratic (dashed blue line) and Repub-
lican (solid red line) governors and state legislatures. The trends reflect the change in the natural
log of annual actions taken during a gubernatorial or legislative term, compared with the election
year.
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3.5.2 Political Influence Over CAA Enforcement
I first assess the extent to which party control of governors’ offices and state leg-
islatures affects regulatory enforcement overall, by assessing discontinuities in total
enforcement actions taken by narrowly elected Democratic and Republican governors
and state legislatures. Figure 3-2 shows the effect of Republican control of governors’
mansions and statehouses on enforcement actions taken by state agencies. I find
evidence that the party of the governor has a strong influence on total enforcement,
whereas the effect of state legislatures is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This
comports with prior research finding that appointment powers afford governors in-
fluence over the direction of agency policy (Wood and Waterman, 1994; Koski, 2007;
Woods, 2004). The analysis provides new evidence of a partisan difference in gover-
nors’ influence: narrowly elected Republican governors reduce regulatory enforcement
as compared with their Democratic counterparts. In contrast, the analysis suggests
that legislatures, due to the challenges associated with collective action, are not as
nimble as the executive in influencing policy.
Due to the small sample included in the bandwidth for the analysis of gubernato-
rial control, I use randomization inference to check the robustness of the large-sample
result.7 The results derived using randomization inference are broadly consistent with
the large-sample RD results. While the point estimates are smaller for the difference
in means test deployed using randomization inference, results from both models are
substantively meaningful. A narrow Republican victory causes a 14%-42% reduction
in enforcement, estimated using randomization inference and local linear regression-
based RD, respectively. This amounts to between 6 and 18 fewer actions in the
median state.
7Appendix Figure B.0-6 shows the results of the randomization-based test and the large-sample RD.
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Figure 3-2: Political Influence Over CAA Enforcement
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The figure shows the RD effect that narrowly elected Republican governors (left panel) and state
legistative majorities (right panel) have on annual enforcement actions taken during each year of
their terms, as compared with the year of their election. The effect was estimated with the rdrobust
(Calonico et al., 2015) R package, using a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal
bandwidth, and bias-corrected robust confidence intervals. The hollow points reflect local averages
for each bin in the data, and they are sized to reflect the number of state-year observations in each
bin. The dependent variable is the change in the residuals from a linear regression of the natural
log of annual enforcement actions, averaged across the years of gubernatorial or legislative terms,
on state and year fixed effects.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects on Enforcement
These average effects may mask heterogeneity in the effects that legislatures and
governors are able to exert through their differential mechanisms of political influence.
Thus, I next assess whether governors and legislatures influence different types of
agency activities. Figure 3-3 shows the results from RD models assessing the effect
of governors and state legislatures on formal and informal enforcement actions.8
8Results from all models are included in the Appendix. The figures and tables in the Appendix
reflect results for each year of a term, in addition to the effect presented here, estimated using the
average annual change in actions taken during gubernatorial terms and legislative sessions.
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Figure 3-3: Governors’ and Legislatures’ Effects on Enforcement
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The plot shows the effect of Republican gubernatorial victories and state legislative majorities on
formal and informal enforcement activities. The effects were estimated with the rdrobust (Calonico
et al., 2015) R package, using a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidth,
and bias-corrected robust confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the change in the residuals
from a linear regression of the natural log of annual enforcement actions, averaged across the years
of gubernatorial or legislative terms, on state and year fixed effects.
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The results shown in Figure 3-3 suggest that the lack of an overall effect for state
legislatures masks an effect that the legislature is able to achieve over formal enforce-
ment activities. This result is significant at the 90% confidence level, but not the 95%
confidence level. It is substantively meaningful in the context of total cross-sectional
and over-time variation in enforcement. The effect is approximately one-third of a
standard deviation in the dependent variable, and implies a 20% reduction in formal
actions taken. The median state would bring three fewer judicial cases or adminis-
trative orders under a narrowly elected Republican-controlled state legislature.
The results also suggest that Republican governors exert stronger influence than
legislatures, but that governors’ influence is most readily observed in informal warning
letters and notices of violation. The effect of a Republican gubernatorial victory on
formal punitive actions is statistically indistinguishable from zero, whereas the effect
on informal actions is robust across the governor’s term with the exception of year
three.9 While these differences in effects are not statistically significant, they are
suggestive of heterogeneous effects.
Together, these results provide support for the theory that the legislature and
governor affect enforcement through distinct channels. Governors exert the strongest
influence on regulatory enforcement in terms of substantive magnitude. Their influ-
ence is primarily observed in the frequency with which agencies issue warning letters
and notices of violation rather than administrative and civil judicial actions. This
provides support for the theory that governors influence enforcement by appoint-
ing politically friendly agency managers who may adjust agency priorities and the
frequency with which the agency takes relatively low-cost signaling actions against
polluters. But governors are hamstrung in their ability to influence resource-intensive
activities. Instead, through its oversight powers and appropriations authority, the
party in control of the state legislature can constrain the resources at an agency’s
disposal for bringing lawsuits and adjust the rules and procedures that govern formal
administrative actions. Notably, the budget mechanism also allows the legislature to
9Appendix Figure B.0-5 shows the results for all years of governors’ terms. Appendix Figure B.0-3
shows the results estimated using various bandwidths.
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change the resources available to the attorney general’s office, which is partly or fully
responsible for bringing formal enforcement actions. The involvement of the attor-
ney general in these cases may introduce a political check on the governor’s power,
particularly if the attorney general is of the opposite party.
3.6 Conclusion: Implications and future research
I have used a regression discontinuity setup to examine whether state legislatures and
governors influence enforcement of the Clean Air Act, one of the nation’s landmark
pollution-control laws. I also develop a theory to explain political influence over state
administrative policy, which could be further developed through testing in other issue
areas or temporal settings. The findings advance knowledge of state policy respon-
siveness by identifying the direction and magnitude of the consequences of partisan
electoral victories for administrative–rather than legislative–policy outputs. I also
find suggestive evidence that governors and state legislatures influence enforcement
through different channels. Governors–through their appointment powers and rela-
tionships with agency directors–can substantially redirect agency enforcement effort,
but their effect is primarily seen in the frequency with which agencies send infor-
mal warning letters and notices of violation to Title V-permitted facilities. State
legislatures–through their control of the resources available to agencies and attorneys
general, committee oversight, and low-profile policy changes–influence the frequency
with which agencies level administrative penalties and bring judicial cases.
The results from the analysis of gubernatorial influence suggest that enforcement
may be one policy mechanism behind Beland and Boucher’s (2015) finding that pol-
lution decreases under narrowly elected Democratic governors. Informal actions gen-
erally precede administrative orders and judicial actions and make up the majority
of enforcement actions taken by state agencies. Thus, even if governors’ influence
is primarily felt in informal activity, a shift in informal enforcement under a new
governor represents meaningful changes in states’ enforcement regimes. Furthermore,
although warning letters and notices of violation require relatively minimal response
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from the recipient, they send a meaningful signal that can promote compliance and
deter future violations at the recipient facility and surrounding facilities (Gray and
Shimshack, 2011). These results show that elections have consequences for enforce-
ment. Because of the importance of enforcement for promoting compliance and im-
proving environmental performance, elections have consequences for environmental
quality.
The analysis also provides evidence that state legislatures influence formal enforce-
ment activity, which is consistent with theoretical and empirical work finding that
legislatures influence the bureaucracy through budgeting (Ansolabehere and Snyder,
2006; McCubbins et al., 1989; Bryner, 1995), oversight (Potoski and Woods, 2001;
Woods, 2013, 2004), or low-profile policy-change tactics (Hacker, 2004; Layzer, 2012).
Extending the time frame to include more elections in the relatively narrow band-
width supporting the continuity assumption would strengthen the claim that state
legislative elections affect formal enforcement activity. Extending the time frame and
sample for this analysis would require collecting data directly from state agencies, as
the states reported their actions to EPA less consistently prior to the year 2000.
This analysis opens at least three opportunities for further inquiry into political
influence over administrative policy, where theoretical development has been rich but
empirical evidence is somewhat thin. First, theory suggests that political influence
over the bureaucracy varies across policy areas, according to dimensions such as the
level of conflict between principals and agents (Waterman et al., 2004; Huber and
Shipan, 2002), distributive concerns (Ringquist, 1994), and information asymmetry
(Waterman et al., 2004; Ringquist, 1994). This analysis provides evidence for politi-
cal influence when there is high conflict between political principals of different par-
ties, and between partisan principals and their bureaucratic agents. Future research
should compare political influence over bureaucratic behavior across policy areas that
vary in goal conflict and other relevant dimensions. Second, future research should
investigate how these effects shrink, grow, counteract, or cumulate in eras with dif-
fering degrees of partisan polarization. Third, while these results are consistent with
the theorized mechanisms of influence available to governors and state legislatures,
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qualitative process tracing in a sample of typical cases could further elucidate these
mechanisms.
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Chapter 4
Backyard Voices: How Sense of Place
Shapes Views of Large-Scale Energy
Transmission Infrastructure
4.1 Introduction
The U.S. energy grid is undergoing dramatic growth and reconfiguration. On average,
the U.S. has seen the construction of 12,000 miles of natural gas pipelines each year
since 1950 (Dooley et al., 2009), accumulating to over 2.5 million miles of transmission
pipeline today (US DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
2018). This trend shows no signs of slowing. Declining natural gas prices and tech-
nological advancement have opened huge extraction opportunities, and many argue
that inadequate transmission infrastructure is the limiting factor in getting this gas
to market. Infrastructure development to meet this need is already underway. For
example, five pipelines connecting to the Marcellus and Utica shales were scheduled
for completion in 2017, with another five to open in 2018 (DiSavino, Scott, 2017).
Meanwhile, the U.S. has 640,000 miles of high-voltage electric transmission lines, and
the electricity transmission infrastructure is projected to grow by 6% by 2030 (US
Department of Energy, 2015). Building a lower-carbon electricity system would neces-
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sitate further infrastructure expansion. For example, meaningful adoption of carbon
capture and sequestration technology would require the construction of 11,000-22,000
miles of pipeline to transport 𝐶𝑂2 by 2030. (Dooley et al., 2009). Large-scale deploy-
ment of wind and solar-generated electricity requires either major advances in storage
technology or an overhaul of the transmission system (MacDonald et al., 2016).
Reconfiguring or expanding the nation’s transmission infrastructure will require
the engagement and guidance of the American public, since communities will be
asked repeatedly to accept new transmission infrastructure. It is thus critical to
understand public perceptions of energy transmission infrastructure, and how these
perceptions are shaped by arguments from government, companies, and advocates.
Scholarly attention to public views of transmission infrastructure has been limited
though. Instead, scholars have focused on attitudes towards electricity generation
facilities such as wind farms and power plants.
In this paper, we expand on work assessing the drivers of public attitudes toward
electricity generation facilities to explore perceptions of energy transmission infras-
tructure. We draw on in-depth interviews with public officials, residents, landowners,
and stakeholders in communities along the routes of two proposed energy transmis-
sion projects to understand how community members view the projects. Our study
contributes to scholarly assessments of public attitudes about energy facilities in four
important ways. First, whereas most prior work has assessed attitudes towards elec-
tricity generation facilities, we focus on transmission infrastructure. Generation and
transmission facilities differ in their aesthetic qualities, the costs they may impose
on communities, and the benefits they may deliver. Our study enables comparison
of public attitudes towards these components of the energy system, which impact
communities in different ways. Second, the study complements survey-based studies
of attitudes about energy infrastructure. We focus on socioeconomic considerations,
a category of perceived impacts that survey researchers have identified as important
drivers of public attitudes. Our analysis elucidates the sources of these perceptions.
Third, we gauge attitudes about proposed projects before they have been approved or
constructed. This allows us to assess public expectations for the projects before res-
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idents have become acquainted with facilities’ impacts or adapted to their presence.
Fourth, we study two proposals that vary in their aesthetic qualities and the source
of the energy they are designed to transmit. This allows us to determine whether
attitudes vary according to these factors.
We apply a framework rooted in social psychology to explain local attitudes about
energy transmission infrastructure. The framework draws from social representation
theory (Moscovici, 2001; Batel and Devine-Wright, 2015) and is centered around the
concept of sense of place, which is composed of attachment, symbolic meanings, and
satisfaction associated with a place (Stedman, 2002). We show how the scale of place
attachments (Devine-Wright and Batel, 2017) and the symbolic meanings underlying
place attachments (Devine-Wright, 2009; Devine-Wright and Howes, 2010; Bailey
et al., 2016) help shape residents’ interpretations and evaluations of proposed projects
as a threat or an opportunity. Whereas this framework has been applied to attitudes
towards wind energy siting proposals, we build upon it and carry it into a new context:
transmission infrastructure. We show how evaluations of the projects stem from
contradictions and complementarities between sense of place and interpretations of
transmission projects’ socioeconomic impacts. Place attachments at the local, state,
and national scales help define the values through which respondents evaluate the
projects. Likewise, symbolic meanings associated with aesthetic characterizations
and economic identities inform interpretation of project impacts and evaluations of
the projects as threats or opportunities.
The paper proceeds in four sections. First, we review prior work assessing attitudes
about energy infrastructure and present our conceptual framework to assess the role of
sense of place in shaping residents’ perceptions of energy transmission infrastructure
(Section 4.2). Next, we describe our case sites and research methods (Section 4.3).
In Section 4.4, we apply the framework in our cases. We describe patterns in the
symbolic meanings and scale of attachments that comprise sense of place among our
respondents. We show how respondents interpret project impacts through the lens
of place sentiments, how these interpretations are rooted in familiar experiences, and
how evaluations of the projects stem from the relationship between sense of place and
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interpretations of project impacts. We conclude in Section 4.5 with a discussion of
the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.
4.2 Background and Conceptual Framework
4.2.1 NIMBY attitudes towards Infrastructure Siting
A large literature in planning and public policy assesses NIMBY–“not in my backyard”–
attitudes towards infrastructure siting proposals. The NIMBY concept refers to at-
titudes of opposition to facilities such as power plants, industrial facilities, mental
health facilities, or affordable housing projects in close proximity to one’s home,
despite generalized support for these types of facilities (Schively, 2007). This phe-
nomenon has received some attention in the context of energy infrastructure siting,
with a particular focus on electricity generation facilities (Ansolabehere and Konisky,
2009; Wolsink, 2000, 2007; Devine-Wright, 2005; Swofford and Slattery, 2010; Rygg,
2012; Slattery et al., 2012; Carlisle et al., 2015; Greenberg, 2009; Greenberg and
Truelove, 2011), nuclear waste disposal (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2011; Sherman, 2012;
Slovic et al., 1991), and oil and gas extraction sites (Michaud et al., 2008; Smith, 2001;
Boudet et al., 2014; Jacquet, 2012; Paydar et al., 2016; Davis and Fisk, 2014). Only
recently have scholars begun to examine the NIMBY phenomenon in the context of
transmission infrastructure (Gravelle and Lachapelle, 2015). Moreover, scholars have
returned mixed findings concerning whether proximity to infrastructure facilities is
an important predictor of support (Gravelle and Lachapelle, 2015; Greenberg, 2009;
Jenkins-Smith et al., 2011; Michaud et al., 2008; Johansson and Laike, 2007; Krause
et al., 2014; Swofford and Slattery, 2010; Boudet et al., 2014; Carlisle et al., 2015).
These varied results may stem from differences in research designs, political and
social contexts, or the types of infrastructure examined in each study. Moreover,
few of these studies have directly assessed NIMBYism in its strict sense, defined as
general support for infrastructure of a particular type but opposition when a project
is proposed near one’s home. A recent study finds little support for strict NIMBYism
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in the energy infrastructure context. Instead, other considerations shape individuals’
views of infrastructure proposed for their communities. Relevant considerations in-
clude trust in energy companies, perceptions of economic costs and benefits associated
with proposed projects, and individuals’ sense of local environmental quality (Konisky
et al., 2018). These results comport with prior work arguing that the NIMBY concept
is too simplistic, and that probing nuanced, complex motivations could provide useful
insights into the drivers of residents’ behavior (Wolsink, 2007; Devine-Wright, 2005,
2009; Batel and Devine-Wright, 2015; Pellizzone et al., 2015; Aaen et al., 2016; Rand
and Hoen, 2017).
4.2.2 Socioeconomic considerations shape attitudes towards
energy infrastructure
To this end, scholars have coalesced around several key factors that tend to drive
public support, opposition, and overall views of large-scale energy infrastructure
projects. These include concerns about socioeconomics, aesthetics, environmental im-
pacts, health risks, planning and siting processes, and proximity to the infrastructure
(Rand and Hoen, 2017). Socioeconomic considerations appear particularly pertinent
in the scholarly and public discourse, especially in the wind-energy infrastructure
context. For example, scholars have identified a strong perception that wind-energy
development brings jobs to communities, and expected economic development has
been linked with support for wind-energy development (Slattery et al., 2012; Bidwell,
2013; Brannstrom et al., 2011; Larson and Krannich, 2016). Likewise, perceived or ex-
pected property-value impacts are a major concern for residents living near proposed
energy projects (Abbott, 2010; Walker et al., 2014), even though studies suggest this
infrastructure has minimal or null effects on property values (Heintzelman and Tuttle,
2012; Fast and Mabee, 2015; Hoen et al., 2015; Lang et al., 2014). Advocates and
opponents also tend to focus on economic concerns in their efforts to influence the
outcomes of siting decisions (Brannstrom et al., 2011; Songsore and Buzzelli, 2015).
Due to the attention paid to them in scholarly and public discourse, we focus
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our analysis on perceptions of socioeconomic impacts.1 There is wide variation in
how individuals and coalitions portray and interpret these impacts though. In public
discourse, supporters and opponents focus on different sets of economic concerns in
shaping their arguments for and against the infrastructure (Songsore and Buzzelli,
2015). Scholars have also found variation in the impacts that tend to drive support
or opposition. Some scholars have found that compensation to landowners drives
support for wind-farm developments (Mulvaney et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2014) and
gas drilling (Jacquet, 2015, 2012). But individual-level compensation can also lead to
conflict within communities, due to concerns about fairness in the distribution of these
benefits (Fast et al., 2016; Baxter et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2014; Brannstrom et al.,
2011; Songsore and Buzzelli, 2015). Some work has shown that European residents
prefer public to private forms of compensation (García et al., 2016) and ownership
(Toke et al., 2008) to address fairness concerns, but it is not clear that concerns about
fairness in compensation predict attitudes about projects in North America (Baxter
et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2014). Nonetheless, concerns about public compensation
including tax revenues do tend to structure debates about siting (Brannstrom et al.,
2011).
In sum, scholars have found that socioeconomic considerations tend to drive views
of electricity-generation facilities, and project developers, opponents, and supporters
often focus on these aspects in public discourse. Building from this work, we focus
on perceptions of socioeconomic impacts to explain distinctions between supporters’
and opponents’ perceptions and portrayals of project impacts. We address two im-
portant gaps in the literature. First, while most prior work has focused on electricity
generation facilities, we examine views of transmission infrastructure. Our study can
help to illuminate whether the real and perceived distribution of costs and benefits
differs between generation and transmission facilities, and how these differences help
to explain public views towards different components of the energy system. Second,
the survey-based literature has focused on perceived socioeconomic impacts, but ques-
1We do not argue, of course, that these are the only project attributes that matter to community
members.
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tions remain about what shapes these perceptions. This question forms the core of
our analysis.
4.2.3 Sense of place shapes perceptions, representations, and
responses to disruptions
Sense of place–a concept developed in social psychology–informs how residents in-
terpret, evaluate, and portray potential disruptions such as, in our cases, energy
transmission infrastructure. Sense of place is composed of three related concepts: (1)
symbolic meanings form the bases for (2) attachment, and both of these contribute
to some level of (3) satisfaction associated with a “spatial setting” (Stedman, 2002,
p. 563). Symbolic meanings are “descriptive statements, rooted in symbols about
‘what kind of place this is’ (Stedman, 2002, p. 564). Meanings are symbolic in the
sense that they are expressed in terms of physical attributes of locations. Some have
conceptualized meanings as cognitive constructs (Stedman, 2002), while others argue
that meanings are comprised of both cognition and emotion (Devine-Wright, 2009).
We adopt the latter definition: the meanings associated with place are imbued with
both thinking and feeling and expressed through symbols. All settings hold multiple
meanings, and symbolic meanings associated with a place vary across individuals.
Symbolic meanings form the basis for place attachment and place satisfaction.
Place attachment is a “bond between people and their environment” (Moore and
Graefe, 1994; Williams et al., 1992; Stedman, 2002). Symbolic meanings are the
“building blocks” of attachment (Bem, 1970): people become attached to places
through attributing meaning to them. Attachment is also a form of identity since
people begin to define themselves in terms of a place, through interacting with the
place and imbuing it with meaning. One intuitive way to distinguish between sym-
bolic meanings and place attachment is to think of symbolic meanings as expressions
of what a place means to a person, whereas attachment is a measure of how much it
means (Bem, 1970; Stedman, 2002). Place satisfaction is an overall attitude, analo-
gous to a feeling thermometer, and it also stems from symbolic meanings. Satisfaction
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is a “multidimensional summary judgment of the perceived quality of a setting” (Sted-
man, 2002, p. 564)(Ladewig and McCann, 1980; Mesch and Manor, 1998). Together,
symbolic meanings, place attachment, and place satisfaction comprise sense of place.
Table 4.1 summarizes these concepts, along with the concepts from social represen-
tations theory that help to link sense of place with interpretation and evaluation of
community disruptions.
Table 4.1: Definitions: Sense of Place and Social Representations of Community
Disruptions
Concept Definition
Sense of Place
Symbolic meanings descriptive statements about a place, rooted in
physical attributes; what a place means to a person;
building blocks for attachment
Place attachment bond between people and their environment; how much
a place means to a person
Place satisfaction overall positive, negative, or neutral attitude about a
place
Social Representation of Community Disruptions
Anchoring linking new information to familiar knowledge through
naming or comparison
Objectification making abstract concepts, values, or principles concrete
The table provides definitions for the central concepts applied in the analysis, in which
we explore how sense of place shapes community-level interpretations of proposed
energy transmission infrastructure projects.
Devine-Wright (2009) combines sense of place with elements of social represen-
tations theory (Moscovici, 2001), in a framework that explains how sense of place
shapes residents’ interpretations, evaluations, portrayals, and actions towards pro-
posed changes in their communities. The framework, depicted in Figure 4-1, assumes
a disruption, which is a proposed or actual change to a place. Individual and social re-
sponses to the disruption unfold in four stages: awareness, interpretation, evaluation,
and coping (Devine-Wright, 2009). In the first phase, community members become
aware of the proposed disruption. This information-gathering process is mediated
by communication with trusted individuals, the media, project developers, and other
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interested stakeholders. Second, individuals interpret the change; they try to make
sense of its implications for their world. People interpret the change through the
processes of anchoring and objectification. Anchoring is the process by which people
link new information to familiar knowledge. Objectification is the process by which
people make abstract concepts concrete (Moscovici, 2001). We explain both concepts
more fully in Section 4.3. The links that people make between the unfamiliar and
the familiar are indelibly shaped by the composition of the familiar. Thus, in Devine-
Wright’s (2009) framework for assessing responses to place disruptions, the symbols
and symbolic meanings that comprise sense of place provide the source material from
which individuals draw in anchoring and objectifying disruptions. For example, some-
one who feels attachment to a farm community may develop expectations about an
unfamiliar disruption by analogy to elements of her experiences as a farmer.
In the third phase, people draw on their interpretations of proposed changes to
evaluate them as threats or opportunities. To continue our example, the farmer will
evaluate the disruption in light of its implications for farming. If people interpret
a change as place-enhancing, they will evaluate the change positively. Interpreta-
tions of a change as place-threatening correspond to negative evaluations, whereas
interpretations of the change as place-enhancing correspond to positive evaluations.
These evaluations depend on the fit between interpretations of project impacts and
the symbolic meanings associated with the place itself. Finally, in the coping and
acting phases, individuals may respond with actions of resistance to or support for
the change. The decision to act and the direction of action depend on evaluation of
the change as a threat or opportunity in light of an individual’s sense of place.
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Figure 4-1: Framework: Sense of place shapes responses to disruptions
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This figure, adapted from Devine-Wright (2009), depicts how sense of place shapes social responses
to community disruptions. The figure depicts five stages: knowing, interpreting, evaluating, coping,
and acting. The present analysis focuses on stages two and three: interpretation and evaluation.
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4.2.4 Sense of place shapes perceptions of energy infrastruc-
ture projects
Scholars have studied these concepts in the context of electricity generation infras-
tructure, in three main ways. First, without explicitly invoking the framework ar-
ticulated here, energy scholars have noted that place-related values, identities, at-
tachments, and meanings help explain responses to energy facility siting proposals
(Pasqualetti, 2011; Ferguson-Martin and Hill, 2011; Bidwell, 2013; Hirsh and So-
vacool, 2013; Phadke, 2013; Petrova, 2013). Second, scholars have explicitly used
elements from Devine-Wright’s (2009) framework to show how social representation,
symbolic meanings, and place attachments shape responses to facility siting propos-
als. These studies first gauge the meanings that survey respondents assign to their
communities. Examples of meanings include environmental health, economic decline,
tourism, wilderness, or friendliness (Jacquet and Stedman, 2013; Devine-Wright and
Howes, 2010; Bailey et al., 2016). Then, scholars show how residents interpret pro-
posals (through anchoring and objectification) and evaluate them in light of their
place attachments. For example, community members may anchor a proposed wind
farm by comparing turbines’ height to an industrial tower. These individuals would
interpret the wind farm as “industrializing.” Residents who view their community as
touristic–a symbolic meaning–are likely to evaluate this industrializing interpretation
as a threat. Conversely, those who view their place as economically struggling might
evaluate the industrializing wind farm as an opportunity (Devine-Wright and Howes,
2010). Opposition (support) hinge on contradictions (complementarities) between
symbolic representations of a place and perceptions of project impacts, as interpreted
through anchoring and objectification (Devine-Wright and Howes, 2010; Bailey et al.,
2016; Devine-Wright, 2009).
Third, scholars have assessed whether the scale of place attachment shapes ac-
ceptance of energy infrastructure. In these studies place attachment is generally op-
erationalized separately from symbolic meanings. Scholars ask respondents to what
extent they feel a sense of connection or belonging to their communities (Jacquet and
87
Stedman, 2013), the nation, or the world (Devine-Wright and Batel, 2017). They then
assess whether feelings of attachment to place drive attitudes about infrastructure de-
velopments. Findings are mixed, perhaps because the concept of place attachment is
imprecise and abstract as a survey item when it is separated from the symbolic mean-
ings underlying it. We argue that the content of symbolic meaning is an important
component in the link between place attachment and views of disruptions. In our
case sites, almost all respondents expressed place attachment, but their perceptions
of project impacts and their overall attitudes toward the proposals varied widely. As-
sessing the content of place attachments–and not simply gauging their existence or
their geographic scale–helps explain these differing perceptions.
4.3 Methods and Data
We apply this framework to assess how sense of place shapes perceptions of two pro-
posed long-haul energy transmission projects in the American Midwest. We chose our
case sites according to two criteria. First, we paid particular attention to the timing of
our data collection and selected projects that were still in the planning stages. Neither
project had been approved when we conducted our interviews. This timing distin-
guishes our study from prior work gauging public views after project completion. We
explore anticipatory interpretations and expectations, rather than perceptions that
are shaped by the end product or have had time to weaken in intensity. Second,
the cases differ in the type of infrastructure proposed. We study one natural gas
pipeline and one high-voltage transmission line intended to transmit wind-generated
electricity. This variation allows us to compare perceptions of projects which dif-
fer in their physical attributes and in the source of the energy they are designed to
carry. Third, both projects are designed primarily for transmission through, rather
than distribution within, the communities they will cross. This feature distinguishes
the localized impacts of transmission projects and distribution facilities, which have
been the main focus of prior assessments of energy infrastructure siting processes.
Our study extends knowledge of public attitudes about the U.S. energy system by
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illuminating perceptions of transmission–rather than distribution–facilities.
Our data consist of semi-structured interviews with county government officials;
stakeholders such as representatives of unions, farm bureaus, businesses, and envi-
ronmental groups; and community residents whose properties the projects would or
would not cross. We focused our interviews around two broad questions that we in-
troduced in Section 4.2 as queries of interest to scholars and practitioners. How do
community members and stakeholders evaluate the socioeconomic aspects of large-
scale energy infrastructure projects, and how do perceptions of siting processes shape
their evaluations? We used a semi-structured interview approach (Weiss, 1994). This
means we used an interview guide to ensure that we covered a core set of topics with
each respondent, but we allowed flexibility in the conversation so that respondents
could raise concerns and perspectives we may not have asked about. We adapted a
template interview guide for each respondent, and this template is included in the
Appendix. One of the authors conducted the interviews, and all interviews were
conducted in person or over the phone.2
We used a snowball sampling technique to identify interview respondents in each
case site. We identified initial contacts through media reports, the websites of relevant
stakeholder groups, and county government websites. We then arranged additional
interviews with individuals recommended by these initial contacts. In total, we inter-
viewed 31 individuals across the two project sites. Table 4.2 shows the roles of our
interview respondents across the two cases.
2Only one interview was conducted over the phone, because the respondent was not available in
person during the days we visited his community. All other interviews were conducted in person.
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Table 4.2: Interview Respondents Across our Case Sites
Description Project # of Respondents
Local official (elected) Pipeline 4
Power Line 7
Local official (unelected) Pipeline 2
Power Line 2
Stakeholder Pipeline 3
Power Line 2
Resident Pipeline 3
Power Line 7
Developer Pipeline 0
Power Line 1
We subjected our interview data to several rounds of qualitative coding, to un-
derstand how respondents interpreted and evaluated the proposed projects. In the
initial coding we categorized and organized responses based on the structure of our
interview protocol and initial research questions. This round of coding helped us
to identify commonalities and differences in respondents’ perceptions of project at-
tributes on a variety of dimensions, the implications of these attributes as individual-
or community-level costs or benefits, and overall evaluations of the projects.
Through the first round of coding, it became clear that individuals were using
elements of their social and individual experiences to interpret, assess, and ultimately
evaluate these proposed disruptions to their communities. To systematically assess
how social and individual experience informs respondents’ perspectives, we developed
a second coding protocol around sense of place and social representations. Table 4.3
summarizes the concepts that we used to organize the second round of coding.
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Table 4.3: Coding for Social Representations and Sense of Place
Concept Operationalization Example
Anchoring Naming Project is a “land grab”
Comparison Developer is not a utility
Objectification Value or principle,
concretely defined
“need” as demonstrable local shortage
of electricity
Symbolic meaning descriptive statement
rooted in physical
attributes
existing utility infrastructure is used
to characterize a place as industrial
Place attachment geographic scale of
expressed meanings
state as an oil producer
We code the interviews according to the operational definitions of anchoring and
objectification identified by Moscovici (2001). First, respondents categorize by nam-
ing the project or some aspect of it. For example, they might call it a “land grab”
(naming the project itself), or they might name crop damage as a concerning char-
acteristic. Second, they compare the project to a familiar prototype. For example,
many respondents compare the power line to pipelines, and this comparison informs
their expectations regarding disruption to farmland. We extend Moscovici’s (2001)
definition of prototypical comparisons to include metaphor as well.3 We identify in-
stances of objectification by coding for values that respondents invoke in evaluating
the projects, and noting the concrete evidence they use to argue that the project is
(in)consistent with each value.
We also coded the interviews for evidence of sense of place: symbolic meanings
and place attachments. These reveal themselves both through respondents’ general
portrayals of their communities and through their depictions of the relationship be-
3The distinction between metaphor and prototypical comparisons is subtle, as they are both forms
of comparison. We classify a comparison as a metaphor if a person uses the comparison to illustrate
an aspect of the project without claiming that the analog is a prototypical example of a class. For
example, a respondent might compare the height of a transmission tower to the height of a football
stadium, but this is not a claim that the tower is a stadium. By contrast, a prototypical comparison
makes a classification claim. For example, many respondents compare the merchant developer that
proposed the transmission line to traditional utilities. Respondents then argue that these entities
do or do not belong in the same class, and by extension that they should or should not be subject
to the same permitting procedures.
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tween the projects and their communities. Following Stedman’s (2002) argument
that symbolic meanings form the basis for place attachments, we coded segments of
the interviews wherein respondents invoked some concrete symbol, its meaning, and
the time- and/or geographic scale of place attachment associated with the symbolic
meaning. For example, one respondent depicts his community’s landscape this way:
We have power lines all over the place and I’ve been raised with that and
we have a substation where I was raised. My parents’ house was less than
350 feet from a substation....The school bus route came along there from
when I was in grade school and we’d walk from the house across a railroad
track bed to the school bus stop at the substation. I can tell you today if
I drove by that road every day I’m not for sure I could tell you whether
the gate was open on that fenced-in substation or not, or if there was any
wires to it. I don’t see it anymore because I’ve seen it every day. You
may have rooms in your house that you don’t know....You see them so
many times. You see them every day unless somebody drastically moves
a cabinet or something, you probably don’t see that cabinet any more.
It’s there and you see it but it doesn’t click.
The symbols invoked here include power lines, a substation, and (through ana-
logical reasoning) rooms in a home. The symbolic meaning they convey is that of a
rural-industrial landscape, and this meaning contributes to and reflects place attach-
ment at the local scale.
We use this coding process to extract the symbolic meanings expressed by the
residents we talked with, describe the interpretations and evaluations they present
when discussing the projects, and show how these two sets of concepts are related.
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4.4 Analysis: Sense of place informs the interpreta-
tion and evaluation of energy transmission in-
frastructure
Our primary question is how symbolic meanings and place attachments shape inter-
pretations and evaluations of transmission infrastructure projects proposed for our
case communities. To answer, we assess patterns of place attachments, symbolic
meanings, and the links between them among supporters and opponents of both
projects.4 Several patterns emerge in the frequency with which supporters and oppo-
nents of the projects express symbolic meanings and place attachments. First, all of
our interview respondents convey local place attachments. This provides support for
the argument that understanding multi-scalar place attachments is critical to explain-
ing the relationship between sense of place and evaluation of community disruptions
(Devine-Wright and Batel, 2017). To this end, project supporters, compared with
opponents, more commonly invoke higher-level (state or national) place attachments.
It is too simplistic to argue that those who feel a sense of place attachment are the
most likely to oppose infrastructure proposals. Instead, the geographic scale of place
attachments interacts with symbolic meanings to inform interpretation of particular
project impacts.
A second pattern concerns the aesthetic characterizations that respondents apply
to their communities. Opponents more often express place sentiments relating to
nature, home, and respite. In contrast, supporters commonly view their communities
as rural-industrial landscapes and convey pride in their communities’ achievement of
progress or modernization.
4Appendix Tables B.0-21 and B.0-22 show the number of respondents that invoked each scale of
place attachment and symbolic meaning, and the number of times we used each code. We created
a code for each symbolic meaning expressed by an interview respondent, and coded all instances
of that meaning expressed by any respondent. Table B.0-21 shows the percentage of supporters
and opponents that communicate the meanings expressed most frequently. Table B.0-22 shows
the frequency with which we applied these codes across transcripts and thus provides a sense for
the intensity with which respondents express each meaning. Note that Table B.0-22 includes some
meanings that are not included in Table B.0-21, because they are expressed with low intensity or
by only one respondent.
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Third, while there are some similarities in the economic identities that supportive
and opposing respondents express, they vary in the specific production-related place
meanings they express. Economic identities include vulnerability or poverty along
with production-related meanings, such as farming, commerce and industry, or energy
production. Respondents in both groups express a sense of community vulnerability.
This pattern comports with findings that local economic quality is not a significant
independent predictor of support or opposition to infrastructure projects (Konisky
et al., 2018). Instead, sentiments of community vulnerability interact with other
symbolic meanings underlying productive identities to shape perceptions and evalu-
ations of project impacts. Both supportive and opposing respondents identify with
their places as agricultural producers.5 Opponents more often focus on agricultural
production to the exclusion of other productive activities like energy or manufactur-
ing.6 In contrast, supporters often highlight commercial and industrial productivity
or energy production. We next assess how these patterns of symbolic meanings and
place attachments inform interpretations and evaluations of project impacts.
Scale of place attachments help define the values and principles
by which respondents evaluate the projects
Place attachments help respondents evaluate the projects. Specifically, the geographic
scale of place attachments informs how respondents objectify the principles of need,
progress, service, and security, through which they evaluate the projects. Table 4.4
shows the links between place attachment, particular interpretations of values and
principles, and evaluations of the projects.
5This frequency appears slightly lower among power line supporters, in part because two project
supporters were stakeholders associated with labor and environmental groups, and not local to the
communities where the projects were proposed.
6The prevalence of farm-related place sentiments appears lower among pipeline opponents, but it
is important to note that all pipeline opponents who express production-related place sentiments
express sentiments associated with farming. We talked with a few pipeline opponents from suburban
communities, whose place sentiments were not related to production at all but instead to aesthetic
characteristics. This is an example of how the objective differences between places constrain the
possibilities for interpretation of impacts through the lens of sense of place (Van der Horst, 2007)
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Table 4.4: Scale of place attachments, values, and evaluations of projects
Place
attachment
Value or
principle
Definition Evaluation
National,
local
need, progress national and local electricity needs opportunity
National,
local
need, service community contribution to national
electricity needs
opportunity
National,
state, local
security,
progress
American energy independence, local oil
and gas extraction
opportunity
Local need no unmet local electricity needs threat
The table shows the links between the geographic scale of place attachments and the
meanings respondents apply to ambiguous values and principles. Place attachments
inform how respondents define the values they use to evaluate the projects.
In both cases, only supporters express national-scale place attachments, and they
often justify their support for the project in terms of these higher-level place attach-
ments. A county commissioner on the power line route couches his support based
on the need for national infrastructure improvements. He explains, “We’re all three
[county commissioners] of the opinion that the infrastructure of the electric trans-
mission in the United States is ancient and needs to be upgraded....Infrastructure is
important if the nation is going to grow.” This respondent assigns meaning to national
electricity needs and sees the project as an opportunity to better meet those needs.
He also links national and even global place attachment back to his community. He
continues:
I just saw on television one of the politicians talking, that the reason
people are poor in other parts of the world is because they don’t have
electricity. Electricity has been the finest gift to the humans that you can
imagine. As a little boy I grew up without electricity and...To me, why
would anybody protest? There’s electric lines going across my, it was at
the time my great-grandfather’s property and he gave the right of way he
was so happy to have electricity in the area. Now we’re griping about not
getting enough money.
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This respondent links his own experience from childhood with national and even global
electricity needs. He also expresses a value of progress defined in a geographically
nested way, and evaluates the project as an opportunity to advance national and
local progress.
Other power line supporters justify their support for the project by invoking, as
a component of community identity, local service towards the national good. One
respondent expresses the sentiment this way:
I think it’s almost a little patriotic for me to be able to provide to people
that we’re not only providing their food, we’re not only able to provide
them quality product for them to eat, but we’re also able to help them
to have electricity, to have energy, that that’s something that we are able
to provide here in rural [America] that they can’t do in the cities because
it’s just not feasible.
This definition of service reveals geographically nested place attachments: this re-
spondent values both local service and national needs. Several other respondents
invoke similar definitions of service in explaining their support for the power line and
in describing their community’s role in the project. Geographically nested place at-
tachments are central to these objectifications of service, progress, and need. In turn,
these values–so defined–provide a basis for viewing the project as an opportunity for
the community, region, or nation.
Similarly, respondents along the pipeline route invoke the value of national security
to explain their view of the pipeline as an opportunity. One respondent explains, “I am
a firm believer that we need to be independent of foreign oil. What do we fight these
wars over at the end of the day? It is generally oil and to do that, I think it [domestic
oil and gas extraction] is going to save our nation, it really is.” He continues by arguing
that pipelines are the safest, most reliable technology for facilitating the extraction
of oil and gas from the Marcellus and Utica shales. He also links national security
with regional and local impacts, musing, “I wish I was 20 years younger so I could
see the impact on this region in the next 20 years as we become truly independent of
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foreign oil and the economic activity that is going to be ongoing with the Utica and
the Marcellus.” The respondent’s exposure to the energy industry shapes his sense of
place: he draws meaning from the local oil and gas industry. The pipeline presents
an opportunity to expand gas extraction, enhancing both this source of local meaning
and national security. Thus, his sense of place tied to energy production contribute
to the view of the project as an opportunity for both the nation and the region.
Conversely, the exclusively local place attachments expressed by many opponents
grounds the criteria they use to evaluate the projects. This is particularly evident in
the power line case, where respondents evaluate the project in terms of geographi-
cally defined (local) need. Opponents contrast the project with existing power lines,
railroads, and highways, arguing that the critical distinction with these other types
of infrastructure is that they all serve a local need. One opponent declares, “This
RTO was not ... Doesn’t need the energy [from the transmission line]. We have
plenty of cheap abundant electricity as it is and we’re also utilizing wind energy right
here...that we make here.” Another compares the proposal to a recently constructed
transmission line: “Well, it was moving electricity in [my state] from one spot to
another spot in [my state]. I assumed they needed it. Ameren is an electric com-
pany....They’re serving the people of [my state].” These respondents do not view the
project as an opportunity to meet a need, because they define need in an exclusively
local way. Thus, place attachment informs their particular definition of need, through
which they evaluate the project. 7
The values of need, security, and service are ambiguous, in that they are subject to
interpretation and can thus take on different meanings for different individuals. Place
attachments inform the particular meanings that respondents apply to these values
in our cases, and, thus, their evaluations of the projects as threats or opportunities.
7Supporters are also aware of this distinction, but they often invoke a more abstract definition
of “public good,” or they express place attachments encompassing the state, region, nation, or
future. This layered place attachment informs their conception of “need” as extending beyond the
immediate needs of their community or even state.
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Symbolic meanings associated with economic identities inform
interpretation of project impacts
In combination with the geographic scale of place attachments, the meanings un-
derlying production-related place attachments shape the way in which respondents
interpret and evaluate the projects’ economic impacts. Table 4.5 summarizes these
links between symbolic meanings and geographically scaled place attachments, inter-
pretation of impacts, and evaluations of the projects.8
Table 4.5: Links between productive identities, scale of place attachments, interpre-
tation, and evaluation of project impacts
Economic
Identity
Scale of Place
Attachment
Interpretation of project impact Evaluation
Energy,
agriculture
local, state,
national
benefit: independence from foreign oil
and gas opportunity
benefit: expanded energy development
benefit: pipeline construction jobs
Modernity local,
national
benefit: upgrade grid opportunity
Agriculture local
(non) benefit: local electricity
threatcost: inconvenience to farmers, farmland
devaluation
(non) benefit: non-local, temporary jobs
This table shows the links between symbolic meanings associated with economic iden-
tities, scale of place attachments, interpretation of project impacts in light of place
sentiments, and the resulting evaluations of the projects. The table shows that eval-
uations stem from the perceived complementarity or contradiction between sense of
place and perceived project impacts.
In general, supporters and opponents differ in whether farming features as the
only source of economic identity. A respondent in the power line case exemplifies a
dualistic sense of place infused with a narrative of arrested decline. She expresses
8Table B.0-20 provides a complete summary of the links between sense of place, anchors people use
to interpret the proposals, the values they use to evaluate them, and interpretations and evaluations
of the projects.
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nostalgia for her town’s identity as an industrial producer:
If you were to look at us 30 years ago, we had a manufacturing plant here
for GE, for General Electric...There was a Simco and they did a lot of
welding, and they did a lot of production of I’m not sure exactly what
specifically they produced, but had a lot of welding, they had a lot of
trades jobs....We’ve lost so many manufacturing jobs that there’s really,
unless you are attached to the local government or the school or you’re
doing something that supports the agriculture industry here, there aren’t
many jobs.
She also draws meaning from her community’s identity as an agricultural producer,
and expresses a similar narrative of decline. She recalls farmers’ struggles during
the 1980s farm crisis and, informed by this memory, sees farmers teetering again:
“Profit margins and row crop production are razor thin right now. For instance, last
year we wouldn’t have had any income over being able to make the payments...Some
of the stuff is kind of starting to snowball the same way they did in the early ’80s
to lead to the crash like in the mid-’80s.” Other respondents also invoke symbols
suggesting a narrative of decline, including job loss, out-migration, school district
budget shortfalls, and dwindling county budgets.
When viewed within a context of industrial and agricultural decline, the project
represents an opportunity for community recovery and individual hedging. Most re-
spondents recognize that jobs associated with the power line would be temporary
and may not go to local workers. Even so, when viewed through the lens of in-
dustrial decline, the project represents an opportunity to revitalize the community’s
manufacturing identity:
They [jobs] are not going to affect us here in the county because that
would be probably close to an hour and 20 minute drive every day for
someone...But no, that’s not really a concern to me that they would be
temporary because hopefully this industry continues to build and trans-
mission continues to improve and expand and they’re able to continue
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building up, those temporary jobs become permanent and they’re able to
get more jobs.
This expectation of future growth complements the narrative of community decline
and recovery. Likewise, compensation to farmers represents an opportunity for hedg-
ing by those whose properties are directly impacted by the line. Additionally, indi-
vidual compensation has a multiplier effect:
Having that additional revenue [compensation from the power line] is re-
ally big. One of the things that’s really neat about farmers and agricultur-
alists, is when we have extra money in our pockets it’s most likely going
to stay local. We’re going to buy more cows, it means we need to buy
more feed, so that keeps the individuals employed at the feed mill. It’s
really a trickle down system to where, maybe we’ll buy another tractor or
we may upgrade equipment.
In this view, transmission infrastructure represents an opportunity for land to multi-
task in its productive capacity, as both grazing land and a rent generator. Her sense
of place is rooted in manufacturing decline, farmers’ vulnerability, and memories of
agricultural decline and feeble recovery. The project complements these meanings; she
views it as an opportunity to hedge against crop and land price fluctuations and bring
back local manufacturing. For this respondent and others, a narrative of community
decline supports evaluation of the project as an opportunity to ensure the continua-
tion of local services, replenish county coffers, and support local service-industry or
construction businesses.
Pipeline supporters also commonly evaluate the project as an opportunity in light
of dualistic place sentiments rooted in agriculture and energy production. Pipeline
respondents who express energy-related place sentiments are optimistic about future
employment growth associated with pipeline construction. One respondent recalls:
One day I went up to see one of their guys up on the rigs, and it was
Jimmy from Louisiana. We got to talking and he goes, “You know what?
As soon as I train somebody to run this rig, I am going back to Louisiana.
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Nothing against Ohio, but I am an offshore driller guy,” He said. That
was the problem we had initially, they had to bring the people in from the
outside because they knew how to ... They were trained to do the work.
Then we, it took us about two to three years to get caught up and start
a well site training center that was developed right here downtown, just
down the street, to train workers, to teach welding and to teach everything
that needed to be to run these rigs....Our biggest challenge in the next
10, 20 years is going to be workforce, having a workforce that is trained,
can pass a drug test and wants to come to work everyday. That is going
to be the biggest challenge because the jobs are going to be there....I tell
people, “Look, you want Junior to have a job in the next 20 years, we have
got to seize the opportunity here.”
This respondent’s hopeful attitude mirrors the hope for a manufacturing rebound in
the power line case. Like power line respondents, he recognizes that developers have
imported workers, but expresses hope that the growing industry will support local
workforce development. His prior experience with the oil and gas industry informs
this hopeful interpretation for employment growth. It also shapes his sense that
energy production is an important source of meaning. In turn, the importance of oil
and gas development as a symbolic meaning contributing to his sense of place implies
that the pipeline’s potential to expand shale-gas extraction is place-enhancing.
Production-related identities also interact with the scale of respondents’ place
attachments to inform their views of the projects’ potential as economic opportuni-
ties. One power line supporter describes employment opportunity in the wind-energy
industry in terms of opportunities for his state:
Wind by its very nature creates jobs in Missouri because Missouri is a
manufacturing center that’s all about bending metal. We make airplanes.
We make cars. So if you go to the AWEA [American Wind Energy As-
sociation] website or any website that shows you the wind energy supply
chain, you’re going to see lots of stuff in Missouri. And so wind being built
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anywhere in the country, is creating jobs in Missouri...Whereas there’s no
coal mined in Missouri at all for Missouri electricity production.
Similarly, respondents in the pipeline case describe the pipeline as essential to re-
opening capped shale gas wells in Ohio, and this evaluation is deeply rooted in the
state’s identity as an energy producer. One respondent describes his upbringing:
Where I come from in southeastern Ohio, drilling and oil and gas produc-
tion is literally part of our collective consciousness, because we’ve been in-
volved with it in agriculture for literally decades and over a century....You
see it come in cycles, but now with Marcellus and Utica shale develop-
ment that you’re seeing over there...It’s not new strata or new discoveries,
because we’ve always known the oil and gas is there. It’s basically having
the technology to be able to harvest it efficiently and effectively.
This respondent and others view pipeline construction as an essential component to
unleashing the state’s energy production potential and as the safest, most efficient
technology for doing so. For those to whom oil and gas development is an important
source of place meaning, the project is place-enhancing.
Respondents who express purely local, farm-based production identities interpret
quite differently the potential for employment or economic development associated
with the projects. A county commissioner on the power line route states:
This county is one of the larger counties in the state. You can guess
that most of [the land] is agricultural, not all of it, but a great chunk
of it is agricultural. We feel very strongly that without agriculture this
county would have nothing....The farm community is the biggest producer
of money in the county.
Many also link this meaning with a sense of vulnerability: “It’s not a great time to be
a farmer and rancher right now anyways,” and “It takes generations and generations
of building anything to make a living off of.” Respondents in this group focus on
disruption to farming and decline in property value that the project could impose,
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rather than the opportunity to “bring back” lost manufacturing jobs or hedge against
risk. They discredit claims about employment opportunities:
What they do is they have like a circus and they get, they hire workers
and they all start at a beginning location, you know, in whatever state it
is. And then they take their little traveling circus, and they go from the
beginning all the way to the end....The vast majority of the pipeline work-
ers were from out of state and....It’s not people that live in the community
for the most part.
This quote illustrates that respondents whose place attachments are not rooted in
local or statewide manufacturing are not inclined to see the project as an economic
opportunity. Instead, they dismiss employment opportunities as immaterial and focus
their evaluations on disruption to agriculture and the inadequacy of compensation the
developer pays to farmers. A project opponent in Illinois observes:
There are power lines that go, they don’t go parallel with the bound-
ary; they go at an angle across a big, nice field. Oh, that hurts that
field....Every time they’re out there doing tillage work, you’ve got to go
around it some way. You’ve got to watch for it. You’ve got to watch for it
or you’ll hit one of those poles, that big pole. We’re talking about a piece
of land that’s worth millions of dollars, and then you have that obstacle.
Respondents for whom agriculture represents the only source of economic identity
focus on disruption to farming when evaluating the project. They dismiss manu-
facturing employment or service-industry business as either unlikely to transpire or
irrelevant to their local place attachments rooted in agricultural production. The
project represents a threat of loss rather than an opportunity to recover or hedge
against possible losses.
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4.4.1 Aesthetic characterizations shape interpretations and eval-
uations
Symbolic meanings associated with aesthetic qualities also provide a basis for inter-
preting and evaluating project impacts. Opponents and supporters convey aesthetic
descriptions of their communities, and Table 4.6 summarizes the links between aes-
thetic meanings, interpretation of project impacts, and evaluations.
Table 4.6: Aesthetic meanings, scale of place attachment, interpretation, and evalu-
ation of project impacts
Aesthetic
Meaning
Scale of Place
Attachment
Interpretation, Value Evaluation
Suburbs,
nature, home local
cost: damaged natural areas
threatcommunity cost: tax revenues decline
individual cost: property values decline
Rural-
industrial local
(non) cost: no decline in property values
opportunitybenefit: tax revenues increase
benefit: cut property tax rates
The table shows the two broad patterns of aesthetic meanings that community mem-
bers use to describe their communities, the interpretations of project impacts com-
monly associated with each characterization, and the resulting evaluation of the
project as a threat or opportunity.
Aesthetic place sentiments conveyed by opponents include portrayals of the com-
munity as suburban, depictions of natural landscapes, and affinities for home. One
pipeline opponent evokes all three of these, in describing the view from his home:
This is probably one of the more pristine tributaries to the river because
it doesn’t have a lot of building around it. It doesn’t go through really
any villages or anything. It’s just out in the country. More so it’s being
built up more and more because this guy over here wants to develop it.
But anyway....I can go on and on. This river is very, very important to
me. This whole swamp is. This is a floodplain. In the spring this totally
becomes a lake. I call it Lake [his wife’s name].
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Later, he describes the developer’s plans for boring beneath his swamp: “They pump
the water across where the water is ponded on the upside, put the pipe in, fill it
back up, ‘restore’ it.” Scoffing incredulously, he adds, “My battle with anybody was
you don’t restore wetlands. You destroy it and then wait for it to come back 50,
75 years later.” These quotes illustrate a contradiction between the pipeline and
the aesthetic characteristics that provide meaning to a place and thus build place
attachment. This view exemplifies the symbolic meanings espoused by many project
opponents who view their communities as rural respites, natural landscapes, or who
express strong feelings of a place as home.
In contrast, many supporters–particularly in the pipeline case–describe landscapes
as rural-industrial, a depiction that does not produce the same sense of threat. They
note the existence of power lines, electricity generation facilities, highways, pipelines,
and other infrastructure and argue that none of these interferes with the productive
or aesthetic value of the land. One respondent expresses this in colorful terms:
Do we like pipeline or energy infrastructure? Well I’ll tell you this. Our
farm in [a different] County: We have three pipeline systems, an AT&T
transmission cable, American Electric Power, a 725 kilowatt transmission
line goes across the corner of it. Pennsylvania Railroad and yeah there’s
a cellular tower on the farm across the road.
A power line supporter says, “In this locale you can’t see very far anyway. You
can’t see very far without seeing cell phone towers, you can’t see very far without
seeing other utility poles.” In this view, people are so accustomed to seeing utility
infrastructure that they no longer notice it, farmers have gotten used to farming
over pipelines and around power poles, and consequently the project does not pose a
threat. These respondents do not view a new proposal for industrial infrastructure
as a threat to the landscape, since it is already industrialized.9
9Notably, in the power line case some opponents also depict the landscape as rural-industrial, but
they draw a different meaning from the existence of utility infrastructure on many farms. Farmers
have done enough and should not have to accept more infrastructure on their properties. In their
more generalized depictions of the landscape, opponents portray the community as a rural respite
and highlight the negative impact of new infrastructure on view sheds and natural areas. These
aesthetic depictions correspond with views of the project as a threat.
105
Different aesthetic characterizations also shape expectations for the projects’ eco-
nomic impacts. For instance, opponents whose sense of place is rooted in a natural-
landscape aesthetic downplay the project’s revenue generating potential. They argue
that the new infrastructure would cause a decline in property taxes. Landowners
would petition for a reduction in the assessed value of their homes based on the
aesthetic disruption caused by the new infrastructure. In contrast, supporters who
view their community as a rural-industrial landscape are not particularly worried
about property devaluation. They cite examples of instances in which power lines,
pipelines, or other aesthetic nuisances have failed to cause a reduction in home-sale
values. Moreover, an assessor along the power line route points out that the tax
revenues from a pipeline that crosses the county generates 35% more revenue than
all of the farm land in the county. Another supporter points out that nine of the top
ten taxpayers in the county are utilities. Other supporters recall situations wherein
other counties lowered individual property-tax rates after pipelines produced a wind-
fall for local school districts. Respondents who anchor to these experiences view the
power line as an opportunity to add to local revenues and/or reduce local property
taxes. These conflicting evaluations are informed by the symbolic meanings respon-
dents associate with their communities. For those who view the landscape as already
industrialized, one more project does not pose a threat to a landscape already criss-
crossed by them. But those who cherish their communities as pastoral respites are
more likely to worry about property devaluation caused by visible infrastructure, since
this is an interruption to the landscape as they perceive it.
4.5 Implications and Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the relationship between sense of place, perceptions of
community impacts, and evaluations of community disruptions in the form of energy
transmission infrastructure proposals. We build from scholarship that finds little ev-
idence for a NIMBY explanation for community opposition to energy infrastructure,
positing instead that public perceptions are more nuanced than the NIMBY label sug-
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gests. Survey researchers have used perceptual measures to identify socioeconomic
considerations as important drivers of public attitudes, and our analysis helps to elu-
cidate the sources of these perceptions. We deeply explore the place sentiments that
help to shape community perceptions of socioeconomic impacts including landowner
compensation, jobs, tax revenues, manufacturing activity, electricity provision, and
impact to property values and farming operations. We show how the geographic scale
of place attachments and the symbolic meanings that compose sense of place inform
respondents’ interpretation and evaluation of project impacts.
We show that the scale of place attachments informs individuals’ definitions of
the values and principles they use to evaluate proposed disruptions. Those who view
the projects as an opportunity are more likely to hold state and national-scale place
attachments. Opponents, in contrast, are more likely to express exclusively local place
attachments. These differences inform the values–particularly need, service, progress,
and security–through which respondents evaluate project impacts.
We also show that the symbolic meanings people associate with their communities–
particularly those associated with economic identities and aesthetic qualities–shape
views of direct and second-order economic impacts. Opponents are more likely to feel
connected to their community’s identity as an agricultural producer, whereas sup-
porters in both sites draw meaning from their communities’ history of manufacturing
or energy production. The scale of place attachments and symbolic meanings that
underly them also interact to shape interpretations and evaluations of the proposed
disruptions. For example, respondents who hold state-scale place attachments and
value the state’s role in U.S. manufacturing view the project as an opportunity even
if it will not create jobs in their own town or county.
The study contributes to conceptual and empirical explanations of public atti-
tudes about the U.S. energy system, by applying the sense-of-place framework in
the transmission infrastructure context. Conceptually, we advance the sense-of-place
framework by focusing on how the scale and content of place attachment interact
to shape perceptions. Exploring the symbolic meanings underlying place attach-
ments adds nuance to understanding of the relationship between place attachment
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and attitudes toward community disruptions. As our analysis shows, the content of
multi-scalar and local place attachments can vary widely with important implications
for interpretations and evaluations of disruptions. Our study also provides an em-
pirical advance, because we carry the sense-of-place framework into the transmission
infrastructure context. Wind-farm development has been the primary context for de-
veloping the framework, and we highlight concerns that are prevalent in responding
to transmission infrastructure proposals.
The timing of our interviews also distinguishes the analysis, since much prior
work focuses on perceptions of projects once they have been installed. We draw our
inferences from interviews conducted during the planning and permitting process.
Our findings can help scholars and practitioners better understand and address the
concerns of community members who will be asked repeatedly to accept infrastructure
like the projects we study here.
The interpretation of proposed disruptions is not an atomistic process. Instead,
through political and social discourse, interested actors try to shape interpretations
in light of pre-existing attachments, and they may even shape those attachments
themselves (Moloney and Walker, 2007; Devine-Wright and Howes, 2010). Our study
captures discourses at a single moment in time, such that we cannot trace the social
processes that shape our respondents’ place attachments. Instead, future research
could trace how social constructions shape individuals’ place attachments and thereby
inform their interpretations and evaluations of place disruptions.
The political and social discourses that inform interpretations of disruptions raise
important considerations for equity and justice for at least two reasons. First, the
power to shape discourse is unequally distributed. Second, places differ in their
objective characteristics, which raises perilous implications for communities that al-
ready host infrastructure. Variation in communities’ environmental, aesthetic, and
economic qualities shapes the available symbols from which individuals draw place-
related meanings. This variation thus constrains the possibilities for interpreting
impacts through the lens of sense of place (Van der Horst, 2007). To the extent
that developers site infrastructure by anticipating conflicts between sense of place
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and proposed projects or adapt compensation accordingly, the nation’s infrastructure
future could perpetuate an unjust distribution of costs and benefits accruing from
infrastructure siting. Even if community members hold perceptions of their commu-
nities as “industrial” and therefore do not view disruptions as place-threatening, it
does not necessarily follow that new infrastructure should be sited there. Nor does
it follow that communities whose characteristics imply that residents are likely to
view a project as a threat should not accept some share of the nation’s infrastructure
capacity expansion.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Taken together, these papers advance understanding of the drivers of environmental
politics in a polarized American political context, and they provide a foundation for
future research of relevance to political science and environmental policy. Chapter
One provides empirical evidence that the polarization of Americans’ views of environ-
mental policy runs deep and is ubiquitous around the country. The conservationist
wing of the Republican Party has largely disappeared, and Americans’ views of en-
vironmental protection are now differentiated by region more than by party. The
exception is the American West, where views are distinct from those of the rest of
the nation even after accounting for partisanship. The study raises opportunities for
future research into the causes and consequences of this lingering geographic differ-
entiation within an otherwise nationalized partisan split. The analysis also raises
questions about the rhetorical roots of the changing drivers of environmental con-
cern, most notably the increased salience of economic concerns in shaping Americans’
views. Additionally, the opinion data provide a crucial ingredient for explaining the
parties’ changing postures towards environmental protection.
Chapter Two provides evidence that elections have consequences for regulatory
enforcement, and for administrative policy more broadly. The analysis also provides
evidence of heterogeneity in the influence that governors and legislatures can exert
over state agencies. This heterogeneity is consistent with theoretical predictions con-
cerning the differential mechanisms of political control available to governors and state
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legislatures, but future research should more deeply explore the process of political
influence. Moreover, while the study provides evidence for political influence over one
type of administrative policy (regulatory enforcement), future research should explore
heterogeneity in political influence in other policy areas (e.g., healthcare, education,
financial regulations, or welfare).
Chapter Three extends the sense-of-place framework to the energy transmission
infrastructure context. The study deepens the conceptual framework itself. I show
how the meanings underlying place attachments inform the values that individuals use
to evaluate community disruptions, and I highlight the place-related identities that
shape community responses to disruption in the American Midwest. Place meanings
are socially constructed, though, and future research should trace the power-laden
discursive processes that shape individuals’ place attachments which, in turn, inform
interpretations and evaluations of place disruptions.
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Appendix A
States Divided: Partisan Polarization
and Environmental Protection
A.1 Survey Questions Included in the Estimates of
Environmental Concern
Table A.1-1: Survey Questions Included in the Estimates of Environmental Concern
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
policy 2001 When it comes to protecting the environment;
do you think government too often gives in to
business interests or don’t you think so?
Time Magazine and CNN 2001
policy 2000; 1992;
2001; 2003;
2004; 2005;
2006; 2010;
2011; 2012;
2013; 2014;
2015
Do you think the U.S. government is doing too
much; too little; or about the right amount in
terms of protecting the environment?
Gallup 2000a, 1992, 2001, 2003a,
2004b, 2005, 2006, 2010a, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015
A-1
Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
policy 2001; 2002;
2003; 2004;
2005; 2007;
2008
With which do you agree: Life on earth will
continue without major environmental disrup-
tions only if we take additional; immediate;
and drastic action concerning the environ-
ment; We should take some additional actions
concerning the environment; We should take
just the same actions we have been taking on
the environment?
Gallup 2001, 2002a, 2003a, 2004b,
2005, 2007, 2008b
policy 1990; 1991 With which do you agree: Life on earth will
continue without major environmental disrup-
tions only if we take additional; immediate;
and drastic action concerning the environ-
ment; We should take some additional actions
concerning the environment; We should take
just the same actions we have been taking on
the environment?
Gallup 1990, 1991
policy 2001; 2002;
2003; 2006;
2007; 2012;
2014
Do you favor or oppose more strongly enforcing
federal environmental regulations?
Gallup 2001, 2002a, 2003a, 2006, 2007,
2012, 2014
policy 2014 Do you think government enforcement efforts
of the Clean Air Act are adequate?
Cooperative Congressional Election
Study 2014
policy 1990; 1985 Do you think government enforcement efforts
of environmental regulations are adequate; too
strict; or not strict enough?
Time Magazine and CNN 1990; Time
Magazine 1985
policy 2010; 2002;
1995; 2001;
1990; 1985
Are the existing environmental laws and reg-
ulations adequate; should go further; or have
gone too far?
CNN 2010b; Time Magazine and CNN
2002, 1995, 2001, 1990; Time Magazine
1985
policy 1996 With which do you agree: current environ-
mental laws need to be made tougher. They
are tough enough but need better enforcement.
Both laws and enforcement are at the right
levels; or current environmental laws are too
tough and should be loosened up?
Belden and Russonello 1996
policy 1992; 1995;
2001; 1990
Would it be better to go slow in spending
money to clean up the environment; or do you
think we should go full-speed ahead?
Time Magazine and CNN 1992b,c,
1995, 2001, 1990
policy 1997 How high a priority should the environment
be for Congress and the President in the next
year?
Gallup 1997a
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Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
policy 1990 How high a priority should cleaning up the en-
vironment be for the country?
Washington Post 1990
policy 1997 How high a foreign-policy priority should the
environment be?
Pew 1997
policy 2000; 2004 Should the federal government spend more to
protect the environment?
National Annenberg Election Survey
2000a,b,c,d,e, 2004, 2000f
policy 2009; 2004;
2003; 2002
How important is it that the president and
Congress deal with the environment in the
next year?
CNN 2009; Gallup 2004d, 2003b,
2002b
policy 1998 How high a priority should providing tax cred-
its to reduce pollution be for using the surplus?
Gallup 1998b
policy 1989; 2007;
1986; 2002;
2001; 1990;
1992; 1996;
1997; 2006
Do you agree or disagree that protecting the
environment is so important that requirements
and standards cannot be too high; and con-
tinuing environmental improvements must be
made regardless of cost?
CBS 1989, 2007, 1986, 2002, 2001a,
1990, 2001e, 1992b, 1996, 1997, 1992c,
2006; New York Times 1989
policy 1998 Do you agree or disagree that protecting the
environment is so important that requirements
and standards cannot be too high; and con-
tinuing environmental improvements must be
made regardless of cost?
American National Election Studies
1998
policy 1979; 1982;
1983
Do you think environmental protection laws
and regulations have gone too far; or not far
enough; or have struck about the right bal-
ance?
Roper 1979, 1982, 1983
policy 2008; 2007 Do you think environmental regulations in this
country are: excessively strong; too strong but
not excessive; about right; need to be some-
what stronger; or need to be a lot stronger?
Knowledge Networks, American Clean
Skies Foundation 2008; Knowledge
Networks, MIT 2007
policy 2002 Do you think environmental regulations in this
country are: excessively strong; too strong but
not excessive; about right; need to be some-
what stronger; or need to be a lot stronger?
(with prelude)
Knowledge Networks, MIT 2002
policy 2010 Do you think that America is doing more than
enough; about the right amount; or too little
to protect the world’s environment?
General Social Survey 2010
policy 1992; 1990 Would you be willing to pay 200 dollar more in
taxes to clean up the environment if you knew
the money was going to be used for environ-
mental cleanup purposes only?
Time Magazine and CNN 1992c, 1990
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Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
policy 1992; 1990 Would you be willing to pay 500 dollars more
in taxes to clean up the environment if you
knew the money was going to be used for en-
vironmental cleanup purposes only?
Time Magazine and CNN 1992c, 1990
policy 1985 In order to do more to clean up toxic wastes;
would you be willing to pay higher federal in-
come taxes to fund cleanup programs across
the nation?
Time Magazine 1985
policy 1990 Would you be willing to pay an extra 25 cents
per gallon of gas to reduce pollution and global
warming?
Time Magazine and CNN 1990
policy 1990 Would you be willing to pay an extra 50 cents
per gallon of gas to reduce pollution and global
warming?
Time Magazine and CNN 1990
policy 1993; 1994;
2000; 2010
How willing would you be to pay much higher
prices in order to protect the environment?
General Social Survey 1993, 1994,
2000, 2010
policy 1985 In order to do more to clean up toxic wastes;
would you be willing to pay higher state and
local taxes to fund cleanup programs in your
area?
Time Magazine 1985
policy 1993; 1994;
2000; 2010
How willing would you be to accept cuts in
your standard of living in order to protect the
environment?
General Social Survey 1993, 1994,
2000, 2010
policy 1993; 1994;
2000; 2010
How willing would you be to pay much higher
taxes in order to protect the environment?
General Social Survey 1993, 1994,
2000, 2010
spending 2005 Should spending for environment and natural
resources increase; decrease; or stay the same?
Knowledge Networks, The Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations 2005
spending 2000 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2000
spending 2002 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2002
spending 2006 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2006
spending 2008 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2008
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Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
spending 2010 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2010
spending 2012 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2012
spending 2014 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2014
spending 2016 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 2016
spending 1973 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1973
spending 1974 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1974
spending 1975 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1975
spending 1976 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1976
spending 1977 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1977
spending 1978 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1978
spending 1980 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1980
spending 1982 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1982
spending 1983 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1983
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Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
spending 1984 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1984
spending 1985 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1985
spending 1986 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1986
spending 1987 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1987
spending 1988 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1988
spending 1989 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1989
spending 1990 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1990
spending 1991 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1991
spending 1993 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1993
spending 1994 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1994
spending 1996 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1996
spending 1998 Are we spending too much; too little; or about
the right amount of money on improving and
protecting the environment?
General Social Survey 1998
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Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
tradeoffs:
economy
2008; 2010;
2000; 2001;
2002; 2003;
2004; 2005;
2006; 2007;
2009; 2011;
2012; 2013;
2014; 2015
With which statement do you agree: Protec-
tion of the environment should be given pri-
ority; even at the risk of curbing economic
growth or economic growth should be given
priority; even if the environment suffers to
some extent?
CNN 2008, 2010b; Gallup 2000a, 2001,
2002a, 2003a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007,
2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015
tradeoffs:
economy
2003 With which statement do you agree: The high-
est priority should be given to protecting the
environment. Both the environment and the
economy are important but the environment
should be given priority; both the environment
and the economy are important but the econ-
omy shold be given priority; the highest pri-
ority should be given to ceconomic considera-
tions?
Knowledge Networks, MIT 2003
tradeoffs:
economy
1990; 1991;
1995; 1998;
1999; 2000;
1997; 1992
With which statement do you agree: Protec-
tion of the environment should be given pri-
ority; even if it means a loss of jobs in some
industries; or the availability of jobs should be
given priority; even if the environment suffers.
Gallup 1990, 1991, 1995, 1998a, 1999a,
2000b, 1997b, 1992, 1999b
tradeoffs:
economy
1992 Do you think the federal government’s cur-
rent regulations protecting the environment
will weaken; strengthen; or have no effect on
the economy?
Time Magazine and CNN 1992a
tradeoffs:
economy
2009 With which statement do you agree: Protec-
tion of the environment should be given pri-
ority; even at the risk of curbing economic
growth or economic growth should be given
priority; even if the environment suffers to
some extent? (extra answer choice)
Public Agenda Foundation 2009
tradeoffs:
economy
1992 Is it more important for the government to
push ahead with laws that protect the envi-
ronment even though some workers might lose
their jobs as a reslt; or protect some workers’
jobs even though the environment might be
harmed as a result?
Time Magazine and CNN 1992a
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Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
tradeoffs:
economy
2006 With which statement do you agree: Stricter
environmental laws and regulations cost too
many jobs and hurt the economy or stricter
environmental laws and regulations are worth
the cost.
Pew 2006a
tradeoffs:
economy
1992 Would you favor or oppose stricter air pollu-
tion laws even if some factories might have to
close?
CBS 1992b
tradeoffs:
economy
2001 Do you agree or disagree that we must protect
the environment even if it means paying higher
prices for electricity and gasoline?
CBS 2001a,c,b
tradeoffs:
economy
2000; 1990;
1993; 1996;
1997; 1992
Do you agree or disagree that we must protect
the environment even if it means jobs are lost
in your community?
CBS 2000, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1997,
1992a; New York Times 1996
tradeoffs:
economy
2006; 2007;
2008; 2010;
2012
Should we protect the environment even if it
costs some jobs or reduces our standard of liv-
ing or is protecting the environment not as im-
portant as maintaining jobs and our standard
of living?
Cooperative Congressional Election
Study 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012
tradeoffs:
economy
1993 Would you favor stronger federal government
measures to protect the environment; even if
some American workers might lose their jobs.
Time Magazine and CNN 1993
tradeoffs:
economy
2013 Do you favor or oppose tougher laws and reg-
ulations to protect the environment even if it
raises prices or costs jobs?
Public Religion Research Institute
2013
tradeoffs:
economy
1990 Do you agree or disagree that we must protect
the environment even if it means paying higher
prices for electricity and gasoline? (different
answer choices)
NBC 1990
tradeoffs:
economy
2008 With which do you agree: Protecting the en-
vironment should be a top priority even if it
means higher consumer prices. Protecting the
environment is important; but it is more im-
portant to keep the economy growing.
National Annenberg Election Survey
2008
tradeoffs:
economy
2009 Do you agree or disagree that protecting the
environment should be given priority; even if
it causes slower economic growth and some job
losses?
Pew 2009
tradeoffs:
economy
1990 Do you agree or disagree that we must pro-
tect the environment even if it means increased
government spending or higher taxes?
CBS 1990
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Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
tradeoffs:
economy
2007; 2009;
1992; 2015
Which is more important to you–stimulating
the economy or protecting the environment?
CBS 2007, 2009b,c,a, 1992b, 2015
tradeoffs:
energy
2001; 1977 Which do you think is more important–
producing energy; or protecting the environ-
ment?
CBS 2001d,j,f,i, 1977, 2001g,a,e,c,b,h
tradeoffs:
energy
2008; 2006 Which should be a more important priority for
this country: protecting the environment or
developing new sources of energy?
Pew 2008a,b, 2006b
tradeoffs:
energy
2008; 2006 Which should be a more important priority for
this country: protecting the environment or
developing new sources of energy?
Pew 2008a,b, 2006b
tradeoffs:
energy
2007; 2010;
2011
Which should be a more important priority for
the government: protecting the environment
or developing new sources of energy?
CBS 2007, 2010, 2011
tradeoffs:
energy
2010 Which of the following should be the more im-
portant priority for U.S. energy policy: deep-
ing energy prices low or protecting the envi-
ronment?
Pew 2010
tradeoffs:
energy
2007; 2001 Which should be a higher priority for the
government – increasing the production of
petroleum; coal and natural gas; or encour-
aging people to conserve energy?
CBS 2007, 2001f,g,a,c,b,h
tradeoffs:
energy
2008 Which is more important–finding new energy
sources; or improving energy conservation?
ABC News 2008
tradeoffs:
energy
2009; 2008;
2006
Which should be the more important priority
for US energy policy?...Expanding exploration;
mining and drilling and the construction of
new power plants; or more energy conserva-
tion and regulation on energy use and prices
Public Agenda Foundation 2009; Pew
2008a,b, 2006b, 2008c
tradeoffs:
energy
2001 Do you agree or disagree: we need to place
fewer regulations on the oil and gas companies
to make it easier for them to increase energy
production?
CBS 2001a,b
tradeoffs:
energy
1979; 1982 There is increasing talk about an energy cri-
sis...Are you more on the side of adequate en-
ergy or more on the side of protecting the en-
vironment?
Roper 1979, 1982
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Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
tradeoffs:
energy
2001; 2002;
2003; 2004;
2005; 2006;
2007; 2008;
2009; 2010;
2011; 2012;
2013; 2014;
2015
With which statement do you agree: Protec-
tion of the environment should be given prior-
ity; even at the risk of limiting the amount of
energy supplies – such as oil; gas and coal –
which the United States produces or develop-
ment of U.S. energy supplies – such as oil; gas
and coal – should be given priority; even if the
environment suffers to some extent?
Gallup 2001, 2002a, 2003a, 2004b,
2005, 2006, 2007, 2008b, 2009, 2010a,
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015
voting 2010 How important will the environment be to
your vote for Congress?
CNN 2010a; Gallup 2010b
voting 2010 How important will the environment and
global warming be to your vote for Congress?
Gallup 2010c
voting 2004; 2000;
2008; 2003
How important are the candidate’s positions
on the environment in influencing your vote
for President?
Gallup 2004a, 2000c, 2004c, 2008a,
2003c
voting 2008 How important will the environment and
global warming be to your vote for President?
Gallup 2008c
voting 2016; 2015;
2004
How important will the environment be to
your vote for President? (subset registered
voters)
Pew 2016, 2015; Princeton Survey Re-
search Associates, International 2004
voting 2000 How important will the environment be to
your vote for President? (additional answer
choice)
Gallup 2000b
voting 2003 Will the environment be the single most im-
portant issue to your vote for President?
ABC News 2003
voting 2003 How important will the environment be to
your vote for President?
Princeton Survey Research Associates,
International 2003
voting 2012; 2004;
2007; 2008
How important will the environment be in de-
ciding who to vote for this fall?
Pew 2012, 2004a, 2007b, 2004b, 2007a,
2008d
worry 2007 How would you characterize your overall level
of concern about the environment?
Cooperative Congressional Election
Study 2007
worry 1990 Do you think the world currently is facing an
environmental crisis?
Washington Post 1990
worry 2000; 2010 Do you agree or disagree: Many of the claims
about environmental threats are exaggerated.
General Social Survey 2000, 2010
worry 1990 Do you think your health is currently being
hurt by a lack of environmental quality?
Time Magazine and CNN 1990
worry 1993; 2000;
2010
Do you agree or disagree: There are more im-
portant things to do in life than protect the
environment.
General Social Survey 1993, 2000, 2010
A-10
Survey Questions A.1-1 Continued from previous page
Question
Cate-
gory
Years Question Sources
worry 2006; 2007 How important to you is protecting the envi-
ronment?
Cooperative Congressional Election
Study 2006, 2007
worry 1992 How serious a problem is pollution in the area
where you live?
CBS 1992b
worry 1992 Is pollution a serious problem that is getting
worse in the country?
CBS 1992b
worry 2000 How serious a problem is the environment? Gallup 2000a
worry 1995; 1990 Is protecting the environment one of the most
important problems facing the country?
Time Magazine and CNN 1995, 1990
worry 1992 How serious a problem is the risk that Amer-
ican workers might lose their jobs when envi-
ronmental regulations are enforced?
Time Magazine and CNN 1992a
worry 1994 Has pollution of the air and water gotten bet-
ter; worse; or stayed the same?
Time Magazine and CNN 1994
worry 2001; 2002;
2004; 2005;
2006; 2007;
2008; 2010;
2011; 2012;
2013; 2014;
2015
How much do you worry about the quality of
the environment
Gallup 2001, 2002a, 2004b, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008b, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015
worry 1984 How important are threats to the environ-
ment?
Gallup 1984
worry 1991; 1992;
1996
How much do you worry that pollution and
other environmental problems will get worse?
ABC News 1991, 1992; Washington
Post 1996
worry 1993; 1994;
2000; 2010
How much do you agree that we worry too
much about the future of the environment; and
not enough about prices and jobs today?
General Social Survey 1993, 1994,
2000, 2010
worry 1990; 2006 How serious a problem is pollution where you
live?
CBS 1990; Pew 2006a
worry 1990 How serious a problem is pollution in the coun-
try as a whole?
CBS 1990
worry 1993; 1994;
2000; 2010
How much do you agree or disagree that people
worry too much about human progress harm-
ing the environment?
General Social Survey 1993, 1994,
2000, 2010
worry 1990 How serious a national security threat are envi-
ronmental problems like air pollution and wa-
ter contamination in the next 5 years?
Market Strategies, Inc. Americans
Talk Security Project 1990
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A.2 Validation and Comparing Models
To assess the face validity of the estimates, I investigate their cross-sectional corre-
lations with the measures shown in Figure 2-4 and with a third metric that should
correlate strongly with public concern about the environment: vote share in presiden-
tial elections. Even if the estimates trend separately overall, the ordering of states in
the data should be strongly correlated between environmental concern and ideology,
climate concern, and presidential vote share, particularly in the latter part of the time
period when environmental regulation had become a highly polarized issue between
the two American political parties (Kim and Urpelainen, 2018; McCright et al., 2014;
Shipan and Lowry, 2001; Kim and Urpelainen, 2017; Lindaman and Haider-Markel,
2002). Table A.2-2 and Figures A.2-3 and A.2-2 show the cross-sectional correlations
between the state-year estimates of environmental concern presented in Section 2.5,
climate concern, ideology, and presidential vote share. The estimates are correlated
quite strongly with all three existing metrics, and the correlation with presidential
vote share and ideology increases substantially over time. This is consistent with
the finding that the parties have become more cleanly sorted ideologically over time.
Across the slate of political issues, the public is now better sorted into partisan camps
than it was prior to the mid-1990s.
One choice that the researcher must make in developing time-series model is
whether to include items that are only asked in a single year. Including these items in-
creases the sample used to estimate opinion, but it is difficult to estimate parameters
for these items. Including them seems to skew the estimated posterior distribution of
opinion for the years in which they are included. For this reason, Section 2.5 shows re-
sults estimated without single-year items. Here I present cross-sectional correlations
between models estimated with (Section A.2.2) and without (Section A.2.1) these
items.
A second choice the researcher must make is which demographic predictors to
include in the hierarchical model. I estimate models with only state-level intercepts;
with state-level intercepts and party as a grouping variable; and with state-level
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intercepts, party, and race as grouping variables. This Appendix includes tables and
figures showing the correlations between various versions of the model and ideology,
climate concern, and vote share. Table A.2-3 and Figure A.2-6 show that the model
estimated with party and race as grouping variables performs slightly worse in its
correlations with existing measures of public concern. For this reason, I focus on the
models without party and race as grouping variables in the panel models presented in
Section 2.5.3. I also present state-level estimates of party polarization for years with
relatively large sample sizes in Figure 2-5, to maximize accuracy and precision in the
figure and, thus, the reliability of conclusions drawn from it.
A.2.1 Models with a 2-year Time Filter for Item Inclusion
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Table A.2-2: Cross-sectional correlation between state-level environmental concern
and three existing measures of public opinion (no groups, 2-year time filter for item
inclusion)
correlations
year ideology climate voteshare
1973 -0.06
1977 0.62 0.41
1980 0.70 0.56
1985 0.69 0.50
1990 0.74 0.45
1991 0.72 0.44
1992 0.72 0.62
1993 0.66 0.63
1994 0.74 0.62
1996 0.75 0.75
1997 0.76 0.75
1998 0.78 0.76
2000 0.77 0.71 0.57
2001 0.77 0.81 0.59
2002 0.84 0.84 0.62
2003 0.80 0.90 0.62
2004 0.83 0.91 0.86
2005 0.83 0.90 0.87
2006 0.85 0.91 0.86
2007 0.82 0.91 0.86
2008 0.82 0.89 0.84
2009 0.85 0.89 0.85
2010 0.85 0.87 0.82
2011 0.83 0.88 0.83
2012 0.85 0.88 0.82
2013 0.84 0.90 0.83
2014 0.85 0.89 0.85
2015 0.90 0.86
2016 0.90 0.88
This table shows correlations between environmental concern and ideology, climate
concern, and vote share. The model is estimated with state-specific intercepts but
no pooling based on demographic predictors. Items only used in a single year are
dropped from the estimates.
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Figure A.2-1: Cross-sectional correlation between state-level environmental concern
and three existing measures of public opinion (no groups, 2-year item filter)
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This table shows correlations between environmental concern and ideology, climate
concern, and vote share. The model is estimated with state-specific intercepts but
no pooling based on demographic predictors. Items only used in a single year are
dropped from the estimates.
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Table A.2-3: Cross-sectional correlation between state-level environmental concern
and three existing measures of public opinion (estimated with race and party groups,
and 2-year item filter)
Correlations
year ideology climate voteshare
1973 -0.12
1977 0.57 0.30
1980 0.50 0.49
1985 0.32 0.13
1990 0.26 0.14
1991 0.33 0.26
1992 0.57 0.57
1993 0.14 0.20
1994 0.17 0.24
1996 0.77 0.81
1997 0.80 0.81
1998 0.72 0.82
2000 0.76 0.67 0.55
2001 0.71 0.70 0.48
2002 0.38 0.40 0.41
2003 0.35 0.37 0.24
2004 0.74 0.75 0.70
2005 0.47 0.37 0.43
2006 0.82 0.87 0.86
2007 0.73 0.84 0.81
2008 0.86 0.89 0.84
2009 0.81 0.80 0.81
2010 0.86 0.88 0.86
2011 0.42 0.44 0.42
2012 0.82 0.86 0.85
2013 0.44 0.38 0.33
2014 0.54 0.58 0.50
2015 0.58 0.60
2016 0.73 0.79
The table shows the cross-sectional correlations between annual levels of environmental concern and
ideology, climate concern, and Democratic presidential vote share. The model was estimated with
state, race, and party as individual-level grouping variables and post-stratified to the state-year level
for comparison with the other measures.
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Figure A.2-2: Cross-sectional correlation between state-level environmental concern
and three existing measures of public opinion (model estimated with race and party
groups and 2-year time filter)
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Model estimated with 2-year time filter and pooling by race and party.
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Figure A.2-3: Cross-sectional correlation between state-level environmental concern
and three existing measures of public opinion (estimated with parties but no race
groups, 2-year time filter)
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Model estimated with 2-year time filter and pooling by party but without race.
A-18
A.2.2 Models Without a Time Filter For Items’ Inclusion
Figure A.2-4 shows national-level polarization, estimated with a model that includes
single-year items and without race as a grouping variable. Overall, the results are
consistent with the filtered model, with one notable difference. The parties appear
more polarized in the early part of the time period for the model estimated with all
items. This is likely due to the greater precision of these estimates during the early
part of the time period, which stems from the larger samples used (Table 2.2).
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Figure A.2-4: Increasing polarization about environmental protection
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National polarization in environmental concern
The figure shows nationally aggregated environmental concern among Democrats, Republicans, and
Independents, since the late 1970s. These estimates reflect a model that incorporates single-year
items, in addition to those spanning two or more years as shown in Figure A.2-4.
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Figure A.2-5 shows trends in environmental concern, based on estimates that
include all items in the data rather than only those items asked in two or more
years. Figure A.2-5 is analogous to Figure 2-4 in Section 2.5, with the distinction
that Figure A.2-5 is based on estimates that include single-year items. While the
trends are broadly similar, the figure shows that the environmental concern index
dips to a more extreme low in the late-2000s, when estimated using all items. The
environmental concern index also diverges from ideology from the early 1990s through
2006 when estimated with all items. This divergence covers a shorter time span for
the estimates based on time-filtered items.
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Figure A.2-5: Trends in environmental concern, climate concern, and policy liberalism
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The figure shows trends in environmental concern, mass liberalism (Caughey et al., 2017), and
climate concern (Bergquist and Warshaw, 2018). These estimates reflect a model that incorporates
single-year items, in addition to those spanning two or more years as shown in Figure 2-4.
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Tables A.2-4 and A.2-5 and Figure A.2-6 show the correlations between a model
estimated without a time filter for items’ inclusion, and the three existing measures
of liberalism and environmental concern. The results for the state model (estimated
without parties) are quite similar in their variance with and without single-year items.
The results from the state-party model are more variable when estimated without a
time filter for items’ inclusion.
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Table A.2-4: Correlations between environmental concern and 3 measures of public
opinion for a model estimated without race or party as groups, and without filtering
items based on years of availability
correlations
year ideology climate vote share sample size
1973 0.67 5555
1977 0.66 0.43 5748
1980 0.74 0.56 9435
1985 0.74 0.56 8360
1990 0.77 0.48 6584
1991 0.74 0.48 2589
1992 0.74 0.63 8705
1993 0.75 0.63 4141
1994 0.77 0.63 4515
1996 0.79 0.76 6142
1997 0.79 0.76 3685
1998 0.80 0.76 6210
2000 0.81 0.70 0.64 29224
2001 0.80 0.76 0.64 10417
2002 0.85 0.81 0.65 5788
2003 0.81 0.84 0.65 4941
2004 0.88 0.87 0.85 9095
2005 0.86 0.87 0.88 970
2006 0.88 0.91 0.89 46262
2007 0.84 0.92 0.89 15254
2008 0.82 0.90 0.90 67824
2009 0.83 0.89 0.91 6562
2010 0.84 0.91 0.91 64117
2011 0.84 0.90 0.92 1747
2012 0.85 0.93 0.90 54363
2013 0.85 0.93 0.91 5085
2014 0.85 0.93 0.90 55505
2015 0.93 0.90 3374
2016 0.93 0.94 2440
This table shows the annual samples and correlations between a model estimated without any
demographic grouping variables, and using all items in the data rather than restricting the model to
using items that appear in at least two years. The table shows that the model performs quite well
when using all of the data.
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Figure A.2-6: Cross-sectional correlation between state-level environmental concern
and three existing measures of public opinion
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Table A.2-5: Correlations between environmental concern and 3 measures of public
opinion for a model estimated with race and party as groups and without filtering
items based on years of availability.
correlations
year ideology climate voteshare sample size
1973 0.56 5555
1977 0.65 0.66 5748
1980 0.60 0.53 9435
1985 0.38 0.14 8360
1990 0.27 0.37 6584
1991 -0.07 -0.08 2589
1992 0.52 0.48 8705
1993 0.13 0.07 4141
1994 0.06 0.06 4515
1996 0.64 0.58 6142
1997 0.76 0.66 3685
1998 0.48 0.56 6210
2000 0.74 0.62 0.52 29224
2001 0.68 0.68 0.48 10417
2002 0.43 0.42 0.44 5788
2003 0.47 0.47 0.25 4941
2004 0.70 0.71 0.63 9095
2005 0.38 0.30 0.36 970
2006 0.80 0.86 0.83 46262
2007 0.52 0.72 0.63 15254
2008 0.80 0.85 0.83 67824
2009 0.73 0.72 0.72 6562
2010 0.82 0.85 0.85 64117
2011 0.38 0.39 0.41 1747
2012 0.78 0.84 0.85 54363
2013 0.52 0.50 0.49 5085
2014 0.80 0.89 0.85 55505
2015 0.52 0.55 3374
2016 0.65 0.63 2440
This table shows the annual samples and correlations between a model estimated with race and
party as demographic grouping variables, and using all items in the data rather than restricting the
model to using items that appear in at least two years. The table shows that the model’s annual
variance is higher when using all of the data.
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Appendix B
Controlling the Regulators: How
Party Control of Government Shapes
Environmental Regulation in the 21st
Century
B.0.1 Robustness Checks for the Continuity Assumption: Large-
sample RDD for Gubernatorial Elections
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Figure B.0-1: Robustness Checks for the Continuity Assumption: RD for Guberna-
torial Elections
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The plot shows 95% confidence intervals for placebo tests of several predictors on placebo outcomes.
The estimates reveal no significant discontinuities in placebo outcomes at the treatment-assignment
threshold.
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Table B.0-1: Effect of current running variable on change in informal actions lagged
by one, two, and three years
Lag (years) Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
1 0.056 0.399 77 0.089
(-0.148, 0.37)
2 0.043 0.98 88 0.112
(-0.455, 0.467)
3 0.264 0.449 66 0.107
(-0.363, 0.82)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variable is the change in the residuals from a two-way fixed effect regression of the natural log of
annual actions on state and year fixed effects.
Table B.0-2: Effect of lagged running variable on informal actions (first year and
averaged across term)
Years since election Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Avg. (1-4) 0.002 0.883 80 0.13
(-0.521, 0.448)
Year 1 0.177 0.383 83 0.138
(-0.247, 0.643)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variable is the change in the residuals from a two-way fixed effect regression of the natural log of
annual actions on state and year fixed effects.
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Table B.0-3: Effect of lagged treatment (Republican victory) on informal actions (first
year and averaged across gubernatorial term)
Years since election:
Avg. (1-4) 1
Lagged treatment 0.011 0.052
(0.097) (0.100)
Constant 0.004 −0.022
(0.066) (0.068)
Observations 149 147
R2 0.0001 0.002
Adjusted R2 −0.007 −0.005
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The effects were estimated using OLS regression.
Table B.0-4: Effect of current running variable on lagged running variable and lagged
treatment
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Lagged vote margin -0.036 0.514 70 0.11
(-0.263, 0.131)
Lagged Republican victory -0.119 0.616 69 0.105
(-0.776, 0.46)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variables are the lagged running variable and lagged treatment.
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Table B.0-5: RD estimates of effect of current vote margin on legislative vote margin
or statehouse party majority
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Legislative vote margin (euclidean distance) -18.639 0.488 101 0.123
(-75.409, 35.973)
Republican statehouse majority -0.144 0.521 105 0.126
(-0.672, 0.34)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a
triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confi-
dence intervals. The outcome variables are the running variable that assigns treatment
and the treatment variablefor the state legislative analysis.
Table B.0-6: RD estimate of effect of gubernatorial vote margin on public environ-
mental concern
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Public environmental concern -0.164 0.324 111 0.126
(-0.627, 0.207)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variable is state-level environmental concern, estimated using an adaptation of the dynamic group-
level item-response theory model developed by Caughey and Warshaw (2015).
B.0.2 Robustness Checks for the Continuity Assumption: Leg-
islative Elections
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Figure B.0-2: Robustness Checks for the Continuity Assumption: RD for Legislative
Elections
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The plot shows 95% confidence intervals for placebo tests of several predictors on placebo outcomes.
The estimates reveal no significant discontinuities in placebo outcomes at the treatment-assignment
threshold.
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Table B.0-7: Effect of current running variable on lagged outcome
Lag (years) Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
1 -0.117 0.574 196 54.481
(-0.366, 0.203)
2 0.051 0.745 212 65.324
(-0.308, 0.43)
3 0.061 0.67 177 60.398
(-0.313, 0.487)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variable is the change in the residuals from a two-way fixed effect regression of the natural log of
annual actions on state and year fixed effects.
Table B.0-8: Effect of lagged running variable on current outcome variable (first year
and averaged across term)
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Avg. (1-2 or 1-4) -0.001 0.885 181 43.619
(-0.347, 0.299)
Year 1 0.041 0.742 213 66.942
(-0.254, 0.356)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variable is the change in the residuals from a two-way fixed effect regression of the natural log of
annual actions on state and year fixed effects.
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Table B.0-9: OLS Effect of lagged treatment (Republican majority/minority status)
on current outcome variable (first year and averaged across gubernatorial term)
Years since election
Avg. 1
Lagged Republican majority status −0.019 −0.041
(0.075) (0.077)
Constant 0.006 0.016
(0.055) (0.056)
Observations 288 286
R2 0.0002 0.001
Adjusted R2 −0.003 −0.003
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The effects were estimated using OLS regression.
Table B.0-10: RD estimates of effect of current running variable on lagged running
variable and lagged treatment
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Lagged distance to majority 13.161 0.159 171 40.403
(-5.972, 36.586)
Lagged Republican majority status 0.237 0.131 198 54.248
(-0.058, 0.449)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variables are the lagged running variable and lagged treatment.
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Table B.0-11: RD estimates of effect of current vote margin on gubernatorial vote
margin or party of governor
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Gubernatorial vote margin 0.053 0.743 122 65.893
(-0.186, 0.261)
Party of governor 0.264 0.186 117 60.286
(-0.121, 0.625)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variables are the vote margin and the treatment variable for the gubernatorial analysis.
Table B.0-12: RD estimates of effect of running variable on public environmental
concern
Outcome variable Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Environmental concern -0.078 0.18 253 72.306
(-0.196, 0.037)
The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The outcome
variable is state-level environmental concern, estimated using an adaptation of the dynamic group-
level item-response theory model developed by Caughey and Warshaw (2015).
B.0.3 Results
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Figure B.0-3: Point estimates and confidence intervals at various bandwidths
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The figure shows the point estimates and bias-corrected robust 95%confidence intervals for the large-
sample RD estimates of the influence of Republican governors and state legislatures on informal and
formal enforcement actions, respectively.
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B.0.4 Results: Governors
Figure B.0-4: Governors’ Influence Over Informal Enforcement
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The figure shows the RD effect that narrowly elected Republican governors have on the change in
annual informal enforcement actions taken during each year of their term, as compared with the
year of their election. The effect was estimated with the rdrobust (Calonico et al., 2015) R package,
using a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidth, and bias-corrected robust
confidence intervals. The hollow points reflect local averages for each bin in the data, and they are
sized the reflect the number of state-year observations in each bin. The dependent variables are the
residuals from two-way fixed-effects regressions of the logged change in annual enforcement actions
taken one, two, three, and four years after an election, and averaged across gubernatorial terms, on
state and year fixed effects.
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Table B.0-13: Results Derived from Residualized, Logged Count
Years After Election Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Total Actions
1 -0.566 0.009 87 0.094
(-1.131, -0.164)
2 -0.439 0.072 85 0.092
(-1.028, 0.045)
3 -0.458 0.083 83 0.098
(-1.091, 0.066)
4 -0.659 0.019 85 0.107
(-1.403, -0.123)
Avg. -0.538 0.012 87 0.094
(-1.079, -0.131)
Informal Actions
1 -0.747 0.005 80 0.087
(-1.475, -0.267)
2 -0.468 0.032 89 0.101
(-1.037, -0.045)
3 -0.302 0.226 86 0.113
(-1.032, 0.244)
4 -0.863 0.004 72 0.088
(-1.733, -0.334)
Avg. -0.636 0.003 81 0.087
(-1.23, -0.257)
Formal Actions
1 -0.162 0.535 107 0.141
(-0.756, 0.392)
2 -0.086 0.879 93 0.123
(-0.748, 0.639)
3 -0.486 0.165 85 0.118
(-1.285, 0.219)
4 -0.315 0.624 84 0.125
(-1.174, 0.705)
Avg. -0.3 0.297 101 0.129
(-0.897, 0.274)
Effect of Republican victory on annual enforcement actions, from 1-4 years after an election. The
effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The dependent
variable is the change in residuals from a fixed effects regression with state and year fixed effects on
the natural log of annual enforcement actions.
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Table B.0-14: Results Derived from Change in Logged Count of Enforcement Actions
Years After Election Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Total Actions
1 -0.575 0.007 91 0.096
(-1.128, -0.181)
2 -0.365 0.185 99 0.111
(-0.978, 0.189)
3 -0.328 0.455 102 0.119
(-1.295, 0.58)
4 -0.76 0.108 109 0.13
(-2.037, 0.201)
Avg. -0.653 0.003 96 0.1
(-1.183, -0.243)
Informal Actions
1 -0.715 0.006 81 0.088
(-1.419, -0.243)
2 -0.279 0.21 97 0.114
(-0.84, 0.185)
3 -0.106 0.705 107 0.136
(-1.113, 0.752)
4 -0.816 0.099 106 0.132
(-2.155, 0.184)
Avg. -0.698 0.002 89 0.094
(-1.302, -0.3)
Formal Actions
1 -0.195 0.459 104 0.132
(-0.798, 0.36)
2 -0.03 0.959 97 0.127
(-0.663, 0.699)
3 -0.223 0.717 92 0.122
(-1.269, 0.872)
4 -0.325 0.627 103 0.144
(-1.619, 0.975)
Avg. -0.367 0.171 107 0.139
(-0.996, 0.177)
Effect of Republican victory on the change in annual informal enforcement actions, from 1-4 years
after an election. The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using
a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals.
The dependent variable is the change in the natural log of annual actions.
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Figure B.0-5: RD Effect of Republican Control of Governorships on CAA Enforcement
Actions
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The plot shows 95% confidence intervals for the effect of Republican gubernatorial election victory on
enforcement activity. The models were estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015),
using a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidth, and robust confidence
intervals. The dependent variable is the change in the natural log of annual enforcement actions,
averaged across gubernatorial terms. The dependent variables are the residuals from two-way fixed-
effects regressions of the logged change in annual enforcement actions taken one, two, three, and
four years after an election, and averaged across gubernatorial terms, on state and year fixed effects.
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Table B.0-15: Point estimates and confidence intervals at various bandwidths
Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
-0.23 0.21 8 0.01
(-4.369, 0.96)
-0.33 0.659 15 0.02
(-1.124, 1.778)
-0.587 0.784 22 0.03
(-1.378, 1.04)
-0.603 0.371 36 0.04
(-1.511, 0.564)
-0.631 0.186 45 0.05
(-1.488, 0.29)
-0.641 0.125 60 0.06
(-1.342, 0.163)
-0.624 0.069 68 0.07
(-1.327, 0.05)
-0.63 0.061 77 0.08
(-1.241, 0.027)
-0.632 0.04 84 0.09
(-1.215, -0.028)
-0.598 0.016 90 0.1
(-1.255, -0.131)
-0.547 0.007 95 0.11
(-1.29, -0.21)
-0.514 0.005 98 0.12
(-1.275, -0.226)
-0.488 0.005 106 0.13
(-1.229, -0.221)
-0.46 0.005 110 0.14
(-1.2, -0.216)
-0.418 0.004 118 0.15
(-1.19, -0.228)
-0.373 0.004 125 0.16
(-1.167, -0.226)
-0.348 0.005 127 0.17
(-1.143, -0.207)
-0.32 0.005 134 0.18
(-1.118, -0.195)
-0.29 0.006 139 0.19
(-1.103, -0.189)
-0.265 0.006 145 0.2
(-1.076, -0.176)
The table shows RD estimates for the effect of Republican gubernatorial victories on informal en-
forcement, estimated using bandwidths from 0 to 0.2 of proportional vote margin. The dependent
variable is the change in logged count of annual actions taken during each year of a governor’s term.
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B.0.5 Randomization-Based Analysis of Gubernatorial Influ-
ence
Since gubernatorial elections only occur every four years, my analysis includes a small
number of elections and an even smaller number of close elections. As a robustness
check for the analysis of gubernatorial control, I complement the RD with random-
ization inference, a statistical technique designed for hypothesis testing with small
samples.
In the randomization-inference framework, the researcher tests the sharp null hy-
pothesis that there is no treatment effect for any unit. Under this sharp null, the
potential outcomes for all units are known, since the potential outcome for each unit
is the same under the observed randomization of treatment and any counterfactual
treatment assignment. Since all potential outcomes are known under the null hypoth-
esis, the researcher can derive the distribution of any test statistic and determine the
p-value and confidence interval for an observed test statistic based on this distribu-
tion. The distribution of test statistics thus provides a reference distribution through
which to determine the probability of observing the effect that was actually observed
(Rosenbaum, 2010, Ch. 2), and rejecting or failing to reject the null hypothesis.
To derive the distribution of the test statistic (in this, case, a t-test of difference
of means) and test the hypothesis, the researcher simulates all possible random as-
signments of treatment and determines the probability of observing the observed test
statistic, if the null hypothesis is true. Under the additional local stable unit treat-
ment value assumption, the test can be inverted to derive a confidence interval for
the size of the effect (Ho and Imai, 2006; Cattaneo et al., 2015; Rosenbaum, 2010). I
follow the approach developed by Cattaneo et al. (2015) for applying randomization
inference to calculate a p-value and confidence interval in a regression discontinuity
setup. I test the sharp null hypothesis that there is no effect on enforcement fol-
lowing the election of a Republican governor. Table B.0-16 and Figure B.0-8 reflect
the results and confidence intervals for this difference in means test, estimated using
the residualized and first-differenced dependent variable. Figure B.0-6 compares the
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estimates derived using randomization inference and the conventional large-sample
RD design. The stricter identification assumption required to apply randomization
inference narrows the bandwidth within which the analysis is conducted. This in-
creases the efficiency of the estimates, but also reduces their substantive magnitude.
Still, overall the results from randomization inference support the conclusions drawn
using the conventional RD.
Table B.0-16: P-values for Fisher’s Exact Test of Effect of Republican Gubernatorial
Control on CAA Enforcement
Outcome Variable Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Average
Total actions (residualized,
logged count)
0.0427 0.0977 0.1365 0.0706 0.0373
Total actions (logged count) 0.0421 0.1597 0.3923 0.19 0.0135
This table shows p-values for a difference of means test in a test of the sharp null hypothesis that
there is no difference in mean outcomes between Republican and Democratic-led environmental
agencies.
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Figure B.0-6: Randomization Inference and Large-Sample RD Estimates of Effect of
Republican Control of Governorships on CAA Enforcement Actions
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The plot shows the effect of Republican gubernatorial victories on CAA enforcement. The effect was
estimated with the rdlocrand (Cattaneo et al., 2018) (small sample) and rdrobust (Calonico et al.,
2015) (large sample) R packages. The large-sample model was estimated using a triangular-kernel
local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidth, and robust confidence intervals. The small-sample
confidence intervals correspond to a difference-in-means test. The dependent variable is the change
in the residuals from a linear regression of the natural log of annual enforcement actions, averaged
across the years of a governor’s term, on state and year fixed effects and an intercept term.
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Applying randomization inference in an RD design rests on the assumption of lo-
cal randomization of treatment, which is more stringent than the continuity assump-
tion (De la Cuesta and Imai, 2016). When elections are very close, assignment into
treatment (Republican victory) and control (Democratic victory) is quasi-random.
Quasi-random election outcomes approximates random assignment to treatment in
an experimental setting. Random assignment ensures that the distribution of poten-
tial outcomes is the same in treated and control groups. This balance assures the
researcher that the difference in average outcomes between the two groups is caused
by the treatment rather than systematic differences in background variables between
the two groups.
To test this assumption and select the bandwidth for the randomization-based
RD analysis, I use a procedure that is similar to the robustness checks used to exam-
ine the validity of the continuity assumption in large-sample RDs. I test for balance
in the same pre-treatment covariates and placebo outcomes used to test the conti-
nuity assumption in the large-sample RD models. I then select the largest window
within which I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in means in pretreat-
ment covariates and placebo outcomes between treatment and control groups. I use a
confidence level of 85% for this test, under the logic that the greater danger is in com-
mitting Type II error in bandwidth selection (Cattaneo et al., 2015). Failure to reject
the null hypothesis provides evidence that the local randomization assumption holds
within a given window around the treatment-assignment threshold. To avoid mis-
takenly conducting the analysis within a bandwidth where there is imbalance across
pretreatment covariates, I set a significance level that makes it more difficult to fail
to reject the null hypothesis (Cattaneo et al., 2015). Figure B.0-7 shows the p-values
associated with a series of difference-of-means tests for windows of varying widths
across the treatment-assignment thresholds, along with the bandwidths used for the
randomization-based RD. I use the widest bandwidth within which I can reasonably
rule out imbalance on all of the pretreatment covariates and placebo outcomes, with
𝛼 = 0.15.
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B.0.6 Bandwidth Selection for Randomization Inference
Figure B.0-7: Bandwidth Selection for Randomization Inference-based RD Analysis
of Effect of Republican Gubernatorial Control on CAA Enforcement
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The plot shows the minimum p-value for difference of means tests used to verify the local-
randomization assumption and choose a bandwidth for RD analysis using randomization inference.
The groups are defined by the treatment-assignment threshold (50% vote share), and each point
reflects the minimum p-value for a difference in means test between treated and control groups on
the same covariates used to test the validity of local randomization in the large-sample RD. These
are the previous election’s margin, the outcome variable lagged by one year, and the prior governor’s
party.
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Figure B.0-8: Randomization Inference: Effect of Republican Control of Governor-
ships on CAA Enforcement Actions
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The plot shows 95% confidence intervals for the difference of means in enforcement activity between
Republican and Democratic governors elected with +/- 5% vote margins. The confidence intervals
were calculated using the rdlocrand package (Cattaneo et al., 2018). The dependent variable is the
change in annual enforcement actions taken one, two, three, and four years after an election, and
averaged across gubernatorial terms.
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B.0.7 Results: State Legislatures
Figure B.0-9: Effect of Republican Control of Governorships on CAA Enforcement
Actions
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The plot shows the effect of Republican statehouse majorities on CAA enforcement. The effect was
estimated with the rdrobust (Calonico et al., 2015) R package, using a triangular-kernel local linear
estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidth, and robust confidence intervals. The estimate is significant at
the 90% confidence level.
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Table B.0-17: Results Derived from Residualized, Logged Count
Years after election Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Total Actions
1 -0.058 0.567 233 57.705
(-0.304, 0.167)
2 -0.088 0.544 203 46.758
(-0.391, 0.206)
(-0.456, 0.26)
Avg. -0.023 0.888 205 45.403
(-0.271, 0.235)
Informal Actions
1 0.019 0.935 211 50.181
(-0.351, 0.381)
2 0.013 0.992 215 51.442
(-0.445, 0.45)
Avg. 0.039 0.879 208 48.425
(-0.356, 0.416)
Formal Actions
1 -0.227 0.104 239 68.611
(-0.542, 0.051)
2 -0.224 0.101 226 60.731
(-0.543, 0.048)
Avg. -0.225 0.088 253 78.636
(-0.506, 0.035)
Effect of Republican victory on annual enforcement actions, from 1-2 years after an election, and
averaged across legislative sessions. The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico
et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust
confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the change in residuals from a fixed effects regression
with state and year fixed effects on the natural log of annual enforcement actions.
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Table B.0-18: Results Derived from Change in Logged Count of Enforcement Actions
Years after election Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
Total Actions
1 -0.047 0.626 233 58.724
(-0.294, 0.177)
2 -0.08 0.738 229 56.326
(-0.469, 0.332)
Avg. -0.012 0.94 211 48.243
(-0.257, 0.238)
Informal Actions
1 0.037 0.832 217 53.998
(-0.313, 0.389)
2 0.089 0.637 219 53.217
(-0.379, 0.62)
Avg. 0.054 0.783 213 49.929
(-0.323, 0.429)
Formal Actions
1 -0.222 0.131 245 74.521
(-0.54, 0.07)
2 -0.218 0.248 237 68.056
(-0.606, 0.157)
Avg. -0.239 0.083 252 76.653
(-0.537, 0.033)
Effect of Republican statehouse majority status on the change in annual informal enforcement ac-
tions, from 1-2 years after an election and averaged across the legislative term. The effect was
estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel local linear
estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the
change in the natural log of annual actions.
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Figure B.0-10: RD Effect of Republican Control of State Legislatures on CAA Puni-
tive Actions, Large-Sample RD
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Effect of Republican legislative victory on the change in annual enforcement actions, in the first
two years years after an election. The effect was estimated using the rdrobust package (Calonico
et al., 2015), using a triangular-kernel local linear estimator, MSE-optimal bandwidths, and robust
confidence intervals. The dependent variable is the change in residuals from a two-way fixed effect
regression of the natural log of annual actions on state and year fixed effects.
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Table B.0-19: Point estimates and confidence intervals at various bandwidths
Estimate Pr >⋃︀z⋃︀ Eff. N BW
-0.101 0.636 75 10
(-0.565, 0.345)
-0.19 0.583 124 20
(-0.582, 0.327)
-0.166 0.457 158 30
(-0.583, 0.262)
-0.18 0.442 189 40
(-0.549, 0.24)
-0.232 0.543 213 50
(-0.481, 0.253)
-0.255 0.39 230 60
(-0.49, 0.191)
-0.243 0.198 243 70
(-0.537, 0.111)
-0.222 0.097 255 80
(-0.574, 0.047)
-0.194 0.054 267 90
(-0.589, 0.006)
-0.175 0.053 278 100
(-0.572, 0.003)
-0.168 0.072 286 110
(-0.539, 0.024)
-0.163 0.088 291 120
(-0.519, 0.036)
-0.161 0.1 294 130
(-0.503, 0.044)
-0.162 0.12 299 140
(-0.482, 0.055)
-0.163 0.137 303 150
(-0.466, 0.064)
-0.158 0.131 305 160
(-0.462, 0.06)
-0.156 0.144 307 170
(-0.452, 0.066)
-0.155 0.153 308 180
(-0.446, 0.07)
-0.155 0.157 309 190
(-0.44, 0.071)
-0.155 0.164 313 200
(-0.429, 0.073)
The table shows RD estimates for the effect of Republican state legislative majorities on formal
enforcement, estimated using bandwidths from 0 to 20% of the range of the running variable. The
dependent variable is the change in residualized, logged count of annual actions taken during each
year of a legislative term.
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Table B.0-20: Sense of Place, Interpretation of Impacts, and Evaluation of the
Projects
Sense of Place / Scale of
Place Attachment
Anchor Perceived Impact and Objectified
Value
Evaluation
Economic Identities
Local, national, progress and
modernity
aging power lines benefit, need: upgrade grid opportunity
local electrification
HVDC power lines in NY safety: low safety risk
Industry and commerce,
trajectory of decline and
recovery
manufacturing jobs benefit: future jobs,
manufacturing recovery
opportunity
Agriculture, trajectory of
decline and recovery
land prices, crop prices, 1980s
farm crisis
benefit: compensation payments
as land “rents”
opportunity
National, agriculture electricity provision, food
provision
service: grid expansion opportunity
Local, agriculture local distribution lines need: local electricity threat
Agriculture, trajectory of
hard-fought progress
“traveling circus” of construction
jobs
(non) benefit: non-local,
temporary jobs threat
power poles obstructing fields cost, distributive justice:
inconvenience to farmers, lost
value of farmland
Agriculture, energy
oil and gas extraction benefit, need: expanded oil and
gas development opportunity
oil and gas well site training
programs
benefit: pipeline construction jobs
negotiation with developers benefit: generous compensation
to landowners
Local, state, national, energy oil and gas extraction security: independence from
foreign oil and gas
opportunity
Community aesthetics
Suburbs, nature, home
pipeline construction process cost: damaged natural areas
threat
property devaluation community cost: tax revenuesdecline
individual cost: property values
decline
Rural-industrial power lines, substation, pipelines
(non) cost: no decline in property
values opportunity
benefit: tax revenues increase
benefit: cut property tax rates
This table shows the symbolic meanings and anchors through which respondents perceive project
impacts and evaluate them as threats or opportunities.
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Table B.0-21: Scale of Place Attachments and Symbolic Meanings: Respondent Fre-
quencies
Code Pipeline Power Line
Oppose (%) Support (%) Oppose (%) Support (%)
Geographic scale
Global 0 40 0 11
Local 100 100 100 100
National 0 100 0 33
State/regional 25 100 50 67
Meaning
Autonomous NA NA 25 0
History 33 80 25 56
Home 67 40 50 33
Nature 67 40 38 11
Producer 33 100 100 89
Agriculture 33 80 100 56
Commerce/industry 0 80 13 67
Energy 0 100 38 22
Progress/modernity 0 100 0 44
Resilient NA NA 25 11
Rural-industrial 0 80 25 33
Service NA NA 0 33
Suburban 67 20 NA NA
Vulnerability 33 40 50 44
Poverty 33 40 25 11
This table shows the percentage of project supporters and opponents in each case site who express
each symbolic meaning. Some meanings are not expressed by any respondents for one of the sites;
these are reflected as “NA” values.
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Table B.0-22: Scale of Place Attachments and Symbolic Meanings: Code Frequencies
Code Pipeline Power Line
Oppose (%) Support (%) Oppose (%) Support (%)
Geographic scale
National 0 21 0 22
Local 92 49 90 76
Global 0 4 0 4
State/regional 8 72 7 16
Meaning
Progress/modernity 0 31 0 18
Capitalist NA NA 0 3
History 5 13 8 11
Home 27 5 18 5
Law and order NA NA 0 2
Nature 23 3 11 2
Outdated NA NA 0 3
Producer 14 69 66 52
Agriculture 14 19 55 34
Commerce/industry 0 10 3 20
Energy 0 58 8 3
Autonomous NA NA 8 0
Resilient NA NA 8 2
Rural-industrial 0 21 5 8
Suburban 36 2 NA NA
Service NA NA 0 10
Steward NA NA 0 2
Underdog NA NA 3 0
Unified NA NA 5 0
Vulnerability 9 11 21 16
Poverty 9 8 5 2
This table shows the frequency with which we used each symbolic meaning code for each project,
and thus provides a sense of the frequency and intensity with which respondents identify various
meanings with their communities. Each cell reflects the percentage of total symbolic meaning code
applications that were applied to each code. “NA” values indicate that no respondents express a
particular geographic scale or symbolic meaning in the interviews.
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